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1 
Introduction 
 
  
 The explosion of reality-based entertainment within the last several decades 
suggests that the desire to know someone else’s “true story”—however inspiring, 
revolting or dull it may be—is as keen as ever. The realistic fictions that dominated the 
visual and literary cultures of late nineteenth century America proclaim a similar desire: 
novels and stories; photographs of all kinds; and early films all catered to an audience 
that seemed eager to know—or at least to see—what it might be like to be someone else. 
By the turn of the twentieth century, however, readers, spectators, authors and 
filmmakers were well aware that sight and knowledge were not the same thing, and the 
fictions that occupied them are trenchant commentaries on the richly varied consequences 
of knowing the difference.  
The relationship between the naturalist literature of the American 1890s and the 
era’s ever-evolving technologies of visual representation highlights the obsessions, 
threats and inescapable paradoxes associated with representing another person’s “true” 
story. My dissertation traces the vexing complexity of this relationship, emphasizing how 
the oddities and extremes of naturalist literature interrogate rather than imitate the kind of 
accuracy associated with photographic representation. The years between 1888 and 1900 
marked a high point for both naturalist literature and photographic technologies. Along 
with the publication of such “classic” naturalist texts like Stephen Crane’s Maggie: A 
Girl of the Streets (1893), Frank Norris’s McTeague (1899), and Theodore Dreiser’s
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Sister Carrie (1900), the introduction of flash technology (late 1880s); the invention of 
the instantaneous camera (1888); and the emergence of film (1894) greatly expanded the 
possibilities for who and what could be represented photographically. During these final 
two decades of the nineteenth century, the growing numbers of the urban poor—largely 
made up of immigrants and African-Americans—were eagerly observed and documented 
by photographers, film makers and naturalist writers alike. Both their shared subject 
matter and their claim to an accuracy grounded in exhaustive visual detail and an 
unflinching commitment to depict even the grittiest of realities led to frequent 
comparisons between naturalist literature and the era’s emerging photographic 
technologies: in contemporary reviews and the commentaries of the authors themselves, a 
distinctly “photographic” accuracy was repeatedly invoked1 as the standard by which 
naturalist literature was judged.  
 
Seeing The Story and Telling The Truth: Narrators, Photography and Film  
 My project argues that naturalist authors responded to the potential of 
photographic representation with far more complexity, skepticism and anxiety than we 
might guess from the now-familiar invocation of the photograph as the ideal model for 
the naturalist novel2. My first chapter suggests that the uncomfortable shifts between 
                                                 
1 As Miles Orvell notes in The Real Thing: Imitation and Authenticity in American Culture, 1888-
1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), both contemporary readers and naturalist 
authors themselves perceived an analogy between the photograph’s unique accuracy and the meticulous, 
lifelike details of the naturalist novel. Orvell cites contemporary reviews of Dreiser’s Sister Carrie that 
favorably compare the novel to photographic representations, praising its “photographic description” and 
its accuracy as “a photograph of life in a large city.” (125) Orvell also notes Frank Norris’s assessment of 
Stephen Crane’s Maggie as “scores and scores of tiny flashlight photographs, instantaneous, caught, as it 
were, on the run.” (126) and Harold Frederic’s comparison of Crane to “a Muybridge, with his 
instantaneous camera, show[ing] that the real motion is entirely different.” (127)   
2 For contemporary considerations of naturalism and photography, see Carol Schloss’s In Visible Light 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) and, more recently, Donald Pizer’s essay, “Naturalism and the 
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narrative intimacy and distance in Frank Norris’s McTeague mirror the promise and the 
threat offered by the kind of documentary photography epitomized in the work of the 
photographer-reformer Jacob Riis. The photographs and text of Riis’s widely published 
and popular photographic text How The Other Half Lives (1890) announced itself as a 
newly accurate and penetrating document of “real life” among the poorest of New York’s 
urban dwellers. Riis’s images of cramped, dark tenement interiors; hidden flophouses and 
basement bars—enabled largely through the newly available photographic flash 
technology—were a newly intimate and unsettling image of a population whose lives 
inspired a voracious curiosity among the middle and upper class readers of both the 
magazines that initially published Riis’s work and naturalist novels alike. By the end of 
McTeague, Norris’s hapless characters look very much like Riis’s subjects, but the 
narrator who tells their story ultimately shrinks from the kind of physical closeness with 
them that a mode of representation like Riis’s photographic practice would demand: the 
threat of becoming complicit in the reprehensible acts he witnesses, or worse, becoming 
indistinguishable from their perpetrators proves too great a risk for the reward of 
producing a representation as accurate as the documentary photograph.  
 Norris’s McTeague was subject to its fair share of criticism on the grounds of its 
lurid content, but in terms of its narrative engagement with the bodies and minds of its 
characters, it was hardly as sensational as it might have been. In my second chapter, I 
argue that the narrator of Stephen Crane’s novella The Monster (1899) confronts the 
possibilities of a story that elicits the kind of visceral thrills, flinches and shudders that 
Norris’s narrator implicitly rejects. Crane tells the story of a man made monstrous in both 
                                                                                                                                                 
Visual Arts” [463-482], in the Oxford Handbook of American Literary Naturalism (Newlin, Keith, ed. 
Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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body and mind with a voice pitched to evince both sensational thrills and an anxious wish 
for the kind of rational, knowing mediation of the naturalist narrator. During the 1890s, 
the practice of the moving picture lecturers who showed, told and otherwise mediated 
experience of early film
3
 epitomized the same sort of narrative balancing act between 
sensation and knowledge that Crane’s narrator performs. As a figure poised between the 
era’s didactic culture of genteel entertainments and an emerging culture of film that was 
frankly more interested in thrilling than in edifying its audience, the moving picture 
lecturer embodies precisely the kind of paradoxical mediation that makes the narrative of 
The Monster so difficult to interpret. Of all the stories and characters that populate 
Crane’s characteristically amoral fictional universe, those in The Monster are among the 
most resistant to satisfyingly ethical interpretations. My reading of The Monster suggests 
that what seems like the novella’s defiant amorality has more to do with its narrative than 
its subject matter: the novella’s frustrated explorations of a mediating practice that 
attempted to master both the bodies and the minds of its audience suggests that even the 
most powerful of mediators is too weak to channel the embodied and mental energies of a 
modern audience towards a reassuring moral resolution.  
 
Living The Story and Knowing The Truth: Embodied Seeing and the Naturalist 
Brute  
                                                 
 3 For more information on the contributions of moving picture lecturers to the early film experience, see 
 Niver, Kemp R., comp., and Bebe Bergsten, ed. Biograph Bulletins, 1896-1908 (Los Angeles: Locare 
 Research Group, 1971), and Charles Musser’s Edison Motion Pictures, 1890-1900, An Annotated 
 Filmography (New York: The Smithsonian Institutions Press, 1997). Biograph Bulletins provides many 
 detailed accounts from local and national newspapers of audience responses to films mediated by lecturers, 
 while Musser’s extensive catalog of Edison’s films provides the “scripts” intended to be read by a lecturer 
 that were included with some films.  
   
5 
  In my first two chapters, it is the narrators of naturalist novels who explore and 
challenge the kinds of representational possibilities afforded by photography and film: 
the narratives of McTeague and The Monster dwell on the promises and threats that new 
visual technologies represented for the kind of privileged, knowledgeable voices that tell 
naturalism’s stories. My last two chapters investigate the consequences of newly accurate 
visual technologies from a somewhat different perspective, namely, that of the 
purportedly inarticulate naturalist brute, that hapless subject unable to either know or tell 
the reality of his own story. Much as our own 21
st
 century stories are seen and told by 
photographic and video technologies that make it possible for nearly anyone to document 
a slice of real life—and what’s more, to make it instantly available to a worldwide 
audience—the emerging photographic and filmic technologies of the late nineteenth 
century made it possible for a greater and more diverse group of people to see something 
like a representation of their “real” lives—and even more significantly, to represent those 
lives for themselves.  
 The ethical, epistemological and aesthetic dilemmas associated with both our own 
and with the late nineteenth century’s cultural moments of heightened visibility are 
embedded in the narrative structures and defining preoccupations of turn-of-the-century 
literary naturalism. June Howard’s classic formulation of the naturalist text as a 
perceptive, articulate spectator’s vexed attempt to tell the story of an ill-fated, 
unselfconscious brute remains the most insightful articulation of naturalism’s 
predominating concern with the consequences and possibilities of a particular way of 
observing the lives of other people. In Howard’s formulation, the brute poses a persistent 
but largely inarticulate threat to the spectator-narrator’s position of distanced observation 
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and knowledge; in other words, the act of telling the brute’s story threatens the spectator 
with a speechless paralysis not much different from the brute’s inability to make sense of 
his environment.
4
  
 Howard’s emphasis on the anxiously symbiotic relationship between spectator 
and brute is vital to my project’s re-evaluation of the naturalist brute as the embodiment 
of a distinctly modern sort of narrative privilege.5 In Howard’s reading, the brute is an 
embodied, visceral re-imagining of social and political anxieties as a distinctly “natural” 
phenomenon, an attempt to “understand individual destiny in terms of biology, social 
problems in terms of the evolution of the species—in short, the historical as the natural.” 
[93] The concept of the “natural” to which Howard here refers imagines the body as an 
unruly force unto itself, distinctly opposed to a Cartesian ideal of rational, objective 
thought as a privileged means of understanding and managing the natural and social 
world. And while it’s true that naturalism’s brutes are most often marked by an extreme 
physicality and/or sensuality, I read this sensory vulnerability as a version of the period’s 
emerging notions of sensation and bodily experience as usable epistemological tools, 
equal to—or perhaps even greater than—rational, analytic thought.  
 The notion of the individual’s body as a volatile but powerful site of perception 
and knowledge was part of a broader intellectual interrogation of the kind of objective, 
rational observation that had long shaped the era’s scientific and aesthetic endeavors. In 
Techniques of the Observer, historian Jonathan Crary acknowledges this intellectual shift 
                                                 
4 For Howard’s complete elaboration of this concept, see Form and History in American Literary 
Naturalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), especially chapter 4: “Slumming in 
Determinism: Naturalism and the Spectator,” 104-141. 
5 In a recently published essay, “Sand In Your Mouth: Naturalism And Other Genres,” in the Oxford 
Handbook of American Literary Naturalism (92-103), Howard herself suggests that the uniquely naturalist 
vision of the brute is a reason for the genre’s ongoing relevance, stating that “it still seems to me that when 
novels concerned with causality and haunted by the problems of agency also mobilize the topos of the 
brute, foregrounding the category of naturalism becomes productive” (Howard 99).    
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as part of what he calls the late nineteenth century’s “generalized crisis in perception.” 
Crary locates the beginning of this crisis in the 1820s and 30s, when new technologies 
and physiological discoveries were making the notion of a uniform or objective 
relationship between observer and observed seem increasingly untenable. Crary argues 
that the concept of perception as a universal faculty that operated in a space cordoned off 
from external or internal forces was gradually replaced with a model of human perception 
as a function of an embodied, individualized observer, one whose perceptions were 
always influenced by an unpredictable set of subjective desires and physiological 
complexities. Along with an exhaustive consideration of the scientific and disciplinary 
implications of this new model of perception, Crary’s work also shows how the work of 
artists like Georges Seurat and Edouard Manet experimented with the possibilities it 
suggested. Michael Leja’s recent study of American art and skepticism argues that the 
kind of scientific and technological revisions that Crary traces underscored the era’s 
characteristic habit of “looking askance,” a profoundly skeptical habit of vision that 
recognized “the human eye” as a “dull tool” rather than a penetrating observer of 
profound truths. Through a consideration of both academic/ “high” art forms like the 
paintings of Thomas Eakins and more popular forms like tromp l’oeil and spirit 
photography, Leja illustrates a crisis of representation rooted in what seemed like an 
ever-widening gap between the visible and the knowable.  
The works of Crary and Leja6 are persuasive accounts of a broad cultural 
skepticism about the instability of vision and, on the other hand, of the growing sense of 
                                                 
6 Other works that read popular American art forms as part of a larger culture of “skeptical looking” include 
Jay Cook’s The Arts Of Deception: Playing With Fraud In The Age Of Barnum (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001) and Karen Halttunen’s Confidence Men and Painted Women: A Study Of Middle-
Class Culture In America, 1830-1870. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).  
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the body more generally as a powerful site of perception and knowledge. The naturalist 
text’s narrative anxiety about the potential of the brute as a powerful teller of his or her 
own story responds to both the representational crises that Crary and Leja identify and to 
more immediate concerns about how the period’s emerging visual technologies 
multiplied the possibilities for seeing and being seen in the urban world. Then as now, the 
most popular technologies of visual observation and entertainment were notable not only 
for the newly accurate or detailed images they produced, but also—and even more 
significantly—for the new practices of observation and spectatorship they enabled. 
Snapshot photography made it possible for middle and even working class Americans to 
record and document their own lives, just as the growing presence of early films as an 
affordable, ubiquitous form of entertainment in both urban centers and small towns made 
it possible for this same population to see their own lives enacted from a distance—and, 
through the interventions of the film lecturer, tailored specifically to their own local 
concerns. Simply put, these technologies gave more and more diverse (whether in terms 
of class, ethnicity or race) groups of Americans than ever before the power to tell their 
own stories. My project suggests that naturalism’s familiar trope of the brute is an index 
not only of broad cultural and social anxieties about the changes wrought by industrial 
capitalism, but also of the epistemological and ethical anxieties associated with the drive 
to show and tell the stories of an ever-more modern America.   
The novels featured in my final two chapters—Henry James’s What Maisie Knew 
(1897) and Kate Chopin’s The Awakening (1899)—are not widely understood as part of 
the naturalist canon. However, each features a protagonist who could easily pass for one 
of the genre’s ill-fated brutes, and each of these characters poses a distinct challenge to 
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the narrator’s privileged point of view that is reflected by the era’s emerging technologies 
of visual observation and entertainment. McTeague’s narrator leaves the final chapters of 
his characters’ stories in the keeping of precisely the sort of brutish characters whose 
stories threaten his distanced, narrative privilege: McTeague’s caged canary witnesses his 
final moments in Death Valley; and a group of little girls are the final witnesses of 
Trina’s battered body. In my third chapter, I suggest that these scenes gesture toward an 
anxiety about the potential of naturalism’s brutes to tell their own stories—an anxiety that 
I argue was also evinced by the rise of snapshot photography as a popular and affordable 
hobby. With the invention of Eastman Kodak’s instantaneous camera in 1888, 
photography became a practice available to virtually anyone. Not much money and 
virtually no knowledge of photography were required: as Eastman Kodak loudly 
proclaimed in their ubiquitous advertisements, all you had to do was press a button—they 
would do the rest. Snapshot cameras allowed almost anyone to document and claim a 
piece of reality without knowing much about it—a possibility that represented a pointed 
challenge to the kind of one-to-one correspondence between seeing and knowing that was 
foundational to the era’s cultures of both visual and literary realism. I argue that Henry 
James’s What Maisie Knew investigates the consequences of a brute’s discovery of her 
own story through a mode of observation much like that of snapshot photography. Like 
the “Kodak fiends” whose enthusiastically voyeuristic practice of photographing 
strangers was reviled in the popular press of the 1890s, the young Maisie sees far more 
than she knows. The sights that Maisie sees, however, ultimately becomes a kind of 
knowledge that exceeds the indexical accuracy that posed such a threat in McTeague: 
what Maisie learns through her Kodak mind affords her a power to control her own story 
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that far exceeds the limits of awareness and agency that define the sort of “brute” that 
Maisie’s guardians persistently mistake her for.  
 What Maisie Knew posits a potent epistemology that rejects naturalism’s 
assumption of an equivalent relationship between sight and knowledge. In my final 
chapter, I argue that, in The Awakening, Kate Chopin offers an even more radical revision 
of the notion that observation is the preeminent means of knowing another person’s 
reality. Edna Pontellier, marked as a brute by her sensory sensitivities; her sexual 
appetites; and her oddly passive way of apprehending her own life, is nevertheless the 
index of what emerges as a mode of narrative that finds accuracy not in the narrator’s 
objective descriptions or privileged knowledge, but rather in the embodied, subjective 
experience of individual subjects. The new “reality” that The Awakening’s narrative 
suggests is one that is heard rather than seen: the prominent soundscape of the novel—
one that is often closely linked to Edna and other brutes—conveys privileged narrative 
information that the novel’s narrator hears and imitates. I argue that The Awakening was 
Chopin’s response to precisely the sort of crisis in representation that Leja describes, one 
that frankly doubts the reliability of the visual as a viable means of knowledge 
production. The novel’s endorsement of sound as a mode of representation with superior 
access to a visceral, subjective ideal of “reality” is not unlike the role of sound in early 
film, in which the many and varied soundscapes—the interventions of local “sound men” 
that tailored film sound to local tastes and opinions; the ability of sound effects to 
transform the meaning of a film, and the irrepressible sounds of the audience itself—were 
soundtracks of a reality that exceeded the limits of the images playing on the screen.  
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Historical and Critical Context 
My project’s focus on the historical practices of observation and documentation 
places it in dialogue with literary criticism that reads realist and naturalist literature 
through the lens of historically specific cultural practices of image making and writing. 
As one of the first of such studies to consider the dilemma of representation—whether in 
terms of painting, photography or writing—as one of naturalism’s constitutive concerns, 
Walter Benn Michaels’s The Gold Standard and the Logic of Naturalism has been a key 
influence on my own work. Michaels argues convincingly for naturalism’s concern with 
a particular question of accuracy that was continually posed by both the era’s financial 
and cultural systems of representation, namely, which is more real, the thing itself or its 
representation? A monetary system based on the gold standard of the book’s title is the 
ultimate example of what Michaels calls the “double identities that seem, in naturalism, 
to be required if there are any identities at all,” but as Michaels shows, such identities 
also defined the terms of the era’s cultural debates about fictional realisms like tromp 
l’oeil painting, photography and writing itself. Michaels’s work focuses on the complex 
possibilities suggested by the representations themselves—paper money, a tromp l’oeil 
painting, or a photograph—and the cultural responses to such representations. Like 
Michaels, I read in naturalism an overweening concern with the problem of accurate 
representation; however, my project locates this concern in specific parallels between the 
narrative oddities of the naturalist text and the everyday acts of representation enabled 
and enacted by the era’s popular visual technologies. Miles Orvell’s consideration, in The 
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Real Thing: Imitation and Authenticity in American Culture, 1880-1940, of how the 
nineteenth century debate about photography’s contested status as an art form or as 
evidence of reality was reflected in the era’s realist literature has also provided a valuable 
historical framework for my own consideration of how questions of accuracy and truth 
are asked and answered by visual and literary representations.  
My project is also in dialogue with a recent strain of literary criticism that 
reevaluates and/or redefines naturalism’s generic commitments, particularly in terms of 
how the genre exceeds or otherwise challenges the most familiar and often derisive 
assumptions about what it is—identities that range, as Lisa Long has noted in a recent 
review of such works, from the “debauched heir of literary romanticism; the less radical 
cousin of European naturalism; or as is most often claimed, the pessimistic and 
overcompensating kid brother of the more respectable American realism.”7 One of the 
works in particular that Long considers, Jennifer Fleissner’s Women, Compulsion, 
Modernity: The Moment of American Naturalism, argues convincingly for the kind of 
expanded definition of naturalism that my own work suggests. In terms of her argument 
for how a psychoanalytically defined model of obsessive compulsive behavior structures 
the naturalist text, Fleissner’s work in particular has been a key influence on my own 
reading of the naturalist narrator as a force driven by latent, largely inarticulate and 
uncontrollable anxieties. The wide range of texts treated by the authors of Mary Papke’s 
2003 anthology, Twisted From the Ordinary, argues both for an expanded definition of 
the genre and for its continued usefulness as a lens through which to view historical and 
cultural phenomena that are not often regarded as central concerns of the genre. The very 
                                                 
7 Long, Lisa. “Genre Matters: Embodying American Literary Naturalism.” American Literary History 19.1 
(2007): 160-173. 
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recently published Oxford Companion to American Literary Naturalism makes a similar 
gesture, pointing to naturalism’s relevance to a broad range of topics with essays from 
renowned scholars in the field.  
 My own project urges us to take naturalism seriously, as an insightful and 
prescient commentator on a social world in which everything, it seems, can be made 
readily available for our viewing pleasure. The epistemological and ethical skepticism 
that I locate at the heart of the naturalist project insists on a genre far more modern than 
any of its more familiar redefinitions—as a dead end of realism, for example, or a stop on 
the way to modernism—might suggest. At the very least, my reading of naturalism 
reminds us of the profound and uncanny strangeness—however “normal” it might come 
to seem—of watching the lives of others unfold from a distance. 
 14 
Chapter 1 
 
The Threat of Accuracy: Photographic Narratives in Frank Norris’s McTeague 
 
 Frank Norris’s McTeague is a novel full of stories, told by narrators with 
dangerously intimate relationships to the stories they tell. The dentist McTeague’s foray 
into bourgeois respectability is hardly the only plot that occupies the novel’s observant 
narrator; and this narrator is hardly the only storyteller who contributes to what the novel 
imagines about the possibilities and limitations of narrative representation. Most critics 
read McTeague’s subplots as variations on one or more of the novel’s predominant 
themes: Miss Baker and Old Grannis as satiric caricatures of the impossibly ideal 
bourgeois household; Zerkow the junk dealer and Maria Macapa as cruder, more 
exaggerated versions of Trina and McTeague, the novel’s primary victims of their own 
unmanageable desires. But in the case of Maria and Zerkow, the act of narrative itself 
becomes—quite literally—a matter of life and death. McTeague’s Maria/Zerkow subplot 
speaks most directly to the novel’s larger concerns with the narrative risks that 
representing experience accurately entails. During the last two decades of the nineteenth 
century, photography offered what looked like an indisputable answer to questions about 
the truth and accuracy of the period’s proliferating representations of urban experience. 
It’s hardly surprising, then, that Norris uses a photographic model to explore the meaning 
and implications of narrative accuracy in his “story of San Francisco.” The Maria/Zerkow 
subplot tests the possibilities of a particular kind of accuracy for narrative
 15 
representation—an indexical accuracy that reaches beyond the mimetic faithfulness to 
surface detail that is usually invoked as naturalism’s most “photographic” quality. 
 The standard of photographic accuracy that the Maria/Zerkow subplot evokes is a 
standard derived from the photograph’s ontological condition: no photograph can exist 
without the camera and photographer having shared, at some point, a moment of time and 
space with the object or person it pictures. Like a footprint or a shadow, the photograph 
indexes the material existence of the person or object it represents. Throughout the novel, 
Maria’s story of the gold plate—and later, her story of the abuse that she endures—are 
figured as narrative representations with a legitimate claim to this kind of indexical 
accuracy. Zerkow and McTeague’s narrator perceive Maria and her story as accurate, 
authoritative evidence of lived experience; in much the same way that many during the 
1880s and 90s perceived the first photographically illustrated narratives of urban life as 
newly accurate representations of what often seemed like an increasingly unknowable 
and illegible city.  
 Maria Macapa, who could easily be read as a fictional version of a real-life 
subject described by such narratives, tells a story that is as accurate and powerful as these 
narratives themselves—without the help of any photographic evidence at all. The 
accuracy of Maria’s story breeds the peculiar intimacies that she shares with Zerkow and 
Trina—intimacies that imagine Maria’s body as the indexical link to her story’s accuracy. 
Zerkow’s desire for Maria springs from his conviction that she has seen and touched the 
magnificent gold plate she describes, and Trina’s friendship with Maria is grounded in 
the physical evidence that both women exhibit to prove the stories of their husbands’ 
abuses. Fascinated by—and envious of—the kind of accuracy that Maria seems able to 
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produce, McTeague’s narrator is compelled to share the intimate spaces and emotions 
that Maria shares with Zerkow and Trina, moving through the fictional spaces of the 
novel as an embodied, material presence. The narrator’s telling of Maria’s story is 
marked by the evidence of both his shared intimacies with Maria, Zerkow and Trina; and 
by his abrupt attempts to withdraw from such intimacies. In the chapter that follows, I 
read the narrator’s shifts from intimate to distant modes of narration as a recognition of 
the risks and consequences that any narrator faces as part of an effort to tell an 
indexically accurate story. These shifts register the psychological risks associated with 
telling a “real-life” story about violence and murder, and the sudden narrative 
withdrawals from McTeague’s doomed characters are anxious attempts to mitigate such 
risks. The narrator’s embodied presence at the scene of several of the subplot’s violent 
conclusions interrogates the ethical implications of indexical accuracy, but it also 
questions the value of such accuracy as a “true” way to represent any experience, 
particularly that of the working and lower classes in late nineteenth century urban 
America. 
 
Indexical Accuracy, 1887-1900: Photography, The Body and The City 
 The interrogation of indexical accuracy that surfaces in McTeague’s 
Maria/Zerkow subplot speaks to a set of cultural and intellectual anxieties about the 
nature of perception, accuracy and the human body—anxieties that frequently surfaced in 
and around the new uses of photography that were emerging in the final two decades of 
the nineteenth century. The period’s medical and social scientific investigations 
continually revealed new complexities about the nature of the human body and the 
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psyche, and the cultural and intellectual responses to such work were an uneasy mix of 
optimism and anxiety.8 Emerging scientific and pseudo-scientific concepts about the 
instability of perception, sensory trauma and nervous disorders
9
 pointed to a generalized 
anxiety about the human body’s potential to meet the challenges of living in an 
increasingly mechanized, highly stimulating urban environment.
10
 Photography occupies 
a paradoxical position vis-à-vis these anxieties: it was a technology that both exposed the 
limitations of the human body and offered itself as a way to make up for those 
                                                 
8 Jonathan Crary’s Suspensions of Perception: Attention, Spectacle and Modern Culture (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1999) defines the work of impressionist and post-impressionist painters Manet, Seurat and Cezanne 
as responses to the nineteenth century’s “generalized crisis in perception,” (2) a crisis that Crary identifies 
as a consequence of scientific discoveries about optics and perception that began at the start of the 
nineteenth century. Crary claims that “the scientific work of Hermann von Helmholtz, Gustav Fechner and 
many others” on optics and perception had, by the 1860s, “defined the contours of a general 
epistemological uncertainty in which perceptual experience had lost the primal guarantees that once upheld 
its privileged relation to the foundation of knowledge.” (12) See Crary’s earlier work, Techniques of the 
Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990) for details 
about the scientific and technological advances that he defines as the primary influences on the 
development of a modern concept of embodied observation.  
9 In Suspensions of Perception, Crary outlines the scientific research, during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, about the relationship between nervous disorders and perception, claiming that the majority of 
such investigations “on newly invented nervous disorders, whether hysteria, abulia, psychasthenia or 
neurasthenia, all described various weakenings and failures of the integrity of perception and its collapse 
into dissociated fragments.” (94) Social scientists, physicians and other observers writing at the close of the 
nineteenth century often emphasized the vulnerabilities of the human nervous system to sensory experience 
and emotional stress. For example, Georg Simmel’s 1903 sociological study, “The Metropolis and Mental 
Life,” describes the experience of living in the modern city as a series of sensory shocks that eventually 
exhaust the nervous system, producing the characteristically “blasé” attitude of the modern urban dweller. 
The idea of modern life as sensorially exhausting also figures prominently in the work of physicians and 
psychologists like George Beard, G. Stanley Hall and Herbert Spencer; and Max Nordau’s widely read 
study of the art and culture of the late nineteenth century, Degeneration, locates much of the pathology of 
so-called degenerate artists in their “abnormal” sensory and perceptive faculties. See: Georg Simmel, “The 
Metropolis and Mental Life,” in: On Individuality And Social Forms; Selected Writings. Levine, Donald N., 
ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971); Tom Lutz, American Nervousness, 1903: An Anecdotal 
History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); George Beard, American Nervousness, Its Causes And 
Consequences, A Supplement To Nervous Exhaustion (Neurasthenia). New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 
1881; Max Nordau, Degeneration. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1912.  
10 Many critics who theorize about the history and cultural formations of the late nineteenth century regard 
the traumatic physiological experience of managing the urban environment as a defining feature of modern 
life. Walter Benjamin has famously theorized the links between visual culture, capitalism, and the jarring 
sensory experience of everyday life in the late nineteenth century urban environment; more recently, Ben 
Singer’s study of early sensational cinema argues that the “blood-and-thunder” melodramas popular during 
the 1880s and 90s were responses to the often traumatic and almost always distracting experience of living 
in a highly stimulating urban environment. See: Walter Benjamin, On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” in: 
Illuminations. Arendt, Hannah, ed. & intro. and Harry Zohn, trans. (New York: Schocken Books, 1985); 
and Ben Singer, Melodrama and Modernity: Early Sensational Cinema And Its Contexts. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2001). 
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limitations. During the late 1880s and 1890s, the popular media’s most notable uses of 
photography emphasized the medium’s potential as a technological solution for the 
bodily anxieties of modern life, highlighting the ways in which photographs could 
expand the capacities of human perception and knowledge. By the turn of the century, 
photography was well-recognized as a useful tool for middle and upper class city 
dwellers seeking to see and understand what often seemed like an illegible and 
unknowable urban environment. Many of the photographically illustrated articles 
appearing in popular magazines, beginning in 1897 and continuing into the early 1900s, 
express this attitude. In his discussion of a series of articles published by Scribner’s 
between 1897 and 1903, Alan Trachtenberg shows how the photographic illustrations of 
dramatic urban sights like skyscrapers and teeming crowds emphasized photography’s 
role as a visual technology that could help the urban dweller adjust to and appreciate “the 
explosive transformation” of the modern urban environment, one that “made the city 
seem as threatening to tranquility and older perspectives as it was fascinating in its 
modernity.” Trachtenberg explains that articles portraying these new sights of the city as 
aesthetically pleasing encouraged the idea of the camera as one of the “delightful new 
mechanical instruments for seeing the city in unexpected ways;” while guidebook-style 
articles illustrated with old and new urban landmarks in a “city that no longer seemed 
self-evident…focused on the challenge not simply of getting around but of taking it all in, 
enjoying the spectacle—especially through the lens of a camera.” 11 
                                                 
11 Trachtenberg, Alan. Reading American Photographs: Images as History, Matthew Brady to Walker 
Evans (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), 185. For a detailed discussion of how photographs like those that 
illustrated the Scribner’s articles contributed to an ideal of urban life as “picturesque,” see Bramen, Carrie 
Terado, “The Urban Picturesque and the Spectacle of Americanization” American Quarterly 52.3 
(September 2000) and Hales, Peter, Silver Cities: The Photography of American Urbanization 1839-1915. 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984).  
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 Photography’s role as a viable tool for managing the visual and hermeneutic 
challenges of the city was enabled by the progress in photographic technology and 
printing techniques that occurred during the latter part of the nineteenth century.
12
 Two of 
the most important examples of such progress are the introduction of the half-tone 
engraving process in the 1880s and the introduction of flashlight powder in the late 
1880s. Both of these advances emphasized the photograph’s indexical accuracy, a feature 
that was crucial in making photographic illustrations into a newly powerful form of 
authoritative evidence for the narrative accounts that they accompanied. The 
development of the half-tone reproduction process made it possible to reproduce images 
of all kinds on the same page as a block of text, thereby making it possible for 
photographs to enter the realm of the popular press in greater numbers than ever before.
13
 
But as Neil Harris points out in his influential study of “the half-tone effect” in popular 
media, the half-tone process did more than increase the sheer number of photographs 
appearing in the newspapers and magazines. To readers in the 1890s, photographs 
reproduced using the half-tone engraving process looked more vivid, more intense—in 
short, more “real”—than any other form of illustration that had ever appeared in the 
popular media. Harris claims that the half-tone reproduction process “code[d] the original 
picture in a new way…the illusion of seeing an actual scene, or receiving an objective 
                                                 
12 Beaumont Newhall, in The History of Photography (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1982), 
provides a detailed discussion of many such technological advances that occurred from the 1870s until the 
turn of the century, including the developing of dry plates, roll film, and various improvements on the 
portability and usability of cameras. See especially pgs. 117-139. And Neil Harris, in “Iconography and 
Intellectual History: The Half-Tone Effect” in John Highman and Paul Conkin, eds. New Directions in 
American Intellectual History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), points to the steady 
advance of photomechanical reproduction techniques throughout the nineteenth century that led up to the 
half-tone engraving process.   
13 Harris claims that the half-tone engraving process, “first appearing in the 1880s and early 90s…was 
firmly established as a major reproductive method for publishers of mass illustrated materials” by 1900 
(Harris 305).  
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record of such a scene, was immeasurably enhanced.”14 Such illusions produced a 
“deeper psychological satisfaction” in readers, which Harris offers as the reason for the 
half-tone’s eventual dominance of older forms of reproduced illustrations from the 
popular media.
15
  
 The emphasis in Harris’s descriptions of half-tone photographs on seeing “an 
actual scene, an objective record,” and “deeper psychological satisfaction” points toward 
a visual experience that derived its appeal from the photograph’s indexical accuracy.16 
One of the other major developments in photographic technology during the 1880s, the 
introduction of flashlight powder, emphasized the same photographic potential to 
produce indexical signs of the people and places it depicted. Although the first available 
kinds of flashlight powder were dangerous to use and imprecise, their enabling of 
photographs that imaged even the dimmest interior spaces changed the way the urban 
poor was represented in the popular media. In his study of urban photography during the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, historian Peter Hales emphasizes the importance of 
early flash technologies in making the often shocking images of life in the urban slums 
believable: 
                                                 
14 Harris 307.  
15 Harris ibid. Harris does note that older forms of illustration were still widely used throughout the 1890s 
and well into the 20th century. Recent works that emphasize the continuing significance of non-
photographic forms of illustration include: Rebecca Zurier, Picturing The City: Urban Vision And The 
Ashcan School (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006) and Joshua Brown, Beyond the Lines: 
Pictorial Reporting, Everyday Life, and The Crisis of Gilded Age America. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002).   
16 Harris’s description of the “half-tone effect” on photographs in particular is echoed by a number of 
photographic and media historians who regard the development of the half-tone reproduction process as a 
crucial moment in the history of both photography and journalism. Newhall notes that “when the feeling of 
presence and authenticity was needed, the mere reproduction of a photograph could carry a conviction 
unattainable by the wood engraving,” (Newhall 252) and Karen Roggenkamp, in Narrating the News: New 
Journalism and Literary Genre in Late Nineteenth-Century American Newspapers and Fiction (Kent: Kent 
State University Press, 2005), claims that “the added layer of authenticity” of photographic illustrations 
reproduced by the half-tone process contributed to an “unquestioning belief in the ‘infallibility and 
objectivity’ of news delivered photographically.” 125.  
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Sometimes the truths they wished to tell were too shocking, too unexpected to be 
accepted without question; then phrases like “as illuminated by the truth of the 
magnesium lamp” or simply “taken from the camera’s eye” reasserted the factual 
authority of the image.
17
  
 
As Hales emphasizes, journalist and social reformer Jacob Riis was among the first city 
reporters to take advantage of flashlight powder’s ability to “illuminate the truth” of life 
in the urban slums.
18
 The years during which Riis was actively documenting the lives of 
slum dwellers on the Lower East Side coincided with both the development of flashlight 
powder and the first experiments with the half-tone reproduction process, and Riis 
eventually made use of both technologies to achieve the kind of indexical accuracy that 
he wanted to illustrate his work. The images that Riis could obtain with flash 
photography were like no other illustrations of the urban slums that were familiar during 
this period in history. What Riis called the “flashlight possibilities”19 of his photography 
were the possibilities of creating the kind of accurately powerful illustrations—the kind 
that went beyond mimetic faithfulness and attested to the real existence of the conditions 
they pictured. In his autobiography, Riis describes the motivation for his photographic 
practice as “…the wish [that] kept cropping up in me that there were some way of putting 
before the people what I saw there…A drawing might have done it, but it would not have 
been evidence of the kind I wanted.”20 Flashlight powder made it possible for Riis to 
obtain the kind of images he wanted, and eventually, the half-tone reproduction process 
made it possible for his images to reach a large audience in a newly vivid and accurate 
form. By the time Riis’s book-length study of the slums was ready for publication in 
                                                 
17 Hales 5.  
18 For a thorough discussion of Riis’s methods, including his pioneering—and often dangerous—use of 
flash powder, see Hales 163-217.  
19 Riis, quoted in Hales 171.  
20 Riis, quoted in Hales  169.  
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1890, Riis was insisting that his work be illustrated with half-tone reproductions of his 
original photographs, rather than with the inferior copies that had accompanied the first 
publications of his work.
21
 How The Other Half Lives was one of the first widely 
distributed books to use half-tone reproductions of photographs as illustrations.
22
 
 How The Other Half Lives garnered serious attention when it was published in 
1890, and both contemporary reviews of the work and later historical assessments 
suggest that the impact of the work was due in no small part to its photographic 
illustrations. Hales claims that “the photographs provided the real revolutionary impact” 
to the work, in part because such illustrations had been seen by very few readers.
23
 And 
as contemporary accounts of the reception of Riis’s work suggests, the photographic 
illustrations represented a newly powerful form of indexical accuracy that guaranteed the 
truth of what the photographs showed. Hales notes that contemporary reviews of Riis’s 
book-length account of life in the slums reserved their most detailed and careful 
comments for the photographs and illustrations, and points out that even when those 
critics “who didn’t directly address the photographs or point to them as the major 
arresting element of the book unconsciously adopted metaphors of light, sight, and vision 
to explain their fascination with the book.”24 
 My reading of Riis’s work vis-à-vis McTeague’s narrator is that of an impossible 
ideal, one that this narrator eventually recognizes as untenable for an observer who 
approaches his subjects through the interiority of language rather than from behind the 
                                                 
21 The first publications of Riis’s photographs by the popular press preceded the widespread adoption of the 
half-tone reproduction process, and thus the earliest reproductions of Riis’s photographs in 1888 and 1889 
in the New York Sun and Scribner’s, respectively, were wood engravings and line drawings copied from 
Riis’s original photographs. Newhall claims that the line drawing accompanying the New York Sun article 
were “not convincing.” (Newhall 133) 
22 Harris 314; Hales 179.  
23 Hales 179. 
24 Ibid.  
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camera’s protective apparatus. What Riis managed to achieve for his narratives through 
his photography was, according to Hales, “a means of hiding his hand, erasing his 
presence as authority, and transferring that authority to an apparently irrefutable medium 
of proof.”25 The narrator’s corporeal presence in McTeague is an attempt to transform his 
stories into just this sort of “irrefutable proof,” but as I will show, this attempt is 
inevitably frustrated by the narrator’s unwillingness to maintain the intimacies with his 
characters necessary for telling an indexically accurate story. Photographs like Riis’s 
offer the fantasy of a bodily presence that can easily be erased, a hand that can easily be 
hidden—but as McTeague’s narrator learns, such bodily erasures and concealments are 
far more difficult to enact than Riis’s photographs make them seem.  
 The stubborn bodily presence of McTeague’s narrator that frustrates his attempts 
to tell a photographic story reflects the vexed relationship of photography and the body 
that, along with the concept of photography as an ideal of authoritative accuracy, was 
also a part of the emerging visual culture of the 1880s and 1890s. The photographer’s 
body at the scene of the photograph guarantees the photograph’s indexical accuracy, but 
this same seeing body was also being marked as increasingly unreliable by much of the 
photographic experimentation and practice at the end of the nineteenth century. The 
results of Eadweard Muybridge’s experiments with stop-motion photography, published 
first in the Scientific American in 1878 and later, in 1887, as an eleven-volume set
26
, 
revealed facts about human and animal movement that were imperceptible to the naked 
eye, thereby revising ideas about both the reliability of human perception and the 
generally accepted facts about human movement. Beaumont Newhall claims that 
                                                 
25 Hales 193. 
26 Newhall 121.  
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Muybridge’s work “convincingly demonstrated…the inadequacy of human vision,” 
revealing the facts of human locomotion to a larger audience even than the first 
photographic investigations into human locomotion in the 1860s;
27
 and Jonathan Crary 
identifies Muybridge’s work as one of the most significant examples of a nineteenth 
century technology that participated in “a blunt dismantling of the apparent continuities 
of movement and time,” identifying his work as “one instance of a larger decoupling of 
empirical verisimilitude from a “reality effect.”28 
 Work like Muybridge’s was one of many examples of photography being used as 
a way to understand and document the facts of the human body. Such practices were 
quickly taken up by disciplinary organizations committed to the management and control 
of criminal bodies. Allan Sekula
29
 has convincingly argued for the significance of 
photography as part of the late nineteenth century’s methods of police work and 
investigation; although Sekula emphasizes that, by the end of the nineteenth century, 
photography lost some of its authority as a standard of identification, his work 
nevertheless references a moment when photography was part of a wider effort among 
social scientists, legal authorities and others to document the human body for disciplinary 
purposes. In his discussion of the first uses of photography for juridical purposes, Sekula 
identifies the photographic image as an evidentiary tool that works by silencing a certain 
kind of narrative. When confronted with the photographic “mug shot” of their criminal 
narrator, claims Sekula,  
the protean oral "texts" of the criminal and pauper yield to a "mute testimony" 
that "takes down" (that diminishes in credibility, that transcribes) and unmasks the 
                                                 
27 Newhall 117.  
28 Crary, Suspensions of Perception 140.  
29 Sekula, Alan, “The Body and the Archive” October 39 (Winter 1986) 3-64.  
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disguises, the alibis, the excuses and multiple biographies of those who find or 
place themselves on the wrong side of the law.
30
 
 
In Sekula’s formulation, the photograph’s mastery of the criminal’s body annihilates the 
collection of identities that he or she generates through narrative.  
 The kind of antagonisms between photography, the body and narrative invention 
that Sekula highlights also find expression in the embodied narrative practice of 
McTeague’s narrator. The model for this narrator’s storytelling practice may be grounded 
in the physical proximity required by a photographic practice like Riis’s, but the 
narrator’s abrupt rejections of these intimacies reflect the potentially unsettling 
relationships between photography and the body that are revealed by Muybridge’s 
experiments and photography’s juridical uses. The position of McTeague’s narrator 
within the text is closer to that of a photographer/observer than it is to the observed 
bodies of criminals or Muybridge’s subjects, but this position is not fully secured against 
the kinds of risks faced by the closely observed characters in the novel. Without the 
protection of the camera, the closeness required for indexical accuracy proves too 
dangerous for an observer whose materials are not photographic, but linguistic. The risks 
that the narrator perceives are sometimes psychic, sometimes physical—but they are 
activated by his sense of proximity or comparison of his body to those of the characters 
he describes.  
 The problem of the narrator’s body in McTeague reflects the maddening paradox 
of material presence that lies at the heart of photographic accuracy: the photograph is 
impossible without the invisible, intangible—but nevertheless haptic—exchanges 
between the photograph’s subject, rays of light, the camera’s lens and the photographer’s 
                                                 
30 Sekula 6.  
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eye; and the photograph produced is a material trace that simultaneously guarantees the 
past existence and the present absence of the body pictured. The narrator’s body 
expresses a similar material paradox, serving as both the key to the narrator’s attempt to 
make his own story indexically accurate and as a liability in that same attempt. Realizing 
that the psychic risks of bodily presence are too great, the narrator ultimately reneges on 
his attempt at indexical accuracy.
31
 The mute bodily presence that the narrator thinks is 
enough for accuracy always gives way to the deeper and more disturbing accuracy of 
language, which provokes the narrator’s abrupt withdrawals from the intimate spaces he 
shares with Maria, Zerkow and Trina. The free indirect discourse that the narrator uses in 
those moments that he eventually experiences as his riskiest narrative efforts expresses 
the inextricability of bodily and psychic risk: being physically close enough to the 
characters to be “inside” their heads seems to transform the narrator’s own thoughts into 
their thoughts, or, at the very least, to threaten his objectivity about the characters. The 
narrator never becomes an actor that the characters see, but he experiences himself as a 
potential actor in the scene—and it’s these experiences that unsettle him. The centrality 
of the narrator’s body for the photographic model that Norris deploys in the 
Maria/Zerkow subplot points to the text’s engagement with some of the period’s most 
basic questions of representation, truth and identity; namely, how can anyone who “sees 
                                                 
31 I would place this failed attempt at indexical accuracy among the numerous other “failures” of naturalist 
narrative that many critics contend are the genre’s most meaningful features—an example of the “disorder 
and dysfunction” that Naomi Schor, in Reading In Detail (New York: Routledge, 1989) claims we must 
understand in order to apprehend the naturalist text (Schor 113). Lee Clark Mitchell, in Determined 
Fictions (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), considers what is often described as naturalism’s 
“irritating” narrative style—its repetitions, its purple prose and overused clichés—a style that is often 
offered as a reason for naturalism’s aesthetic failure—as the most important sign of the genre’s 
preoccupation with determinism as a threatening social and psychological possibility (ix-xi). And Michael 
Davitt Bell, in The Problem of American Realism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), points out 
that the kind of free indirect discourse in Dreiser that mimics the characters’ clichéd thoughts, etc. is a kind 
of failure of the naturalism’s generic attitude, claiming that this sort of language “—“collapse[s] the very 
distance on which the book’s apparently naturalistic narrative structure is based.” (Mitchell 160)  
 27 
without touching” do so in a way that avoids both culpability and the possibility of 
becoming a victim of the same forces that menace people being observed; and, is a 
representation that entails such risks even “truthful” or powerful enough to make these 
risks worthwhile?    
 Criticism that explores the relationship between naturalism and photography has 
generally been limited to observations about each medium’s propensity for capturing 
superficial details and overall investment in mimetic accuracy. There are, however, 
several important critical precedents for my own reading of a relationship between 
naturalism and photography that is founded on something other than a faculty for 
mimetic accuracy. For Walter Benn Michaels, it is the photograph’s potential to represent 
a certain kind of “inaccuracy” that aligns the photographic act—and indeed, the act of 
writing itself—with naturalism’s articulation of cultural standards patterned after a 
market economy driven by speculation and risk.
32
 Michaels locates the photographic 
preoccupations of naturalism’s narratives in the charm of this risk, and the potential it 
offers for attaining personal freedom and creativity through the act of representation. For 
Michaels, naturalism sees narrative as a mode of representation that—like photography—
is rich with the potential for a kind of accident and spontaneity that brings with it real 
creativity and freedom.  
 As a reading of naturalism’s relationship to photography that moves beyond 
considerations of mimetic detail, Michaels’s analysis is an important precedent for my 
own claims about the photographic model of narrative enacted in McTeague’s 
                                                 
32 See Michaels, Walter Benn, The Gold Standard and The Logic of Naturalism (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1987), chapter 7, “Action and Accident: Photography and Writing,” 217-244.  
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Maria/Zerkow subplot.
33
 But while Michaels reads photography as a representational 
mode that encourages the gaps between what the operator intends to show, the subject 
pictured, and the image that is actually produced, I am suggesting that, in McTeague, the 
idea of photography is characterized by the inescapable certainties that bind 
photographer, subject and image together. In McTeague, photography does not so much 
represent a standard of spontaneous action as it does a standard of indexical accuracy—
one that the narrator ultimately rejects as too dangerous. In my reading of the 
Maria/Zerkow subplot, the risks of telling a story that is as accurate as a photograph are 
framed in terms of the psychic and emotional dangers that the narrator comes to 
recognize and fear—not, as is the case with Michaels’s reading, in terms of what 
opportunities for creative freedom or spontaneity photographic representation offers.  
 The unpredictability of what the photograph will show is, for Michaels, what 
makes this kind of spontaneity possible: the links between naturalism and photography 
are still ultimately about what the photograph pictures. I argue that the psychological 
risks that McTeague’s narrator senses as part of his narrative project are not about what 
his narrative might or might not show, but are rather about the kind of dangerous 
presence that the photographic act requires. Paul Young, in his recent work on the 
relationship between McTeague and the kinetoscope, also argues that the narrative style 
of McTeague is shaped by the narrator’s anxieties about engaging with an emerging form 
of visual representation, and, like myself, Young emphasizes problems of intimacy and 
                                                 
33 A number of other critics have explored the connection between naturalism and the late 19th century’s 
proliferating modes of visual representations and entertainment. See Orvell’s discussion of Crane, James, 
Dreiser, Norris and others as part of an emerging “culture of imitation” that included visual modes of 
reproduction, display and advertising; Don Graham’s study, in The Fiction of Frank Norris: The Aesthetic 
Context (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1978) of Frank Norris’s “aesthetic documentation” (3) of 
visual works of art throughout his novels; and Bill Brown’s observations in The Material Unconscious: 
American Amusement, Stephen Crane and the Economies of Play (Cambridge: University of Harvard Press, 
1996) on the influence of photography and visual entertainments on the work of Stephen Crane. 
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embodiment as part of the narrator’s telling of the Maria/Zerkow subplot.34 For Young, it 
is not still photography but the kinetescope that “haunts”35 McTeague’s narrator as both 
an ideal form of accuracy and a certain kind of threat. This threat is not, however, one 
that menaces the narrator’s conscience or sanity, but rather one that menaces his cultural 
and social authority as a representative of Norris himself. Young claims that, for Norris, 
the kinetoscope was a visual entertainment that seemed to require an author-like figure to 
select and arrange a collection of snapshot-like scenes; however, the superior accuracy 
and objectivity of these scenes also threatened to obliterate any trace of this author-figure 
in the kinetoscope’s visual narratives. For Young, the problems of intimacy and 
embodiment are not between the narrator and the characters, but rather between the 
narrator as a surrogate for the author and his potential audience. The objectivity of the 
kinetescope’s images threatened what Young claims was, for Norris, the intimate 
“whispering distance”36 between author and reader that guaranteed the author’s 
authoritative presence within the text. Young reads embodiment as yet another threat to 
this authorial presence and authority, a sign of unruliness that he reads in the novel’s 
representation of the audience that responds to the vaudeville-style show that McTeague, 
Trina and her family attend. Young’s reading of McTeague as a novel that interrogates 
the possible relationships between narrative and a modern form of visual representation is 
an important precedent for my own argument, with respect both to McTeague and to my 
larger claims about naturalism’s generic engagement with the late nineteenth century’s 
changing visual cultures.  
                                                 
34 Young, Paul, “Telling Descriptions: Frank Norris’s Kinetoscopic Naturalism and the Future of the Novel, 
1899” Modernism/Modernity 14.4 (2007) 645-668.  
35 Young 645. 
36 Young 658. 
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 Young ultimately explains McTeague’s narrative anxieties as reflections of 
Norris’s authorial anxieties about the threat that modern visual entertainments posed to 
his cultural authority and position in the changing literary marketplace. My reading of 
photography in McTeague is not so much that of a visual form of representation that 
threatens literature’s entertainment value or its cultural authority, but rather as a practice 
that the novel imagines as a way for narrative to approach the problem of representing 
experiences of urban life that differed sharply from those of middle and upper class 
readers. The way McTeague’s narrator reacts to his own attempts to represent the 
experiences of Maria, Zerkow and Trina suggests that such attempts pose a threat to the 
integrity of the narrator’s psyche.  
 My focus on the way the Maria/Zerkow subplot calls attention to the risks of 
presence and involvement aligns my reading with June Howard’s identification of a 
particularly troubled form of observation as naturalism’s generative narrative force.37 But 
while for Howard, naturalism’s narrative form always includes some expression of the 
paralysis that prevents the novel’s spectator/narrator figures from becoming like the poor 
and working class figures they describe,
38
 I am interested in the way McTeague’s narrator 
willingly risks becoming like the characters he describes, at the level of his own narrative 
practice. My interest in the narrative exchanges between McTeague’s narrator and his 
subjects is, in part, an attempt to further explore what Howard calls the “alarming 
                                                 
37 According to Howard’s formulation in Form and History In American Literary Naturalism, naturalism’s 
plots are determined by a characteristic “gesture” by its spectators (either the narrator or a character whose 
perspective approximates that of the narrator/reader/author) of  “gathering…privileged readers (regardless 
of what their class position may empirically be) around him to stare anxiously at the specter of 
proletarianization.” (105) 
38 Howard defines the paralysis of naturalism’s spectators as a “radical disjuncture between action and 
understanding,” a condition that protects these figures from the deterministic forces that menace the other 
characters. Howard explains that “the insight and good intentions of the author and reader, or of a character 
who represents the author and reader, can be envisioned as affecting causal processes and determined 
events only through a vague, virtually magical process.” (Form and History 125) 
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precarious[ness]”39 of the spectator’s protected distance from the characters he describes. 
The intimate approaches of McTeague’s embodied narrator to Maria and Trina are 
moments when what Howard calls the “barrier that separates the classes and the two 
kinds of characters is pierced by proletarianization as well as observation, opening a 
scandalous possibility that threatens the very gesture of control the genre also implies”40 
[italics mine]. The narrator’s experience of intimate observation represents his willing 
traversal of the boundary that separates him from a character like Maria—a character 
who, unlike the inarticulate brutes that Howard describes
41
, seems uncannily able to tell 
just the kind of indexically accurate story that the narrator himself wants to tell.   
  
Seeing a Photograph, Hearing a Story: The Experience of Indexical Accuracy 
 McTeague’s Maria/Zerkow subplot introduces the idea of an indexically accurate 
narrative in its early descriptions of Maria Macapa and her oft-told tale of her family’s 
lost service of gold plate. For Zerkow, the gold-obsessed junk dealer at McTeague’s Polk 
St. flat, Maria’s story guarantees both the plate’s existence and Maria’s past proximity to 
it, and it is these indexical “facts” that provoke Zerkow’s obsession with both Maria 
herself and the plate. As a theory of photography that emphasizes the fact of indexicality 
as the essence of the photograph’s identity and power, Roland Barthes’s Camera Lucida 
offers a productive model for reading both the nature of Zerkow’s obsession and the 
broader implications that photographic indexicality has for the subplot as a whole. Maria 
                                                 
39 Howard 126. 
40 Ibid. 
41 For Howard, one of the defining characteristics of naturalism’s brutish characters is their inability to 
know or describe the subtleties of their own consciousness or experience. Such characters belong to 
naturalism’s “polarized category…of signs,” rather than the category of “sign-producers” that includes 
naturalism’s thoughtful, articulate spectator figures. (Form and History 105) 
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and Zerkow’s relationship and Barthes’ theory of photography are both inaugurated by 
confrontations with the fact of indexical accuracy, and both eventually meditate on the 
consequences of such accuracy. Zerkow’s response to Maria and her story regards the 
two—woman and story—as a representation both corporeal and narrative that certifies 
the existence of the gold plate: 
He was near someone who had possessed this wealth. He saw someone who had 
seen this pile of gold. He seemed near it; it was there, somewhere close by, under 
his eyes, under his fingers; it was red, gleaming, ponderous. He gazed about him 
wildly; nothing, nothing but the sordid junk shop and the rust-corroded tins. What 
exasperation, what positive misery, to be so near to it and yet to know that it was 
irrevocably, irretrievably lost!
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Zerkow believes that Maria has actually seen and touched the tantalizing object she 
describes, and his fascination with her and her story is founded upon this belief. In 
Camera Lucida, Barthes’ experiences a similarly embodied thrill of response to a 
photograph: 
One day, quite some time ago, I happened on a photograph of Napoleon’s 
youngest brother…and I realized then, with an amazement I have not been able to 
lessen since: ‘I am looking at eyes that looked at the Emperor.’43 
 
For Barthes, the photograph of Napoleon’s younger brother fascinates because of its 
connection to an actual moment and person who once existed in the material world. 
Barthes’ “amazement” is the experience of looking at eyes that looked (at the Emperor); 
Zerkow’s fascination with Maria and her story is the experience of seeing someone who 
has seen—and touched (the gold plate).  
 Zerkow’s belief that Maria has touched the gold plate is significant in that it 
recognizes Maria’s body as a necessary part of her representation of the gold plate. In the 
                                                 
42 Frank Norris, McTeague: A Story of San Francisco. Ed. Donald Pizer. (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1996), (30). All subsequent page number references will be noted within the text.   
43 Barthes, Roland. Camera Lucida. Trans. Richard Howard. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), 3.   
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Maria/Zerkow subplot, the indexical sign of the gold plate’s existence is both a narrative 
representation and an embodied person: like the photograph itself, which is at once both 
material object (paper and chemicals) and representation, Maria’s body and her story are 
inextricably fused to each other throughout the novel. As her story unfolds, Maria’s body 
is revealed as more and more flawed, and as such, less and less able to fulfill the promise 
of indexical accuracy that it seems to promise. The sexual relationship that develops out 
of Zerkow’s desire to “touch someone who had touched the gold plate” fails to quell his 
desire for the plate itself, just as it fails to produce any surviving progeny. These “bodily” 
failures evoke the agonizingly incomplete intimacies of sight and touch that Barthes 
associates with the experience of looking at a photograph. The photograph is, in Barthes’ 
explanation, “literally the emanation of the referent. From a real body, which was there, 
proceed radiations which ultimately touch me, who am here.”44 The photograph that 
“emanates” touches the past and the present, the “there” and the “here,” the “real body” 
that was photographed and the seeing, touching viewer of the photograph. But even 
though this viewer is “touched,” it is only ever by the “radiations” of the “real body” 
that’s pictured in the photograph—never by this body itself. The photograph comes close 
enough to the real thing to fascinate, but never close enough to satisfy. Zerkow’s 
experience of listening to Maria’s story is troubled by this same sense of incomplete 
intimacy. Being close to Maria brings Zerkow closer to the plate, but closer isn’t ever as 
close as he would like to be: the plate “seems,” but isn’t “near,” and Zerkow doesn’t so 
much see and touch it as he dimly perceives it, “under” his eyes and fingers, as if the 
plate were close enough to sense psychically but not close enough to touch physically.  
                                                 
44 Barthes 80.  
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 Zerkow’s certainty that the gold plate existed at some point in the past is strong 
enough to convince him, eventually, that the plate exists now, hidden away somewhere in 
the home he shares with Maria. Fascinated by Maria’s story and the effect it has on 
Zerkow, the narrator shares this certainty—up to a point. The narrator recognizes—
however dimly—Zerkow’s madness as a consequence of sinking too deeply into the 
paradox of the photograph’s particular kind of indexical accuracy, and his distance from 
Zerkow at the end of his life registers the narrator’s anxiety about maintaining his own 
sanity in the face of an indexically accurate story. The narrator’s behavior at the end of 
the Maria/Zerkow subplot suggests that indexical accuracy is dangerous, but Zerkow’s 
final appearance in the novel asks an even more pointed question about such accuracy, 
specifically, does the truth of indexical accuracy always guarantee that a story will be 
believed?  
 McTeague’s narrator seems just as fascinated as Zerkow is with the possibility 
that Maria’s story refers to an actual object; in other words, the narrator is fascinated with 
the possibility that the story was “made” in the same way that a photograph is made. The 
narrator’s musings on this possibility seem eventually to lead him to believe in the plate’s 
existence and even to empathize with Zerkow’s feelings about it. Despite how unlikely it 
might seem for Maria, now a poor “maid-of-all-work” at the Polk Street building, to have 
owned the resplendent service of solid gold that she describes, McTeague’s narrator 
provides several possible explanations:  
Were her parents at one time possessed of an incalculable fortune derived from 
some Central American coffee plantation, a fortune long since confiscated by 
armies of insurrectionists, or squandered in the support of revolutionary 
governments? It was not impossible. (30) 
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Maria’s “loss” of the story after the death of her infant provokes another of the narrator’s 
speculative musings about the truth of the story. “It was possible,” muses the narrator, 
“that the gold plate she had once remembered had had some foundation in fact, that her 
recital of its splendors has been truth, sound and sane.” (136) And although the narrator’s 
speculations about this possible connection initially seem more detached than Zerkow’s 
desperate and, eventually, violent insistence on the plate’s existence, the narrator’s 
attitude about the plate resembles Zerkow’s attitude more and more as the subplot draws 
to a close. In a scene that expresses Zerkow’s growing conviction that Maria is hiding the 
gold service, the narrator shares Zerkow’s thoughts and voice, asking whether  
…it stood to reason, didn’t it, that Maria could not have described it with such 
wonderful accuracy and such careful detail unless she had seen it recently—the 
day before, perhaps, or that very day, or that very hour, that very hour? (137) 
 
The narrator empathizes with Zerkow’s belief in the plate’s real existence and comes 
close to sharing his growing delusion that the plate is not only a real object, but also an 
object that Maria is deliberately hiding.  
 Zerkow is eventually unable to tolerate believing both that the plate exists and 
that it is not present, and his madness at the end of his life is a rejection of the reality that 
the plate is not, in fact, hidden somewhere in the Polk Street flat. And although the 
narrator seems to empathize with Zerkow’s feverish delusion that the plate exists 
“somewhere close by,” the narrator stops short of empathizing with Zerkow’s madness. 
The narrative revelation of Maria’s murder and Zerkow’s suicide is far more distanced 
than the narrator’s intimate descriptions of Zerkow’s thoughts and desires about the plate 
itself, as if, when confronted with Zerkow’s madness, the narrator suddenly tries to 
disavow the possibility that he, too, has believed in the truth of Maria’s story and has 
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been tortured by its absence. The narrator reveals Maria’s murder through an account of 
Trina’s discovery of her body, while the circumstances of Zerkow’s death are detailed by 
narrator’s remark that “Polk Street read of it in the morning papers.” (177) The narrator 
offers no definitive answer to the paper’s question of whether Zerkow “had drowned 
himself or fallen from one of the wharves,” (177) effectively denying whether, he, the 
narrator, has been close enough—either physically or emotionally—to Zerkow to know 
whether or not he intended to kill himself.  
 Yet even from his distanced position from Zerkow, the narrator cannot help but 
know what the rusty tin dishes mean to Zerkow, and knowing this means acknowledging 
the possibility of an accuracy more powerful than an accuracy certified by indexical 
presence. The newspaper’s description of Zerkow clutching a set of rusty tin dishes as he 
dies offers a coldly sardonic answer to both Zerkow’s and the narrator’s earnest belief in 
the real existence of the gold plate: dishes do, in fact, exist at the end of the 
Maria/Zerkow subplot, but not in their “correct” form. Clearly, the rusty tin dishes do not 
look like the gold plate that Maria has described, but they are nevertheless “accurate” in 
that Zerkow regards them as the “real body” represented by Maria’s story, the body that 
he could sense but never quite touch. For Zerkow, the rusty tin dishes have fulfilled the 
promise of tactile contact that Maria’s photographic story held out to him for so long. At 
the end of the Maria/Zerkow subplot, the accuracy that prevails is Zerkow’s deluded 
perception of the rusty tin dishes as the service of gold plate. 
 Zerkow’s insane misrecognition points to the risks associated with telling an 
indexically accurate story and questions whether or not the power of such a story is worth 
taking them. Zerkow shows his madness by becoming a particularly involved “narrator” 
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of the story of the gold plate: clutching the rusty tin dishes “acts out” the only indexical 
guarantee of the story’s truth that the novel provides. Zerkow’s death scene carries what 
Barthes describes as the photograph’s particular madness to an extreme conclusion. The 
photograph indexes both absence and presence simultaneously, an effect that Barthes 
describes as a “shared hallucination (one the one hand “it is not there,” on the other “but 
it has indeed been”): a mad image, chafed by reality.”45 Zerkow’s misrecognition of the 
rusty dishes as the gold plate is a refusal to accept the duality of his own particular 
“hallucination” of the gold plate.  
 The narrator’s withdrawal from his intimacy with Zerkow at this point in the 
novel throws the consequences of Zerkow’s final involvement with the story into sharp 
relief. When Zerkow becomes the kind of narrator who can claim that “his” story is 
indexically accurate, he goes mad. Telling about the incident after he reads about it in the 
newspapers may distance the narrator from his subject; it may even mean that he isn’t 
able to offer much insight or inside information about what happened—but the narrator’s 
recourse to the newspapers as a mediator between himself and Zerkow suggests an 
unwillingness to risk his own sanity to give his story the kind of immediacy and intimacy 
it would have if he had remained physically and emotionally close to Zerkow. The 
narrator’s shift from a perspective shared with Zerkow to one that he appropriates from 
the newspapers is a shift from a subjective to an (purportedly) objective—perhaps truer—
perspective. The narrator, in the face of what is so clearly a subjective and powerful form 
of accuracy, cedes his authority over Zerkow’s story to the newspapers.  
                                                 
45 Barthes 115. 
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 Norris’s introduction of the newspapers as a narrative authority in McTeague 
registers both his personal engagement with newspaper reportage as source material
46
 for 
the novel and, more generally, the new credibility and authority of newspapers that styled 
themselves as alternatives to the sensationalized “rags” that dominated the popular press 
in the 1880s and early 1890s. By transferring his narrative authority to the newspapers at 
the end of Zerkow’s story, McTeague’s narrator aligns his own narrative practice with 
what had become, by the time McTeague was published in 1899, print culture’s primary 
space of photographic production. Photography was crucial to the efforts of many 
newspapers committed to the newly emerging journalistic ideal of factual, objective 
reporting, and after 1897, the widespread use of the half-tone reproduction process 
quickly secured photography’s role as the dominant mode of illustration in the period’s 
major newspapers. The photograph’s ability to “prove” the existence of what it imaged 
made photography an ideal weapon in the reaction, which intensified throughout the 
1890s, against the fictionalized, exaggerated and sensational “news” stories that were 
alternatively known as “new” or “yellow” journalism. As Karen Roggenkamp claims in 
her history of nineteenth century journalism, for newspaper readers, photography 
“…functioned in some degree as a substitute for the more illustrative prose of new 
journalism.”47 The newspaper articles that Norris used as source material for McTeague 
appeared in William Randolph Hearst’s San Francisco Examiner, a newspaper well-
known for the kind of “illustrative prose” that photography eventually replaced. But the 
narrator’s description of the newspapers that report Zerkow’s death do not seem much 
                                                 
46 Donald Pizer, in The Novels of Frank Norris (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), states that 
“the initial inspiration for McTeague was probably a San Francisco murder in late 1893,” which was “fully 
reported in the San Francisco newspapers on October 10, 1893.” (52-63)  
47 Roggenkamp 125. 
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like the Examiner: rather than affirming the more sensational (but not provable) 
possibility that Zerkow has committed suicide, the newspaper reports only the available 
facts: that Zerkow’s body was found in the water by the wharves, clutching a set of rusty 
tin dishes. In 1893, when the Examiner articles were published, photographs were not yet 
widely used as illustrations in most newspapers. However, by the time McTeague was 
published in 1899, Norris—who worked as a reporter for the San Francisco Chronicle, 
the San Francisco Wave and McClure’s from 1895-1899—was certainly aware of the 
new possibilities for illustrating the news that the half-tone reproduction process had 
introduced. The nameless newspaper that Norris introduces at the end of the 
Maria/Zerkow subplot seems like the kind of newspaper that would use photographic 
evidence in lieu of sensationalized reporting. By having his narrator surrender authority 
to this kind of newspaper—rather than the kind that actually published the articles that 
inspired McTeague—Norris restyles his own sensational sources into the kind of 
objective, fact-based reportage that valued the indexical accuracy of the photograph over 
exaggerated prose.  
 
Taking A Photograph, Telling A Story: Maria And The Narrator Experiment With 
Indexical Accuracy 
 The narrator empathizes with Zerkow as he listens, spellbound, to Maria’s story: 
like Zerkow, McTeague’s narrator recognizes something uncannily accurate about 
Maria’s story. As the narrator observes a storyteller who seems unable to tell a story that 
is not indexically accurate, he finds it increasingly difficult to withdraw from what 
ultimately becomes an uncomfortably intimate relationship with Maria and Trina. The 
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narrator does much more than empathize with Maria and observe her narrative practice: 
he imitates it, and in doing so, finds himself complicit in the circumstances of Trina’s 
death.  
 Even when Maria “loses” her memory of the gold plate, she is still able to tell its 
story—and in fact, her transformed version of this story has an even stronger indexical 
connection to the material world than the original story of the gold plate has. The story of 
Zerkow’s abuse that Maria tells Trina carries the trace of her original story of the plate. 
The bruises that Maria sustains from this abuse index the power that the story still has 
over Zerkow: Maria no longer describes the gold plate’s splendor, but her body’s bruises 
still show the trace of her story. When she and Trina swap stories about their husbands’ 
abuses, their bruises act as evidence for their efforts to determine “whose husband was 
the most cruel.” (172) It would seem that the story of Maria’s abuse would be difficult 
not to believe—and yet the narrator, who initially seemed so certain of Maria’s narrative 
accuracy, doubts whether or not the story of her abuse is true. The narrator points out that 
Maria and Trina “exaggerate” and “invent details,” (172) and affects a sort of skepticism 
about Zerkow’s developing mania about the gold plate: “He [Zerkow] was becoming 
impatient, evidently,” (172) the narrator claims, as a way of introducing Maria’s 
subsequent description of Zerkow’s fits of fever and mania brought on by his futile 
attempts to find the gold plate. The narrator’s skeptical “evidently” suggests that he does 
not quite believe that Zerkow’s mania is a result of his impatience with Maria’s refusal to 
produce the plate, despite the fact that this is obviously the case.  
 The grisly evidence of Maria’s story of abuse unsettles the narrator and accounts 
for the distance he tries to put between himself and Maria and Trina when he describes 
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the two womens’ narrative exchange. His implication that the women are not telling the 
truth suggests a literal form of distance between himself and the women: if the narrator 
were physically close to Trina and Maria, then he, too, could see the severity of their 
bruises and know that they were not exaggerating their stories. To McTeague’s narrator, 
Maria’s bruises look like a particularly violent marker of what it means to tell an 
indexically accurate story. Not only do Maria’s bruises register the physical pain she 
suffers in order to “prove” her story, they also represent a severely limited version of her 
original story, that of the gold plate. The fact that the gold plate was never seen by any of 
the listeners to Maria’s story means that she could have said anything at all about it—she 
could have exaggerated its splendor, or downplayed it, and no one would have been able 
to contradict her with any certainty. The same cannot be said for the story of her abuse. 
The presence of her bruises makes it much harder for Maria to exaggerate the abuse she 
suffers from Zerkow, and even harder, if not impossible, to deny that the abuse has 
happened. The actual violence that Maria endures shares something with Barthes’ 
concept of a photographic violence: just as the photograph forcibly denies the truth of any 
other representation of its referent, Maria’s bruises limit the kind of story she can tell 
about their origin. For Maria, the presence required for her to tell an indexically accurate 
story is dangerous; not only that, the “proof” she gets by being there limits the kind of 
story she can tell.  
 The distance that the narrator puts between himself and Maria during this scene 
suggests his resistance to committing himself fully to the risky kind of presence that 
Maria’s indexical narrative practice requires. But the narrator is also unwilling to 
relinquish entirely the possibility of authenticating his own story with the kind of 
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indexical accuracy that Maria seems so able to attain. Despite what seems like the 
narrator’s physical and emotional distance from Maria and Trina in this scene, the 
narrator is paying close enough attention to their narrative exchange to appropriate a 
phrase that Maria uses in this dialogue. The narrator may not position himself close 
enough to see, but his later quotation of Maria’s advice to Trina to “hump your back, and 
it’s soonest over” suggests that he’s close enough to hear; and indeed, that he’s enthralled 
enough with Maria’s indexical narrative to attempt claiming it for himself.  
 The particular language that the narrator appropriates is telling, in terms of what it 
says about the consequences of telling an indexical story. The narrator chooses a phrase 
that foreshadows the circumstances of the novel’s most grisly conclusions, Trina’s 
murder. Trina’s intense struggle and prolonged death have an uncanny relationship to 
Maria’s advice: Trina does quite the opposite of “humping her back,” and her death is 
anything but quick. The narrator’s dehumanized description of Trina—as a “harassed 
cat;” a “piece of clockwork;” a “rubber ball”—as she dies suggests that the narrator sees 
himself as complicit in Trina’s death, because of his involvement with Trina’s story—his 
quotation of Maria’s phrase is the “evidence” of his presence at the scene of the women’s 
conversation about their husbands’ abuses—abuses which, after all, eventually escalate 
into murder.  
 The narrator’s quotation of Maria’s advice indexes his presence as a witness to 
the abuse the women suffer, but it also indexes (photographically) an intimacy that is—
much like the photographic referent—both present and absent in the representation. The 
narrator’s re-use of Maria’s advice comes just after Maria’s death, in the midst of a 
particularly intimate description of Trina’s thoughts:    
 43 
What odds was it if she was slatternly, dirty, coarse? Was there time to make 
herself look otherwise, and who was there to be pleased when she was all prinked 
out? Surely not a great brute of a husband who bit you like a dog, and kicked and 
pounded you as though you were made of iron. Ah, no, better let things go, and 
take it as easy as you could. Hump your back, and it was soonest over. (185) 
 
The narrator here seems to be speaking in Trina’s defensive voice, sharing in what 
sounds like a reply to a critique of Trina’s slatternly appearance. The narrator’s intimacy 
with Trina strengthens as he follows the progression of her thoughts, shifting into an even 
more personal mode of free indirect discourse. When Trina’s thoughts turn from the 
reasons why she neglects her appearance to her husband’s abuse, Trina is no longer “she” 
or “her,” but “you.” The rhetorical questions that the narrator asks about the futility of 
keeping up her appearance certainly seem as if they express Trina’s point of view, but 
they still maintain some distance from Trina by referring to her as “she.” But when the 
narrator “answers” these questions by referencing McTeague’s abuse, Trina becomes 
“you,” a narrative shift that suggest that the narrator is actually inside Trina’s head, that 
he is actually speaking in her voice. 
 The narrator’s subjective mode of description here gets more intense when the 
narrator describes Trina’s abuse—a situation that the narrator, at the last minute, hastily 
tries to remove himself from by speaking in Maria’s voice rather than in his own. 
Quoting Maria’s advice to Trina while he describes Trina’s thoughts puts the narrator in 
Maria’s place, so to speak, evoking the intimacy that the two women shared before 
Maria’s death. But this quotation is also a way for the narrator to distance himself from 
Trina at what seems like a climactic moment between Trina and the narrator: using 
Maria’s language is a way for the narrator to evoke intimacy without having to participate 
in it directly. The narrator’s quotation of Maria during a moment of intense intimacy with 
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Trina is his most extreme—and indeed, most successful—attempt to imitate the kind of 
indexical accuracy that he observes in Maria’s narrative practice. Quoting Maria directly 
is the closest the narrator can come to indexing his own presence at the scene of Maria’s 
and Trina’s conversation about their husbands’ abuses, but his quotation also can’t help 
but index Maria’s absence in the present moment of the narrator’s intimacy with Trina. It 
is here that the narrator’s story is at its most photographic: at the moment when, like the 
Barthesian photograph, it indexes both that Maria has been present at the scene and that 
she is no longer present “in the flesh.” Maria is clearly not there—the narrator replaces 
her as Trina’s advisor and confidant, but the narrator’s use of Maria’s words are evidence 
that Maria has, indeed, been. 
 The narrator’s attempt to withdraw from Trina in the above scene comes at the 
culmination of an intimacy with her that derives from his presence in Trina’s own home. 
In the scene just before the narrator’s quotation of Maria’s advice to Trina to “hump her 
back,” the narrator wistfully describes the decline of Trina’s physical appearance, with a 
nostalgia for the lovely way she used to look:  
Worst of all, Trina lost her pretty ways and her good looks. The combined effects 
of hard work, avarice, poor food, and her husband’s brutalities told on her swiftly. 
Her charming little figure grew coarse, stunted, and dumpy. She who had once 
been of a cat-like neatness, now slovened all day about the room in a dirty flannel 
wrapper, her slippers clap-clapping after her as she walked. At last she even 
neglected her hair, the wonderful swarthy tiara, the coiffure of a queen, that 
shaded her little pale forehead. (184) 
 
The narrator’s description of Trina’s physical appearance is almost tender in its 
recollection of her lost beauty, and the details he focuses on emphasize the pitiful 
preciousness of her body—her “little figure,” and her “little pale forehead.” The 
narrator’s description here references the pity he feels for Trina, but this reference is 
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inextricably linked to the narrator’s presence at the scene: the narrator is literally close 
enough to Trina to hear the sound her slippers make as she walks around her house.  
 The narrator’s appropriation of anything Maria says during her dialogue with 
Trina would have indexed his presence at this particular scene, but the particular 
language that he chooses hints at the narrator’s complicity in the novel’s grisliest 
conclusion, Trina’s murder. Trina’s efforts to resist McTeague and the length of time it 
takes her to die confirm the “accuracy” of Maria’s advice to Trina to “hump your back, 
and it’s soonest over:” 
…Trina turned and fought him back; fought for her miserable life with the 
exasperation and strength of a harassed cat; and with such energy and such wild, 
unnatural force, that even McTeague for the moment drew back from her. But her 
resistance was the one thing to drive him to the top of his fury. (205) 
 
Rather than submitting to McTeague’s beating, Trina resists, and although it’s impossible 
to say whether this resistance actually does prolong it, the length of time it takes Trina to 
die is a significant part of this scene. The narrator notes that “it was astonishing how long 
Trina held up under it,” (206) and the final metaphor describing Trina compares her to “a 
piece of clockwork running down.” (207) It does seem that, if Trina had “humped her 
back,” her murder might have been over sooner. Like the rusty tin dishes that Zerkow 
clutches as he dies, the nature of Trina’s death scene is a particularly chilling response to 
one of the narrator’s experiments with a form of photographic accuracy. The degree to 
which this advice proves accurate is somewhat more than the narrator has bargained for: 
Maria’s words index the narrator’s presence at the scene of her dialogue with Trina, but 
they also predict the nature and the outcome of Trina’s murder.  
 The language the narrator uses to describe Trina’s dying body during this scene 
suggests that he recognizes the phrase’s uncanny relationship to the scene he’s 
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describing, and that he seeks to distance himself from this recognition. Trina becomes 
more like a thing, an animal or a spectacle in the narrator’s description of her as she 
struggles to resist McTeague:  
No acrobat ever went through such wild gymnastics, such contortions, such 
furious gambols. The frail body bounded about from wall to wall of the room with 
the vigor and elasticity of a rubber ball…It did not seem as if flesh and bones 
could endure such stress and yet live.48 
 
The narrator’s distanced mode of description in this passage is, perhaps, an attempt to 
disavow what he knows—what he can plainly see—about the nature of the crime, 
namely, that a human being—not a “harassed cat” or a “rubber ball”—is being brutally 
murdered. His remark that it didn’t seem possible for “flesh and bones to endure such 
stress and yet live” reads like an impossible wish, a wish that evokes something of the 
longing that Barthes associates with the photograph. The narrator knows that Trina is 
indeed flesh and blood, but he wishes that she weren’t. He wishes, impossibly, that she 
were an animal or an automaton, some form of life or mechanism whose destruction he 
could witness without feeling complicit in its enactment. The narrator reads this scene as 
if what he sees is both there and absent: he watches Trina endure what seems impossible, 
just as the presence of what the photograph pictures seems both absolutely true and 
obviously false.  
 The dehumanized metaphors and skeptical tone that the narrator uses to disavow 
his knowledge of Trina’s humanity produces a narrative that doubts and contradicts itself 
at every turn: rather than the indexical accuracy of a photograph, the narrator’s story 
                                                 
48 This description of Trina’s death appears in the manuscript version of McTeague, in a lengthy passage 
that Norris excised from the first published version of the novel at the request of his publishers. Donald 
Pizer provides all that is extant from the passage (206) in the Norton Critical edition of McTeague 
referenced herein. Although the entirety of this passage was not included in the widely published version of 
the novel, it seems highly likely that, were it not for his publisher’s concern about the passage’s graphic 
detail, Norris would have allowed the passage to remain intact.  
 47 
finally seems inaccurate, in terms of both mimesis and indexicality. The narrator’s 
remark that Trina’s body has the “vigor and elasticity of a rubber ball” as she bounces 
from wall to wall of the schoolroom is especially difficult to reconcile with his literal 
description, in the same sentence, of Trina’s “frail body;” and his statement that “no 
acrobat” ever achieved the kind of “contortions” and “gambols” of Trina’s struggling 
body suggests a certain skepticism about the physical truth of what he sees: if not even a 
virtuoso of bodily contortion could move the way that Trina moves, then perhaps the 
movements the narrator sees are—as indeed, the narrator hopes they are—somehow 
untrue. Such a hope could certainly be fueled by the “visual dictionaries”49 of human 
movement produced by Muybridge and others during the 1880s and 90s. Contemporary 
responses to Muybridge’s work often noted the shockingly different appearance of his 
images and the “live” appearance of human movement: perhaps the narrator has seen 
(just as Norris had surely seen) work like Muybridge’s; and perhaps no image ever did 
show the human body approximating Trina’s “furious gambols and contortions.”
 Realizing the horror of what he witnesses and worrying about his own complicity 
in the crime, McTeague’s narrator would be only too willing to use his knowledge of 
Muybridge’s photographs to prove his disavowal of the reality he witnesses. But Trina, of 
course, is human, regardless of whether or not any photograph exists to confirm it. The 
narrator’s attempt to use Muybridge’s photographs to “prove” what he knows is not 
accurate or true suggests a way in which the photograph, with its authoritative claim to 
                                                 
49 Newhall 122. Newhall uses this term to describe Muybridge’s 1887 eleven-volume publication of 
photographs showing animals and humans in motion. Many of Muybridge’s photographs of human beings, 
most of them nude, depict acrobatic feats like headstands, handsprings and cartwheels. Other photographic 
works popular during the 1880s and 90s that depicted human beings in action evoke a similarly “acrobatic” 
look and feel; Newhall’s discussion on pgs. 119-123 identifies both Etienne Jules Marey and painter 
Thomas Eakins as producers of such work.  
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indexicality, could be used to deny or reconstruct—rather than affirm—the truth of lived 
experiences. Most of the ideas and attitudes about photography in the 1890s that I have 
highlighted in this chapter assumed that the photograph’s ontological claim to indexical 
accuracy meant that photographs could only be used to tell the truth. However, the 
narrator’s use of photographic evidence to disprove or deny the unpleasant truth that he 
witnesses also registers the period’s emergent anxiety about photography’s potential to 
construct new “truths” or “realities” that obscure or deny lived experience—especially 
when that experience is lived by the “hidden” members of the urban poor. Disciplinary 
uses of photography like those that Sekula describes may have replaced the criminal’s 
“protean” autobiographical fictions with the visual truth of his identity, but McTeague’s 
narrator enacts the possibility of photographs being used to generate new fictions that 
deny or distort autobiographical truths. 
 Such a possibility is preferable for an observer like McTeague’s narrator—a 
figure who wants to tell an accurate story, but who knows that the risks of producing such 
a story are too great. Photography was authoritative because of its ontological claim to 
indexical accuracy—but indexical accuracy didn’t necessarily have to equal the truth of 
lived experience. Photographs could, after all, be staged to suggest certain things that 
weren’t necessarily true—as was the case with many of Riis’s photographs. This 
particular photographic possibility—a staged visual fiction with the authority of indexical 
accuracy—represents the ideal that McTeague’s narrator is on the verge of imagining, 
namely, the possibility of possessing the photograph’s authority without experiencing the 
trauma of presence that taking such a photograph would require. 
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 The trauma of being present as an observer—rather than the trauma of being 
present as a victim—is ultimately what dominates the narrator’s story of Trina’s murder. 
As the story of Trina’s murder draws to a close, the narrator’s descriptions focus on the 
traumatic experiences of several other “observers” who witness Trina’s murder, the black 
cat who “lived on the premises” (204) and the kindergarten students who discover Trina’s 
body. The cat figures prominently in the narrator’s description of Trina’s final moments, 
accompanying the narrator as he watches the murder and later, as he turns to a description 
of McTeague’s exit from the kindergarten and return to his room above the music store. 
The physical spaces that the cat occupies and his sensual responses to the scenes he 
witnesses are a curious echo of the narrator’s traumatic attempts to observe the characters 
in McTeague from the photographer’s intimate perspective. As Trina scrubs the floor, the 
cat, “preferring to be dirty rather than to be wet,” watches her from within the “coal 
scuttle, and over its rim watched her sleepily with a long, complacent purr.” The cat’s 
preference to be “dirty rather than wet” as he observes Trina scrubbing the floor is a 
literal echo of the narrator’s realization that any observation of someone else’s 
suffering—even the kind that is physically distant from the “wetness” of active 
involvement—has the potential to “dirty” his psyche with fear and guilt. But the cat’s 
complacency—much like the narrator’s ambitious attempts to observe accurately—is 
quickly destroyed by the horror of witnessing Trina’s murder from an intimate vantage 
point. The narrator’s final description50 of the fight between Trina and McTeague is 
focalized through the cat’s perspective. From outside the cloakroom, the cat hears  
the sounds of stamping and struggling and the muffled noise of blows, wildly 
terrified, his eyes bulging like brass knobs. At last the sounds stopped on a 
                                                 
50 In fact, the only description of the fight that was actually included in the first published editions of 
McTeague is provided through the cat’s perspective.  
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sudden; he heard nothing more. Then McTeague came out, closing the door. The 
cat followed him with distended eyes as he crossed the room and disappeared 
through the street door. (206) 
 
In this passage, the signs of the cat’s “terror” are a literal expression of traumatic 
observation: his eyes, “bulging” and “distended,” seem physically damaged by what he 
has seen.  The cat’s body becomes a literal incarnation of the narrator’s invisible body, 
traumatized and fascinated by the horrors of decay and abuse that he witnesses 
throughout the novel. By the time Trina is dead, this observing feline, “wildly terrified” 
and yet unable to tear himself away from McTeague, has become the literal image of the 
metaphoric “harassed cat” that the narrator evokes in his description of Trina as she 
struggles to survive. The narrator’s attention to the cat’s experience here shifts emphasis 
from the trauma of a human being who struggles like a “harassed cat” to the trauma of an 
actual cat who is “harassed” by the experience of watching that human being’s futile 
struggle.   
 The cat’s terror is not, however, the novel’s final—and hardly its most 
disturbing—image of traumatic observation. Trina’s body is discovered by a group of 
kindergarten students who arrive at school as usual on the morning after the murder. The 
narrator’s final word on Trina’s murder is actually a description of how these children 
notice the body. They arrive as usual and notice a “funnee smell” that one of the girls, “a 
butcher’s daughter,” equates with the smell of her father’s shop. They also notice the cat 
(who returns with the narrator and the children) “acting strangely…his nose pressed close 
to the crevice under the door of the little cloakroom, winding his tail slowly back and 
forth, excited, very eager. At times he would draw back and make a strange little clacking 
noise down in his throat.” (208) The smell of blood and flesh and the cat’s strange 
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behavior direct the girls’ curiosity to the cloakroom, and the narrator closes the scene by 
telling how the students “all ran in,” presumably to discover the source of the smell and 
the reason for the cat’s odd behavior. The narrator’s description stops abruptly with these 
words, signaling his refusal to follow the little girls into the cloakroom and his 
unwillingness to witness the trauma of their discovery. The fact that this trauma—rather 
than that of the murder itself—is what provokes the narrator’s withdrawal is a telling sign 
of his solipsistic preoccupation with the risks of intimate observation.  
   The kind of witnesses—an animal and children—who register what is really the 
narrator’s own trauma of observation signal one of McTeague’s deepest anxieties about 
the risks and dilemmas of accuracy, observation and narrative. The actual characters that 
Norris chooses to show the literal trauma of observation are far less able to understand 
and communicate an account of what they see than the novel’s articulate, subtle narrator. 
The cat, of course, will never speak, and the children who find Trina’s body speak to 
each other in short, declarative phrases and slangy abbreviations (“what a funnee smell;” 
“’tsmells like my pa’s shop;” “ain’t he funnee!”) that suggest both their crude linguistic 
abilities and their naïveté. The cat may be a brute in the literal sense of the word, but 
children are brutes as well: their immaturity and their crude vulnerability to the sensory 
world; their class and their race (Norris is careful to identify one of the children as 
“colored”) mark them as the victims of the naturalist novel’s deterministic forces. In 
some ways, then, it seems only fitting that these characters are forced to serve as 
embodied examples of the observer’s trauma—but the forced transformation of brutes 
into observers also speaks to the narrative situation that initially provoked the urgency 
with which the narrator attempts to tell a photographic story. Maria Macapa, the mentally 
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unstable narrator whose startlingly accurate story fascinates and inspires the narrator, is 
hardly less brutish than the children or the cat. Maria’s story—like the stories that, 
perhaps, the children will one day tell about their grisly discovery—is based on an aspect 
of her personal experience that the novel refuses to definitively disprove or deny. Maria’s 
firsthand experience with the gold plate has imprinted the story into her mind, as if she 
herself were like a photographic plate, sensitized for the task of narrative by an innate 
ability to receive—and even, to articulate—her experience. McTeague’s narrator may be 
able to project the dangers and anxieties of observation onto his brute subjects, but in 
doing so he cannot help but reintroduce the real dilemma of presence, accuracy and 
narrative that his photographic model attempts to solve—namely, that the so-called 
“brutes” whose lives became such fascinating subject matter for journalists, 
photographers and fiction writers at the end of the nineteenth century were always 
already the most accurate narrators of their own stories, more present in their own lives 
than they could ever be in a photograph.
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Chapter 2 
 
Do You See What I See? Mediating Sensational Stories With The Moving Picture 
Lecturer And Stephen Crane 
  
"Why, Martha," said Carrie, in a reasoning tone, "you talk as if you wouldn't be scared of 
him!"  
"No more would I," retorted Martha.  
"O-oh, Martha, how you talk!" said Kate. "Why, the idea! Everybody's afraid of him."  
Carrie was grinning. "You've never seen him, have you?" she asked, seductively.  
"No," admitted Martha.  
"Well, then, how do you know that you wouldn't be scared?"  
Martha confronted her. "Have you ever seen him? No? Well, then, how do you know you 
would be scared?"  
The allied forces broke out in chorus: "But, Martha, everybody says so. Everybody says 
so."  
--from Stephen Crane, The Monster
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“…it would be hard for modern patrons to understand the feeling of panic that swept the 
audience at sight of this smoking monster rushing down upon them…At the point where 
it appeared certain the monster would hurl itself from the screen, babies yowled, 
youngsters trembled like aspen leaves, women screamed, and men sat aghast.”  
 
--from Albert Smith, Two Reels and a Crank52 
 
 At issue in the two preceding quotes are the vexed relationships between 
sensation and knowledge that defined the projects of both naturalist writers like Crane 
and cinematic innovators like Smith at the end of the nineteenth century. Both reflect on a 
particular sort of “monster’s” shocking irruption into spaces of comfortably established 
modes of observation and spectatorship: the disfigured and mentally damaged Henry
                                                 
51 Crane, Stephen, “The Monster.” The Portable Stephen Crane. Ed. Joseph Katz. (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1969) Subsequent page numbers from this edition will be noted in the text.  
52 Smith, Albert, Two Reels and A Crank. (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1952) 39-40.  
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 Johnson’s jaunts through a small town full of nosy neighbors, gossips and hypocrites 
pushes the voyeuristic enthusiasm of its residents to the breaking point; and Smith’s 
“smoking monster” seems about to make its audience flee in terror from what was likely 
a familiar site of pleasurable entertainments.  
 Martha Goodwin’s insistence that neither her neighbors’ tales nor the actual sight 
of Henry Johnson will make her fear him reminds us of the boundaries between sensation 
and knowledge—boundaries that Smith’s hyperbolic description of an early film 
audience’s response to a film depicting a “monstrous” onrushing train willfully forgets. 
Martha believes in the possibility of seeing something frightening without becoming 
afraid—a possibility in which her knowledge of who and what Henry Johnson really is 
would successfully mediate the potential shock of confronting his newly “monstrous” 
appearance. Smith’s description of screaming women and men frozen with fear refuses 
such a possibility, insisting instead on an audience whose visual experience produces a 
genuine fear that is completely untempered by what they surely knew—even at this early 
moment in this history of cinema—about how the “monster” they saw rushing toward 
them was only an image, offered up for their entertainment.  
 As an assertion of the power of rational knowledge to tame either the body’s 
visceral sensations or the insistent chorus of what “everybody says,” Martha’s statement 
is itself a kind of irruption within the text of The Monster. Martha believes that knowing 
and telling the truth is powerful enough to thwart the kind of visceral thrills and, even 
more significantly, the unjust victimization of Henry Johnson by the majority of her 
fellow townspeople. Hardly anyone in Crane’s fictional Whilomville shares Martha’s 
opinion—not even The Monster’s narrator. The narrative voice in The Monster is as cool, 
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as sophisticated, and as ironic as any in Crane’s oeuvre, but it can also be sensational: the 
narrator often seems as vulnerable to the fascinated, fearful thrill of seeing Henry 
Johnson as the townspeople he describes, and just as curious and uninformed about the 
scandalous stories of Johnson’s encounters with Whilomville’s residents. These abrupt 
narrative shifts from a “sensational” voice to one that sounds more like naturalism’s 
characteristic voice of informed distance continually frustrate the reader’s desire to 
know—whether, for example, the narrator regards the victimized Henry Johnson as 
noble, pitiful or ridiculous; or whether the narrator is really as hypocritical and narrow-
minded as the small-town neighbors whose perspectives he seems to both share and 
criticize. The narrator’s commitment to a perspective that registers the thrilling sensations 
of Whilomville’s townspeople far more readily than it explains or describes their moral 
limitations ultimately says more about the futility of any attempt to mediate either the 
sensory or the ethical impressions of an audience—whether of readers or spectators—
through the kind of informed, rational narrative that defined the naturalist project.  
 As a voice inflected by both the sensory charge of a thrilling story and an 
informed sense of how and why that story unfolds, Crane’s narrator sounds uncannily 
like another sort of narrator familiar to purveyors of modern entertainment at the turn of 
the century: the lecturer who, in the early years of cinema, explained and embellished the 
sometimes unfamiliar and predominantly silent scenes of the first moving pictures. Early 
film—at once a technological wonder, a visual novelty and a form that drew heavily on 
its theatrical and literary precursors—exploited both the distinctly sensory thrill of 
confronting the moving image and the comfortable pleasure of recognizing the familiar 
figures, stories and exhibition practices that defined the existing cultures of public 
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entertainment. Descended from both the carnival barker urging potential spectators to 
gape at sideshow wonders and from the refined, well-informed educator of genteel 
audiences, the moving picture lecturer was a familiar part of this culture.
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 He was, 
however, a figure whose attentions to his audiences had always been divided between 
helping them make sense of what they were seeing and encouraging them to experience 
the thrilling sensations of novel sights and sounds.  
 The Monster’s narrator speaks from a similarly interstitial position, one that 
continually evokes both the bodily thrills of sensation and a privileged knowledge about 
the story he tells. Like the moving picture lecturer, The Monster’s narrator attempts to 
mediate how and what people come to know about a story that confronts its audience 
with an aggressive, sensational force. In the chapter that follows, I argue that this 
narrative attempt is in fact an elaborate demonstration of just how futile the attempt to tell 
an ethical story can be in an ever-more visible and sensational social world.  
 This narrative crisis is one that the moving picture lecturer made vividly apparent: 
the history of this figure’s lecturer’s practice emphasizes just how difficult it is to 
mediate, through narrative, what people can easily see for themselves. The Monster’s 
                                                 
 53 For book-length studies of early film history that include information on the moving picture lecturer’s 
 practice throughout the late 1890s and early 1900s, see: Altman, Rick. Silent Film Sound. (New York: 
 Columbia University Press, 2004); Noel Burch’s Life To Those Shadows. (Berkeley: University of 
 California Press, 1990); and Miriam Hansen’s Babel And Babylon: Spectatorship In American Silent Film. 
 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991). For a detailed study of the moving picture lecturer in the 
 context of traveling exhibition, as embodied by popular exhibitor and lecturer Lyman Howe, see Charles 
 Musser’s High-Class Moving Pictures: Lyman H. Howe And The Forgotten Era Of Traveling Exhibition, 
 1880-1920. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). Scholarly articles that treat this topic include: 
 Germaine Lacasse’s “Le bonimenteur de vues animeés/The Moving Picture Lecturer” iris 22 (Fall 1996); 
 Tom Gunning’s “The Scene of Speaking: Two Decades of Discovering the Film Lecturer.”  iris 27 (Spring 
 1999): 67-79. Accounts of this practice dating from the late nineteenth century include: Smith’s Two 
 Reels And A Crank. (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1952); Bush, Stephen W. “The Picture and the 
 Voice.” Moving Picture World 2 November 1912: 429; and “Burton Holmes Takes His Audience On An 
 Interesting Journey,” The Milwaukee Sentinel 15 November 1899: 3, column A. 
 
 
. 
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narrator dramatizes both the ethical and the perceptual implications of this crisis, pointing 
toward the impossibility of mediating either the sense that people make of what they see 
or their subjective sensation of experiencing it. Unlike McTeague, in which the narrator’s 
eager approaches and anxious retreats from his subjects are produced by the pursuit of 
accuracy, The Monster’s narrative oddities suggest a pointed manipulation of fact and 
knowledge—a manipulation that has more to do with the text’s ethical implications than 
its aesthetic ones. The derision and pity with which The Monster’s narrator depicts the 
novella’s victims and perpetrators alike suggests not so much a commitment to accuracy 
as it does a commitment to telling what seems like a moral tale in radically amoral 
terms—a commitment that ultimately exposes the inherent difficulties of producing the 
kind of exhaustive knowledge to which the naturalist text aspires.  
 
Crane, Sensation And The Pursuit Of Knowledge 
 The question of how anyone comes to know and articulate experience is one that 
has often been raised by Crane’s writerly practice and his fiction, both during his own 
lifetime and as part of the ongoing critical conversation about his work. One of the most 
frequently commented upon features—indeed, what might even be called its most 
sensational aspect—of Crane’s best-known work, The Red Badge of Courage, was the 
fact that its author had never experienced the kind of Civil War battles and struggles that 
he wrote about so convincingly.54 Crane’s blurring of the line between fact and fiction 
was also linked to his journalistic writings, many of which are clear precursors or 
inspirations for his fictional works. Crane’s collection of writerly projects could easily be 
                                                 
54 For a fuller discussion of Crane’s photographic and journalistic sources for Red Badge and the 
implications of his absence from any actual battlefield of the Civil War, see Orvell 127-128.  
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read as a studied investigation into the problem of how a writer should come to know the 
stories he tells. Through personal imagination, and the record of the past, as in the case of 
Red Badge? Through direct experience and observation, as in the case of his urban 
sketches? Or through an elaborated re-interpretation of the sensational news stories and 
clichéd, melodramatic plots and themes that filled the newspapers and magazines to 
which he often contributed? Such questions are, of course, just as applicable to many of 
naturalism’s most familiar texts: Crane’s frank experimentation with a diverse array of 
literary epistemologies emphasizes—ironically, of course—the more general tendency of 
the naturalist text to insist on its own claims to factual accuracy. The choices Crane made 
in terms of what to write for newspapers and what to write as fiction suggest that he was 
consciously interrogating the viability of “literary” knowledge. Michael Robertson 
identifies Crane’s “practice of journalism and his familiarity with the fact-fiction 
discourse of 1890s papers” as a major contributing factor to what he calls Crane’s 
“awareness of the instability of narrative representation;”55 and in her study of The 
Monster as an illustration of the cultural and economic dynamics of lynching and 
capitalism at the end of the nineteenth century, Jacqueline Goldsby calls The Monster  
“the most acutely observed and discerning account” of an actual lynching that occurred in 
Crane’s hometown of Port Jervis, NJ, in 1892.56 Evidence also suggests that Crane 
fabricated at least some of what he passed off as true reporting for newspapers, including 
                                                 
55 Robertson, Michael, Stephen Crane, Journalism And The Making of American Literature. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997) 67. 
56 In A Spectacular Secret: Lynching In American Life And Literature (Chicago: Univerisity of Chicago 
Press, 2006), Goldsby reads The Monster as a pointed commentary on the 1892 lynching of Robert Lewis 
in Port Jervis. She notes that Crane’s former neighbors were upset by the novella, angry that Crane was 
revealing “their most shameful moment.” See Chapter 3, 105-163.  
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a story about a house fire that closely resembles the descriptions of the Trescott house 
fire in The Monster57.   
 Critical attention to the role of sensation and perception in Crane’s work has 
primarily focused on discussions of Crane’s preoccupation with visual experience58 and, 
relatedly, his literary impressionism. Recently, however, critical attention has turned even 
more directly to the body’s role in the kind of perception that Crane’s work suggests. 
Walter Benn Michaels has recently commented on the representation of dialect in Maggie 
as an example of realism’s “commitment to making “the complete image” available to 
the senses,” a way of “making sounds seen,” a gesture that he identifies as one that 
acknowledges sight as the primary sense to be satisfied; and Mary Esteve’s recent article 
on Crane’s “documentary anaesthetics” suggests that Crane’s fiction is part of what she 
calls a “cultural will to anaesthesia,” one that “disrupts the dominant will to a stabilizing 
sense-perception.”59  
 Like Esteve, I believe that Crane’s work rejects the notion of a universal or 
objective way of seeing and sensing the world; however, I read Crane’s objection to the 
notion of a “stabilizing sense-perception” not as a rejection or disavowal of sensory 
experience, as Esteve does, but rather as a deep engagement with the newly intense 
                                                 
57 Levenson, J.C.  “Introduction.” Tales of Whilomville. Ed. Fredson Bowers. (Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 1969). xxi 
58 In his introduction to an anthology of essays on Crane, Harold Bloom identifies Crane’s work as part of a 
genealogy of literature that “sees,” which he regards as a distinctive feature of 1890s literature. Carol 
Schloss, in In Visible Light, identifies Crane as one of many authors who aspired to an ideal of neutrality 
and—interestingly—superficiality and surface--represented by photography. Crane and other were, she 
claims, “concerned with securing external likenesses, fascinated by the permutations of the surface of life, 
as if literature no longer had reason to render depth, interiority, or the relation of seen to unseen existence.” 
(18) Keith Gandal, in The Virtues of the Vicious: Jacob Riis, Stephen Crane and The Spectacle Of The 
Slum (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), identifies Crane’s preoccupation with spectatorship and 
visual experience as a mode of deriving a reinvigorated energy/life from the “strenuous” world and 
alternative moral/ethical code of the slums. (79-84) 
59 Esteve, Mary. A "Gorgeous Neutrality": Stephen Crane's Documentary Anaesthetics.” ELH  62.3 (Fall 
1995) 663-689. 
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possibilities for sensation represented by the experience of early film. For Crane, the 
diverse and evolving culture of cinema offered an especially pointed version of the 
epistemological dilemmas raised by much of his fiction.  In 1899, the culture of cinema 
was a highly diverse phenomenon, defined in large part by confrontations between 
established, familiar modes of entertainment like the educational lecture and a newly 
visceral—even shocking—cinematic entertainment that frankly sought to elicit embodied 
responses from its spectators. Such films were usually single shots that animated 
titillating, curious, exotic or sensational scenes. Film historian Tom Gunning, who, with 
Andre Gaudreault, developed the term “cinema of attractions” to describe these films in a 
series of essays written in the last half of the 1980s60, identifies the genre as presenting 
…visual delights, surprises, displays of the exotic, beautiful or grotesque (views 
of foreign sites or indigenous people, scantily clad women or physical freaks) or 
other sorts of sensational thrills…Rather than attempting to create a fictional 
world (as narrative tends to do) attractions address the spectator directly, even 
aggressively, subjecting him or her to emotional shocks…[cinema of attractions] 
could be described as an “exhibitionist” cinema, well aware of the act of being 
seen, flaunting the act of display.61  
 
The moving picture lecturer was frequently figured by the fledgling film industry as a 
reassuring and necessary mediator—not only of the cinema of attractions’ “sensational 
thrills” and “emotional shocks,” but also of the audience’s unpredictable and unruly 
responses to this new mode of entertainment. The relationship between lecturer and 
audience was indeed crucial—but the history of this diverse practice suggests that the 
lecturer often acted more as a register and reflector of audience response than as an 
                                                 
60 For a detailed account of the genesis of this term and a summary of the writings and lectures that 
introduced it to the scholarly community, see Wanda Strauven’s introduction to the recent anthology of 
essays devoted to the topic, The Cinema of Attractions Reloaded (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University 
Press, 2007).   
61 Gunning, Tom. “Cinema of Attractions.” Encyclopedia of Early Cinema. Ed. Richard Abel. (Routledge: 
London and New York, 2010) 124. 
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authoritative interpreter and mediator of a film’s content.62 I read The Monster as an 
exaggerated allegory of both the visceral thrills elicited by the cinema of attractions and 
the lecturer’s collaborative mediation with the audiences who experienced them—an 
allegory that ultimately points to the futility of any narrative project that seeks to tell its 
readers how to see, think or feel.   
 
Henry Johnson And The Cinema Of Attractions  
 Like many of the cinema of attractions’ classic short films, The Monster’s victim-
protagonist Henry Johnson is initially portrayed as an amusing spectacle, well-liked and 
familiar but also curiously observed. However, the story of Henry Johnson’s 
transformation from strutting dandy to ostracized freak quickly becomes a nightmarish 
version of the kind of confrontation between spectator and film that defined the 
experience of early cinema. After his disfigurement, the thrill of seeing Henry becomes a 
genuine terror to his neighbors, one that Henry’s increasingly aggressive exhibitionism 
repeatedly incites. Henry’s monstrosity is essentially a realization of the bodily contact 
between spectator and film that was the cinema of attractions’ most tantalizing—but 
never realized—suggestion.  
 In a series of episodes that culminate in the scene of his disfigurement, Henry 
Johnson’s figurative and literal “performances”—as an obedient servant, a strutting 
“cakewalker,”63 a lightweight boxer and, eventually, a sacrificial body—evoke a number 
of early filmic subjects associated with the cinema of attractions as well as that genre’s 
                                                 
62 See especially [chapter in Altman’s Silent Film Sound? Others?] 
63 The cakewalk was a popular subject for early films. Charles Musser’s catalog of Edison films cites one 
such representative example, produced by W.K.L. Dickson and entitled “Cake Walk.” The film was 
described by The Kinetescope Company’s Price List of Films from May 1895 as “the best negro subjects 
yet taken and are amusing and entertaining.” Musser, Edison Motion Pictures 174.   
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emphasis on exhibitionism. The scene in which Henry “performs” his regular task of 
washing Dr. Trescott’s buggy depicts Henry as a contented servant who enjoys being 
watched. When Jimmie watches Henry perform this task, Henry “procure[s] great joy 
from the child’s admiration” of his work—so much so that when Jimmie fails to be 
immediately distracted by “the wonders of wagon washing,” Henry uses “seductive wiles 
in this affair of washing a wagon,” in an attempt to engage his audience—an audience 
who the narrator tells us Henry is “always delighted to have…there to witness the 
business of the stable.” (452-453) 
 Another early scene, that of Henry’s “cakewalk” down the main street of 
Whilomville, makes both the voyeuristic appeal of Henry’s racialized body and his 
exhibitionism even more explicit. Flaunting his own good looks and flamboyant clothing, 
Henry elicits a string of jibes from a group of young men who interpret his stroll as a 
cakewalk:  
“Hello, Henry! Going to walk for a cake to-night?” 
“Ain’t he smooth?” 
“Why, you’ve got the cake right in your pocket, Henry!” 
“Throw out your chest a little more.” [454] 
 
The narrator claims that Henry is “not ruffled in any way” by the commentary of these 
young men; he responds to them by “laugh[ing] a supremely good natured, chuckling 
laugh, which nevertheless expressed an underground complacency of superior metal.” 
[455] And in fact, Henry relishes the attention he receives from his neighbors: 
Henry was not at all oblivious of the wake of wondering ejaculation that streamed 
out behind him. On other occasions he had reaped this same joy, and he always 
had an eye for the demonstration. [456] 
 
The pleasure that Henry derives from his neighbor’s admiration of him—however 
tongue-in-cheek it may be—is hinted at by the narrator’s early comment that “it was plain 
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from his [Henry’s] talk that he was a very handsome negro,” one who was “known to be 
a light, a weight, and an eminence in the suburb of the town.” [451] Describing Henry as 
“a light” and “a weight” also casts Henry as the principal figure in yet another cinematic 
genre popular during the 1890s, that of the prizefighting film. The narrator makes this 
designation even more explicit in his later description of Henry “duck[ing] in the manner 
of his race in fights” and “aim[ing] to pass under the left guard” [465] of the fiery specter 
who blocks his exit from Dr. Trescott’s burning laboratory. Casting Henry as the kind of 
prizefighter who was frequently depicted in the boxing films of the 1890s—both real and 
staged
64—ascribes a significantly more intense—and bodily—thrill to his performances 
than the one he elicited as a racial curiosity: prizefighting films exploited both the erotic 
thrill of viewing the nearly nude male bodies of the fighters, but they also evoked the 
vaguely sadistic thrills of seeing these bodies beaten, bruised and threatened with injury 
or death
65
.  
 The scene of Henry’s disfigurement marks his definitive transformation from a 
bodily curiosity to a body that threatens its spectators with the possibility of real 
contact—a transformation that is effected by Henry’s surrender to an experience of visual 
sensation untempered by the kind of knowledge that reminded early film audiences of 
their own bodily safety. This scene—perhaps the most explicitly violent scene in the 
novella—is also, in the most literal sense of the word, the most spectacular: in order to 
escape down a little-used staircase in Dr. Trescott’s laboratory, Henry must confront and 
                                                 
64 For more information on the popularity of prizefighting films, see Musser, Charles, The Emergence of 
Cinema: Vol. 1: The American Screen to 1907. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) 193-208; 
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Musser, Edison Motion Pictures, 28-30 and 40-43. 
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pass though what the narrator describes as a “strange spectacle,” one that proves 
impossible to see safely. The narrator’s description of this scene is an incongruous 
combination of visual delight and corporeal threat. The beauty of flames that are like 
“burning flowers…blooming everywhere” in hues of “violet, crimson, green, blue, 
orange, and purple;” or that are “precisely the hue of a delicate coral,” or that “lay merely 
in phosphorescent inaction like a pile of emeralds” are also those that “bit[e] deeply into 
Johnson...like a panther,” and the “delicate, trembling sapphire shape like a fairy lady” is 
the same brutal adversary who “dooms” Henry and Jimmie with her “left guard” and 
clutching “talons” that are “swifter than eagles.” The tension between visible beauty and 
bodily threat that runs throughout this scene finds a brutal resolution in Henry Johnson’s 
disfigurement, when a chemical flame like a “scintillant and writing serpent,” “ruby-red” 
and “languorous,” flows “directly down into Johnson’s upturned face.” [465]  
 Henry’s face is destroyed by the kind of physical contact with a thrilling spectacle 
that the cinema of attractions evokes, but stops just short of delivering. The event of 
Henry’s disfigurement upends the delicate balance between sensation and sense that the 
cinema of attractions cultivated: as he stands before the spectacle of burning wonders in 
Dr. Trescott’s laboratory, Henry is quite sure that he is not safe from what he sees; and in 
fact, he knows that any chance of survival means that he must touch what he sees. Henry 
becomes, then, a victim of pure sensation, a spectator who sacrifices his face and his 
sanity—but retains his vision—in order to survive and save Jimmie. 
 After his disfigurement, Henry Johnson seems to become the kind of threatening 
sensation that he confronted in Dr. Trescott’s burning laboratory. The narrator’s 
statement that “he always had an eye for the demonstration” is grimly realized in the 
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nature of his disfigurement: all that remains of his face is a “single, unwinking eye,” one 
that becomes, for his neighbors, an alarming demonstration of monstrosity. Henry may 
lose his face and his senses in the fire, but—much to the horror of his neighbors—his 
penchant for self-display remains intact: he retains not only his ability to see, but also his 
desire, or impulse, to be seen. Henry’s life after the fire is defined by a series of 
increasingly aggressive confrontations with the people of Whilomville, confrontations 
that elicit fear, anger and violence. Henry’s transformation from a spectacle of fun to one 
of horror is essentially a literalization of the cinema of attractions, one that imagines the 
kind of scenarios that provoke the thrills and frights of these films as “real” events, with 
consequences that resonate long after the initial shock of the encounter has worn off. By 
the end of the novella, it is not only Henry who is ostracized, but also the Trescotts: both 
Dr. Trescott’s medical practice and his wife’s social life become markedly slower when it 
becomes clear that they intend to keep Henry under their roof. Rather than an audience 
whose initial shock gives way to curiosity and pleasure, as we might imagine happened in 
the case of the cinema of attractions, Whilomville’s spectators reject both Henry and 
anyone who continues to associate with him.  
 
The Monster’s Narrator And The Moving Picture Lecturer 
 Whilomville’s rejection of Henry is—oddly enough—one that the novella’s 
narrator seems to share. After Henry’s disfigurement, the narrator’s perspective on Henry 
changes from one of psychological intimacy to a perspective that seems to notice nothing 
but the superficial sights and sounds of Henry’s story. The narrator surrenders to an 
experience of vision that is just that: a vision that “sees” only Henry’s appearance of 
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monstrosity, untempered by any knowledge of his character or history. Throughout the 
second half of the novella, the narrator does not refer to Henry as anything but “the 
monster,” as if the narrator’s perception of Henry as a psychologically complex character 
has been eradicated by the disturbing sight of a face that is nothing but an eye. The 
narrator’s omniscience changes from a psychological to a sensory one—a process that 
ultimately renders the narrator more like the hypocritical townspeople than a moral 
authority who might mediate the disturbing shocks of Henry Johnson’s story.  
 If Henry Johnson is a literal and nightmarish exaggeration of the shocks and 
thrills served up the cinema of attractions, then The Monster’s narrator is an equally 
disturbing exaggeration of the knowledgeable, artful performer who was tasked with 
mediation of early film’s novel and sometimes unsettling or confusing offerings. In the 
initial scenes that feature Henry—many of which mirror the curiosities and thrills of the 
cinema of attractions—the narrator’s commentary on the workings of Henry’s private 
psychology evokes the kind of insider knowledge about Henry that a lecturer might offer 
his audience about a particular film. Perhaps the most striking example of such 
knowledge is the narrator’s precise detailing of Henry’s changing emotional state during 
his attempted rescue of Jimmie Trescott. In this section, the narrator is privy to the chain 
of desires, memories, fears and determinations that Henry experiences as he struggles to 
escape the burning house with Jimmie in tow, a series that the narrator summarizes as 
Henry’s “singular and swift set of alternations in which he feared twice without 
submission, and submitted once without fear.” Henry’s relinquishment of “almost all 
ideas of escaping from the burning house, and with it the desire;” his recollection of the 
back stairway that makes his “submission to the blaze depart instantly;” and his “wish” 
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for the unconscious Jimmie “to participate in his tremblings” [464] all suggest an 
intimate knowledge of the region the narrator has previously referred to as “somewhere 
far in the interior of Henry.” [453]   
 The access that The Monster’s narrator has to the “interior” of a character like 
Henry Johnson mirrors the special knowledge that moving picture lecturers had about 
both the subject matter and the organization of early films. The moving picture lecturer’s 
conventional role, as articulated with increasing clarity throughout the late 1890s and 
early 1900s by trade publications and industry officials, was that of a knowledgeable 
explainer of unfamiliar images or cinematic conventions66. According to such 
commentaries, knowing more about the films he presented than his audience was the 
moving picture lecturer’s special contribution to the cinematic experience—a 
contribution meant to both temper the shocking thrills of early films and to tame the 
potentially unruly responses of enthusiastic spectators. In a series of articles published 
during the early 1900s in the film trade journal Moving Picture World, Stephen W. Bush, 
one of the burgeoning film industry’s most prolific critics—and, perhaps not surprisingly, 
a former moving picture lecturer himself—emphasizes the need for the lecturer’s 
knowledgeable, rational influence as an essential part of experiencing a film, claiming 
that  
                                                 
66 Noel Burch, who posits that the first viewers experienced early films as “too uniformly ‘centrifugal’ for 
the eye to pick its way confidently through them,” claims that the lecturer “served…to bring order to the 
perceptual ‘chaos’ of the primitive picture” and “taught film-goers how to read the vast, flat and acentric 
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Passion Play of Oberammergau,” one of the most popular and widely shown films during the last half of 
the 1890s, Musser states that the shows were characterized by a “consistent reliance on lecturers who 
linked and interpreted the images;” he also claims that, in films depicting boxing matches, the narration of 
the film lecturer “emphasized… the details and significant moments that would one day be brought out by 
close-ups.” Burch, Noel. Life To Those Shadows. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Musser, 
Emergence, 209. 
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you would be surprised how much more you can discover in it than on your first 
witnessing it. This is quite natural. The manufacturer of the picture devoted days, 
perhaps weeks to it, and no matter how hard he may have tried to make it 
perfectly plain and simple, there are always some points which are brought out 
more forcibly by explanation.67 
 
The scenario that Bush imagines here is one in which the lecturer informs audiences of 
what they might have missed—a scenario that assumes that audiences are not just less 
knowledgeable, but also less observant than the lecturer. For Bush, the lecturer’s 
contribution to a film represents not an intensification of the embodied sensations of eye 
and ear, but rather a rational explanation that enhances the experience through 
explanation:   
The lecture, properly selected and handled, delivered by a competent speaker, 
adds directly to the enjoyment of certain pictures, because we all enjoy just in the 
degree in which we understand.68 
 
According to Bush, most films—not just the “great feature films”—would benefit greatly 
from a lecture prepared by “a man of fair education and quick wit and some gift of 
speech.” However, his claim that “we all enjoy just in the degree in which we 
understand” is hardly the universal truth that his rhetoric attempts to make it into, 
especially in the case of early film. It was, in fact, not quite understanding how films 
worked—the marvel of seeing motion displayed on the screen, for example—that 
accounted for the appeal of many films in the cinema of attractions.  
 Despite what commentators like Bush claimed, other historical accounts suggest 
that lecturers—even those who struck the pose of the genteel educator—traded on the 
pleasures of not knowing at least as often as they did on the pleasures of being informed. 
In an 1899 article detailing the recent appearance of traveling lecturer Burton Holmes, 
                                                 
67 Bush, Stephen W. “The Picture and the Voice.” Moving Picture World 2 November 1912: 429. 
68 Ibid. 
 69 
The Milwaukee Sentinel’s appreciation of the well-known Holmes derives largely from 
his identification with his audience’s perspective of naivete and wonder. “Burton Holmes 
Takes His Audience On An Interesting Journey,” the title of the article proclaims, and 
begins by detailing how Holmes’ “wonderful pictures” and “pleasant 
narrative…transported an audience of several hundred people into the very heart of the 
Colorado canyon in Arizona, an unknown and mysterious region to them for the most 
part.”69 According to this commentator, Holmes’s mediation has more to do with his 
presence on the scene than the precise nature of the description or explanation he 
provides. “Mr. Holmes,” states the article, 
frankly confessed at the outset to his inability to put into words the impression the 
canyon made on even so hardened a globe trotter as he, and this could be 
understood as the pictures were thrown on the screen…70 
 
The kind of mediation suggested by the above quote assumes a kind of common ground 
between Holmes and his audience, a shared sense of wonder and danger that robs Holmes 
of his eloquence. In this situation, Holmes is less the knowledgeable, confident expert 
than he is one of the naïve and wondering spectators experiencing the images on the 
screen for the first time. Holmes’s “frank admission” that he is unable to find words to 
describe the scenes in his film assumes a perspective similar to that of his audience, a 
group who has never seen and is thus more likely to experience the images he shows as 
genuinely thrilling. Thus read, Holmes mediates the experience of film not by explaining 
and describing, but rather by admitting to an experience of wonder and amazement that 
mirrors that of his audiences upon seeing his film. It seems unlikely, however, that 
Holmes would actually be at a loss for words while watching images that he himself had 
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70 Ibid. 
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made and had probably seen many times already. Professing his inability to find words to 
describe the images onscreen, then, was likely a calculated strategy, one based on 
Holmes’s perception of his audience’s response to his film images.  
 It is, of course, possible—and likely—that Holmes did provide some explanation 
and background information about the scenery his images displayed; however, his claims 
of wonder and amazement gesture toward a kind of mediation that is more deictic than 
explanatory; more participatory than didactic. In the early chapters of The Monster, the 
narrator’s descriptions of Henry are marked by similar tension: the narrator’s elaborate 
descriptive metaphors seem to be an imaginatively phrased reflection of his intimate 
knowledge of Henry’s psyche—a kind of description that approximates a lecturer like 
Holmes’s refined delivery of insider knowledge. Yet these descriptions are actually closer 
to Holmes’s “frank admission” of wordlessness than we might think. The narrator’s 
metaphors seem to compare Henry Johnson to a world outside the text, when in fact they 
refer most directly to the novella’s plot itself—as if the narrator, like a caricatured 
grotesque of a rapt spectator, can do little else but point and exclaim about the thrilling 
visions unfolding before him.  
 What Michael Fried has called the “relentlessness” of the Crane’s metaphoric 
descriptions71 seems, in The Monster, to be a sign both of the narrator’s ironic distance 
and of his cuttingly perceptive insight about the characters he describes. In the case of 
Henry Johnson, however, the narrator’s metaphors are more sight than insight, 
continually evoking a purely superficial perspective on Henry that refuses to see or know 
what he really is. For example, the narrator’s early evocation of Henry as a prizefighter 
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initially seems to be of a piece with the sarcastic description of Henry’s character in 
which it appears, one that derives its parodic force from Crane’s use of elevated language 
to describe an ordinary servant whose self-important attitudes derive from a mind that is, 
according to the narrator, “precisely alike” to that of a young child. [451] At the literal 
level, the description of Henry as “a light” and “a weight” communicates Henry’s good 
standing—what the narrator calls “his eminence”—in “the suburb of the town,” but the 
proximity of these two words also suggests—along with boxing—the term “lightweight,” 
which evokes what seems like the narrator’s “genuine” opinion of Henry as a person of 
little intellectual consequence. In this sense, then, the proximity of “light” and “weight” 
to each other is a deft bit of sarcastic wordplay that reveals the narrator’s derisive opinion 
of Henry. But the multiple ways in which this phrase can mean, as well as the metonymic 
crowding of “light” and “weight,” also points to an inability to name exactly what Henry 
is: he might be both a light and a weight, or either; just as the meaning of the phrase lies 
in its references to both----or either—figurative, abstract notions of social or intellectual 
status or the far more concrete, visible spectacle of prizefighting films. 
 This refusal—or inability—of the narrator to provide a definitive description of 
Henry becomes even more explicit in his description of the hostler preparing himself for 
his stroll through town:  
No belle of a court circle could bestow more mind on a toilet than did Johnson. 
On second thought, he was more like a priest arraying himself for some parade of 
the church. [453] 
 
In this passage, the narrator seems to revise his original description of Henry with one 
that, “on second thought,” seems more evocative—but not evocative enough, perhaps, to 
justify the complete erasure of the narrator’s initial “thought” about how to describe 
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Henry.
72
 The narrator’s uncharacteristic indecision in this moment calls attention to his 
role as a thinking, speaking mediator who crafts his story carefully, rather than a narrative 
voice or function that aspires to the exhaustive, mechanical accuracy and detail of a 
camera. 
 This scene also includes the narrator’s assertion that “there was no cakewalk 
hyperbole” in Henry’s refined attitude—an observation that is quickly belied by the 
commentary of the young men who teasingly ask Henry if he is “going to walk for a 
cake.” The young men’s opinion of Henry unsettles the narrator’s authority as the 
definitive, knowledgeable commentator on Henry’s story—an authority that was already 
shaken by his uncertainty about whether Henry more resembles a “belle” or a “priest.” As 
an audience themselves, the young men assert an opinion of Henry that seems just as 
valid—if not more so—than the one the narrator offers. Their immediate perception of 
Henry as precisely what the narrator assures us Henry is not makes the narrator’s opinion 
seems suspect—he protests too much, or perhaps he is more influenced by the opinions 
of his characters than we might think. The juxtaposition of the young men’s commentary 
with the narrator’s suggests a certain intimacy between the narrator and the young men—
between, we might say, the mediator of Henry’s story and one of that story’s audiences; 
between a mediator and an audience who are, like the film lecturer and his spectators, 
“constantly keeping in touch.” For The Monster’s narrator, however, it seems as though 
his knowledge of Henry is somehow identical to that of his audience: whether Henry is or 
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is not full of “cakewalk hyperbole,” both parties choose to refer to him through the 
metaphor of the cakewalk. Like the lecturer who must be sensitive to the opinions and 
impressions of his audience, then, The Monster’s narrator seems to have predicted and 
absorbed the opinion of Henry that he knows his audience of young men will have.  
 The metaphoric descriptions of Henry detailed expose certain “cracks” in what 
seems like the narrator’s masterful mediation of Henry Johnson’s story—cracks that 
show how vulnerable the narrator’s “vision” is to the perceptions and opinions of his 
multiple audiences. The text’s uncanny realizations, or enactments, of these figurative 
descriptions suggests that the narrator’s imaginative mediation is curtailed not only by his 
audience’s perception, but also by the narrator’s own “literal” vision of the events he 
describes. During the scene in which Henry and Jimmie are brought out of the Trescott 
home on stretchers, the narrator’s painstaking descriptions of Henry as a “belle of a court 
circle” and a priest are brutally realized:  
A little procession moved across the lawn and towards the street. There were three 
cots, borne by twelve of the firemen. The police moved sternly, but it needed no 
effort of theirs to open a lane for this slow cortege. The men who bore the cots 
were well known to the crowd, but in this solemn parade during the ringing of the 
bells and the shouting, and with the red glare upon the sky, they seemed utterly 
foreign, and Whilomville paid them a deep respect. Each man in this stretcher 
party had gained a reflected majesty. They were footmen to death, and the crowd 
made subtle obeisance to this august dignity derived from three prospective 
graves. [470] 
 
The narrator’s description of the “stretcher party” as a “procession” and a “solemn 
parade” suggests that this scene is the “parade of the church” that Henry-as-priest 
“arrayed himself” for, but this passage also takes up the narrator’s description of Henry 
as the “belle of a court circle.” The designation of the procession as a “slow cortege;” the 
references to the “reflected majesty’ and “august dignity” of the twelve firemen, and the 
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“subtle obeisance” paid to them by the townspeople—these descriptions use the “regal” 
language of a “court circle” that Henry is indeed at the center of in this scene.  
 In terms of a certain kind of accuracy, this enactment of the narrator’s figurative 
descriptions authorizes them as the “right” kind of description. However, in terms of a 
mediation that seeks to complement rather than capture the subject at hand, these 
enactments suggest that The Monster’s narrator has little to offer his readers. The text’s 
enactment of the narrator’s figurative images calls into question the kind of imaginative 
distance from what is described that any metaphoric description implies. Metaphors work 
by directing readers to imagine not what is directly before them (i.e., the “real” characters 
or setting of a text) but rather, to conjure an image that shares some important 
characteristic with whatever is being described. Even though it is just for a moment, 
metaphors create distance between the reader and the “real” events of the text, offering 
them a slightly different or enhanced perspective on the text itself. The Monster’s 
narrator, however, seems unable to offer his readers such perspectives: enactments like 
the realization of Henry as the “belle of a court circle” or “a priest arraying himself for 
some parade of the church” reveal what seem like fanciful, imaginative descriptions as 
little more than a reference to the real events of the text itself, a kind of deictic gesturing 
in which language—and knowledge—is overtaken by the visual. 
 Recent film historical work suggests that the practice of many moving picture 
lecturers was as focused on the immediate experience of the image on the screen as the 
metaphoric practice of The Monster’s narrator was on the immediate experience of The 
Monster’s plot. Many lecturers—those who likely doubled as barkers, projectionists or 
other employees of the theaters that first showed moving pictures—would be better 
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described as agitators than mediators; performers who directed their audiences' 
enthusiastic responses to the experience of watching films. According to Albert Smith, 
one of the founders of the Vitagraph company, his partner Stuart Blackton’s commentary 
about their first train film, The Black Diamond Express, was less a reassuring explanation 
of how the film worked or what it represented and more a calculated acknowledgment—
and indeed, an imitation of—the excitement and thrill that audiences would likely feel at 
the sight of the film. Smith claims that “the widespread discomfiture” at the sight of The 
Black Diamond Express  
appealed hugely to Blackton’s oracular instincts. He would advance upon the 
stage and, with deep voice and vivid gesture, deliver a ruthless peroration on the 
dreadful sensation which the Black Diamond Express held in store for all persons 
present.73 
 
Smith’s description here of Blackton as a “terroristic mood setter” depends on his 
partner’s acknowledgement of the “dreadful sensation” that the audience will feel as they 
watch the film—not on Blackton’s attempt to mitigate this sensation with explanation or 
reassurance. And although Blackton’s commentary does draw somewhat on his prior 
knowledge of the film, i.e., he knows what the audience is about to see, he describes this 
imminent sight from the perspective that is closer to that of a naïve spectator than that of 
a practiced exhibitor who has shown the film many times:   
Ladies and gentlemen, you are now gazing upon a photograph of the famous 
Black Diamond Express. In just a moment, a cataclysmic moment, my friends, a 
moment without equal in the history of our times, you will see this train take life 
in a marvelous and most astounding manner. It will rush toward you, belching 
smoke and fire from its monstrous iron throat…74 
 
                                                 
73 Smith 39. 
74 Smith 38-39. Blackton is referencing not only the “cataclysm” of the film’s subject matter, but also the 
wonder of a photograph that suddenly “becomes” a motion picture when the projector’s crank is turned.   
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The moment of seeing the Black Diamond Express is “cataclysmic” not for Blackton, but 
for the audience, as is the “marvelous and most astounding manner” in which the train 
“take[s] life;” it’s also worth noting that the “moment” Blackton describes was hardly 
unique, and only “without equal” in the experience of first-time viewers of Smith and 
Blackton’s film. Train films were among the most popular of early films, and they were 
shown widely all over the country beginning in the late 1890s and continuing well into 
the early part of the century. Blackton’s commentary, then, is less a deployment of new 
knowledge about the film and more a kind of pose or performance that imitates what his 
audience knows or is about to learn by watching the film.  
 In an article surveying recent scholarship on the moving picture lecturer, film 
historian Tom Gunning emphasizes the significance of precisely the kind of performative 
enthusiasm and sensitivity—even deference—to  audience response epitomized by 
Blackton's commentary. Stressing the need to appreciate the diversity of a cultural 
practice that has only recently begun to receive sustained critical attention, Gunning 
describes several variations of the lecturer’s practice that function less as narrative 
explanations that “serve” a film’s visual images and more as original, individualized 
performances that derive their force from a recognition of the spectator as a key figure in 
the production of a film’s meaning.75 For Gunning, the lecturer is part of the larger 
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soundscape that accompanied a film and exerted considerable influence on how it was 
perceived and understood. Such soundscapes, says Gunning, have the “capacity…to 
create a new space, neither on the screen nor entirely unrelated to it, a space of the 
“auditorium,” shared by the film’s accompanists and the audience in which meaning can 
be played with.”76 
 At the most basic level, however, Gunning highlights how the lecturer’s practice 
called attention to the material presence of the audience itself. The “space of the 
“auditorium” that Gunning references is significant not just as a theater for the production 
of alternate meanings, but also as a space that allows the lecturer to provide a human 
connection between audience and film, a connection that Gunning calls the “common 
ground of nearly all film lecturers”: 
Clearly the film lecture acted as a relay between film and audience, but the 
lecturer could either basically ignore the audience in explicating the film or 
constantly keep in touch with them through jokes, comments and gestures. With 
this tactile metaphor I come back to what I see as the common ground of nearly 
all film lecturers, their supplementing of the visual sense with another dimension. 
Even the trade journal articles calling for a dignified film lecturer found their 
argument for spoken accompaniment not simply in the need for narrative clarity, 
but in the immediate appeal of the human voice. We must not limit this appeal to 
the supplement of sound, but recognize the attraction of being addressed by a 
fully present human being, an element which silent cinema had trouble 
supplying.77  
 
Gunning’s remarks here about the lecturer’s practice of “constantly keep[ing] in touch” 
with the audience suggests a mode of mediation that calibrated itself precisely to the 
responses of the audience to the images on the screen. Such calibration represents the 
acquisition and deployment of a kind of knowledge entirely different from the collection 
                                                                                                                                                 
opportunity to “re-interpret or transform the meaning of the original film,” an opportunity that he claims 
was “inherent in the lecturer’s interaction with a film text.”  
76 Gunning, “Scene” 74. 
77 Gunning, “Scene” 77.  
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of facts that the lecturer would know about a film’s locale or its narrative sequence. 
Gunning suggests that coming to know his audience is at least as important as the 
lecturer’s knowledge about the particulars of the film he shows, and as his “tactile 
metaphor” suggests, the method by which the lecturer acquires such knowledge brings 
him closer to the audience’s experience of embodied sensation than his conventional role 
as distanced, knowledgeable narrator might suggest. Coming to know his audience 
required the lecturer’s careful observation and interpretation of the spectators themselves; 
specifically, of their comments, body language and facial expressions. Lecturers were, 
essentially, managers of a different kind of knowledge—the knowledge of what and how 
an audience responds to and will feel about a particular film.  
 The points that Gunning and Lacasse make about the centrality of audience 
response to the lecturer’s practice gesture toward its principal challenge, one defined by a 
confrontation between two subjects who know, albeit in different ways. The lecturer may 
know more about the film than the audience, but the audience knows what they see. 
Telling people what they were seeing as they were seeing it ran the risk of contradicting 
the interpretations and explanations that spectators were forming for themselves—a risk 
that made the lecturer’s perceptions of audience response even more crucial to his 
successful mediation of a film. He was, then, responsible not only for disseminating his 
own factual knowledge about a film, but also for gauging and managing the knowledge 
that the audience was producing for itself about a particular film.  
 The moving picture lecturer's challenge of mediating an experience that audiences 
were ever-more capable of understanding for themselves illuminates the narrative crisis 
that The Monster pushes to a starkly pessimistic conclusion. By the end of Crane's 
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novella,  no amount of well-reasoned, knowledgeable telling can convince anyone in 
Whilomville that Henry Johnson is not the menacing monster that he appears to be: the 
townspeople stubbornly cling to their sensory experience of Henry rather than the sense 
that figures like Dr. Trescott and Martha Goodwin try to make of him. This eventual 
conclusion is neatly encapsulated by The Monster's opening scene, in which Jimmie’s 
tortured interactions with his father fail utterly to mediate a shocking scene that both 
characters confront—a scene that, like the films that confronted both audience and 
lecturer in the theaters of the 1890s, was visible to both but purportedly more legible to 
the lecturer who explained and commented on its content. But although Jimmie 
understands the scene more fully than his father, he is hardly able to explain what has 
happened or shape his father’s response to it. As he attempts to explain how, during his 
imaginary game of “train,” he has accidentally destroyed a garden peony, Jimmie 
experiences a profound loss for words: 
 “Pa!” repeated the child at length. Then he raised his finger and pointed at the 
flower-bed. “There!” 
“What?” said the doctor, frowning more. “What is it, Jim?” 
After a period of silence, during which the child may have undergone a severe 
mental tumult, he raised his finger and repeated his former word—“There!” The 
father had respected this silence with perfect courtesy. Afterwards his glance 
carefully followed the direction indicated by the child’s finger, but he could see 
nothing which explained to him. “I don’t understand what you mean, Jimmie,” he 
said. 
It seemed that the importance of the whole thing had taken away the boy’s 
vocabulary. He could only reiterate, “There!” [449-450] 
 
Jimmie’s “vocabulary” is reduced to a single word that, in this scene, derives all of its 
meaning from the visible sight of the broken peony—just as the narrator’s metaphors can 
be read as direct references to actual events in the text. As this opening scene suggests, 
struggling—and often failing—to find words to describe a shocking scene is a recurring 
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motif in The Monster –even, it seems, for the narrator. But rather than the kind of feigned 
wordlessness that represents the identificatory strategy of a lecturer like Holmes, The 
Monster’s “lost vocabularies” are genuinely lost. The narrator’s losses of vocabulary 
especially expose the inherent challenges of attempting to mediate the kind of subjective, 
variable experiences of perception and sensation that another person’s spectatorship 
always entails—particularly when, as was true in the case of the moving picture lecturer, 
such mediation was so heavily dependent on reading and interpreting these experiences 
of spectatorship effectively. In The Monster, as the novella’s opening scene suggests, 
such intense concern with audience response leads to the mediator’s loss of control and 
authority: at the end of this scene, Jimmie’s attempt to mediate the shocking scene of the 
broken peony for his paternal audience is taken over by Dr. Trescott, just as the narrator’s 
“audience” of Whilomville residents will eventually commandeer the narrator’s own 
point of view about who and what Henry Johnson is. In the novella’s opening scene, 
Jimmie is acutely anxious about his father’s response to the scene of the broken peony, 
“look[ing] guiltily at his father” just after the incident; twice more as he surveys the 
situation and tries to “fix” the damage he has inflicted, and, finally, “scanning his 
[father’s] countenance” [450] after Trescott has noticed the broken flower. Jimmie’s 
continual checks on his father’s response to what he sees are an exaggerated version of 
Gunning’s evocation of a performer whose skill lay in his ability to perceive and respond 
to the visual data offered by the faces of his audience. In The Monster’s version of this 
scene, sensitivity to an audience’s response inverts the roles of mediator and spectator, 
transferring control of the situation from Jimmie to his father. After several frightened 
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attempts to get his father’s attention and direct it toward the sight of the peony, Dr. 
Trescott is  
obliged to go forward alone. After some trouble he found the subject of the 
incident, the broken flower. Turning then, he saw the child lurking at the rear and 
scanning his countenance. [450] 
 
Abandoned by his guide, Jimmie’s audience of one is forced to search and see for 
himself. In doing so, Dr. Trescott becomes a voice of both a narrative and an ethical 
authority: he draws the story of the peony’s destruction out of Jimmie, and his “delivery 
of judgment” deems the “thrills” of Jimmie’s game of train too dangerous to continue:  
The father reflected. After a time he said, “Jimmie, come here.” With an infinite 
modesty of demeanor the child came forward. “Jimmie, how did this happen?”  
The child answered, “Now—I was playin’ train—and—now—I runned over it.”  
“You were doing what?”  
“I was playin’ train.”  
The father reflected again. “Well, Jimmie,” he said, slowly, “I guess you had 
better not play train any more to-day. Do you think you had better?”  
“No, sir,” said Jimmie. [450] 
 
In this scene, Jimmie is only able to explain what has happened after his father sees the 
damaged peony and, essentially, deduces that Jimmie is somehow to blame. It is only 
after Dr. Trescott becomes an audience who already knows the essentials of what he’s 
seeing that Jimmie is able to explain the details of the sight before them: his story is 
painstakingly brought forth by an audience who sees and knows for itself and passes 
judgment accordingly. 
 As the scene’s most articulate speaker and judge, Dr. Trescott himself assumes a 
sort of narrative responsibility, one that manages the scene’s ethical import and its 
position within the narrative—it is Dr. Trescott, after all, whose dismissal of Jimmie 
brings the scene to a close. Dr. Trescott’s narrative role is thrown into sharp relief by 
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what seems like the narrator’s deliberate abdication of such ethical and narrative 
responsibilities: after the peony is definitively destroyed, the intense psychological 
intimacy that he has shared with Jimmie is replaced by a studied attention to the 
superficial sights and sounds of the Trescott yard. As the narrator begins to describe the 
conversation between Jimmie and his father, his description of the ambient noise in the 
yard suggests that such noise is at least as absorbing as Jimmie’s or his father’s psyches:  
The doctor paused, and with the howl of the machine no longer occupying the 
sense, one could hear the robins in the cherry-trees arranging their affairs. Jim’s 
hands were behind his back, and sometimes his fingers clasped and unclasped. 
Again he said “Pa!” The child’s fresh and rosy lip was lowered.  
The doctor stared down at his son, thrusting his head forward and frowning 
attentively. “What is it, Jimmie?” [449] 
 
The narrator’s description of the lawnmower’s “howl” as a sound that “occupies” 
suggests a certain aggression to the sound of the mower, a noise that forcibly overtakes 
not just an individual’s hearing, but the larger “sense”—not Dr. Trescott’s or Jimmie’s 
sense of hearing, but a larger and more general “sense” indicated by the definite article 
“the”—of the events being perceived. And although the cessation of the mower enables 
the connection between Jimmie and his father, the lack of the machine’s “howl” seems to 
distance the narrator from “the sense” of what happens in Jimmie’s consciousness and to 
redirect his attention to the superficial, material details of the scene. The narrator states 
that “one” could hear the sound of the robins, a pronoun that aligns the narrator’s 
perspective not with Jimmie or his father, but rather with an anonymous listener without 
the kind of access to the characters’ thoughts that the narrator’s initial description of 
Jimmie’s game of train evidences. Rather than confirming and elaborating on Jimmie’s 
feelings of guilt and shame, the narrator’s depictions of Jimmie are now limited to 
descriptions of his physical gestures and demeanor—his “fingers clasped and unclasped,” 
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and his “lowered…fresh and rosy lip.” Several lines later, the narrator makes his lack of 
access to Jimmie’s thoughts explicit when he says that, “after a period of silence, during 
which the child may have undergone a severe mental tumult, he raised his finger and 
repeated his former word—There!” The narrator refuses—or is unable—to definitively 
confirm or deny the “mental tumult” that Jimmie experiences during the “period of 
silence” that passes between Jimmie and his father. No longer privy to Jimmie’s intimate 
thoughts; then, the narrator’s omniscience becomes a kind of purely sensational 
knowledge, one whose access to sights and sounds is expansive but limited to their 
superficial occurrences: like Jimmie himself—or perhaps more like Burton Holmes’s 
“frank” admission of his inability to describe what he sees—the narrator’s mediation of 
this scene becomes a gesture of surrender—a mute finger that does little more than 
point—to the sensational events that he narrates.  
 
Sights, Sounds And Narrative Disruption  
 The replacement, in The Monster’s opening scene, of the narrator’s psychological 
omniscience with a superficial knowledge that is limited to the sights and sounds of the 
Trescott yard is a gesture that is repeated throughout The Monster, and it is one that is 
frequently occasioned by or otherwise linked to representations of sound. These narrative 
perceptions of sound are moments in which the temporal order of the story becomes 
compromised or unsettled—moments in which the narrator seems not to know  as much 
about his story as anyone else who might have watched it unfold. At the end of a section 
that shifts abruptly among several different scenes of intense activity related to the fire at 
the Trescott house, for instance, the narrator draws attention to the simultaneity of the 
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events he has just described, a gesture that “re-caps” the town’s frenzied response to the 
fire with close attention to the way these responses sounded and looked:  
The news had been telegraphed by a twist of the wrist of a neighbor who had gone 
to the fire-box at the corner, and the time when Hannigan and his charge struggled 
out of the house was the time when the whistle roared its hoarse night call, 
smiting the crowd in the park, causing the leader of the band, who was about to 
order the first triumphal clang of a military march, to let his hand drop slowly to 
his knee. [462-463] 
 
The statement that “the news had been telegraphed by a twist of the wrist of a neighbor” 
explains the origin of the whistle that “smote the crowd in the park,” but the rest of the 
information in this passage refers to events that have already been described. The 
narrator’s gesture in this passage seems to be one of practical clarification at the level of 
the novella’s plot—a gesture that echoes the moving picture lecturer’s explanations of the 
often puzzling temporal relationships between scenes in the earliest “story films.” 
However, the narrator’s indication that the events he references happened simultaneously 
does little to enhance a reader’s understanding of The Monster’s plot: the account of these 
scenes that precedes this passage makes it fairly clear that they unfold at around the same 
time; furthermore, why does it matter that Hannigan’s encounter with Mrs. Trescott 
happened at precisely the same moment as the whistle’s “smiting” of the crowd in the 
park? The narrator strikes the didactic pose of the lecturer at a moment in the novella 
when such a pose is largely unnecessary, at least in terms of understanding the plot—a 
gesture that, incidentally, points to the special obsolescence to which the lecturer would 
eventually be relegated by the rise of genuinely narrative films.  
 Rather than providing a necessary clarification, then, the narrator’s commentary is 
most significant in its evocation of an omniscience that seems solely focused on the 
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sensory data and physical spaces of the scenes he observes. The superficiality of this 
perspective is further emphasized by the passage’s emphasis on the minute bodily 
gestures of its characters:
78
 it is, in part, the smallness of the gestures the narrator 
observes here—the neighbor’s “twist of the wrist;” the band leader’s hand dropping 
slowly to his knee;”79 and later, the image of “somebody grappl[ing] the bell-rope in the 
Methodist church” to produce the bell’s “solemn voice speaking from the clouds” 
[460]—that highlight the narrator’s penetrating yet superficial vision—his sensory but 
not psychological omniscience. The narrator’s insistence on the simultaneity of events in 
the passage above emphasizes an omniscience that only knows as much as it sees: the 
narrator’s notation of the simultaneity of the events he describes reveals only that he 
knows what gestures caused what sounds; in other words, he knows how the sounds he 
describes look as well as how they sound.  
 The narrator's sensory omniscience may attempt to claim a form of knowledge 
that transcends the boundaries of the senses, but it is nevertheless spectacularly bad at 
gauging the degree to which its reader knows or understands the story being told. The 
way the narrator references the various scenes in this “sum-up” passage at first seem to 
acknowledge the reader’s familiarity with the scenes he references; however, by the end 
of the passage, the narrator speaks as if the reader has forgotten—or hasn’t heard—his 
initial description of the band’s truncated performance. Referring to Mrs. Trescott as 
Hannigan’s “charge” and the Trescott house as “the house” acknowledges that readers 
                                                 
78 These narrative “close-ups” reflect films in the cinema of attractions that depicted similar views of body 
parts or gestures. Musser claims that “facial expression films,” for example, were “popular in the late 1890s 
and early 1900s.” Musser, Edison Motion Pictures 130. 
79 The similarity of these gestures to the act of writing recalls Michael Fried’s well-known argument, in 
Realism, Writing and Disfiguration, about Crane and the scene of writing. The rhyme in “twist of the wrist” 
especially calls attention to the text as constructed, but also to its potential for being spoken.  
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will immediately recall the scene that describes Hannigan’s efforts to get Mrs. Trescott to 
leave her burning house. Yet his next reference—to the scene of the crowd hearing the 
whistle in the park—seems to forget that the reader already knows about the scene to 
which he is referring. The phrase “the time when the whistle roared its hoarse night call” 
provides the reader with enough information to recall the scene being referenced, 
whereas the clauses that follow sound like an unwitting repetition or re-description of the 
narrator’s original account of this scene that appears several pages earlier:  
Suddenly, without preliminary bars, there arose from afar the great hoarse roar of 
a factory whistle…The band-master had been about to vehemently let fall his 
hand to start the band on a thundering career through a popular march, but, 
smitten by this giant voice from the night, his hand dropped slowly to his 
knee…[458] 
 
The narrator’s repetition, in the later passage, of his comments about the whistle “smiting 
the crowd in the park;” the “leader of the band ha[ving] been about to order the first clang 
of a triumphal military march;” and his “hand drop[ping] slowly to his knee” is more like 
a description that reminds rather than a narrative that tells. The narrator’s re-description 
of this original account of the scene in the park highlights his failure—or refusal—to 
acknowledge what his readers already know about the story he is telling. In this passage, 
a moment of panoramic visual knowledge coincides with a moment of ignorance about 
the reader’s knowledge: emphasizing what he knows about the story also emphasizes 
what he doesn’t know about the reader’s perceptions. The narrator may be supersensitive 
to the bodies and sounds of the story he tells, but he is also blatantly insensitive to his 
reader’s “sense” of the story he is telling.  
 The narrator’s repetitive “sum-up” of exactly how and when the events leading up 
to the fire occur reads like a literary version of the overlapping action that characterized 
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some early fiction films. In The Monster’s latter “re-cap” passage, the narrator’s quickly 
shifting descriptions among scenes that are all occurring at the same time echo this 
technique; however, in Crane’s version, the emphasis is more on simultaneity and 
sensory sensitivity rather than on pushing the narrative forward. Like the visually 
arresting, one-shot films that defined the cinema of attractions, The Monster’s moments 
of narrative stasis are vivid, intensely sensory episodes. Such moments are also marked 
by the narrator’s insistence on his own uniquely sensitive perception of the spectacle he 
describes: complexly synesthetic descriptions and metaphors map out a privileged sort of 
sensory knowledge, one accessible to the narrator alone. Crane’s emphasis on the 
narrator’s sensory privilege is perhaps the novella’s strongest insistence on the futility of 
telling a story that listeners can hear and see for themselves: the idiosyncracy of 
narrator’s synesthetic metaphors and descriptions makes the narrator’s tale look more like 
a private illustration of his own story than an attempt to make that story visible to a 
community of readers.   
 The oddly synesthetic descriptions of the beginning of the fire at the Trescott 
house are an excellent illustration of this tendency: they emphasize the narrator’s 
uniquely sensitive perceptions, but in the process, they undermine the ironic distance and 
narrative authority that characterizes much of his other narration. Several of the 
fundamentally silent visual details in this passage are described in terms of sound, as if 
the narrator’s vision is powerful enough to hear as well as see. The narrator describes the 
“outlines” of the Trescott home has having “faded quietly into the evening,” and in the 
next paragraph states that the fire’s first wisps of smoke “drifted quietly into the branches 
of a cherry-tree.” Describing the fundamentally silent phenomena of fading and drifting 
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as “quiet” suggests that they actually do have an aural component, one that is—perhaps—
only perceptible to the most sensitive of ears.  
 The suggestion of an ear that is sensitive to sight as well as sound is made explicit 
in the metaphoric language that the narrator uses to describe the first glimpses of actual 
fire: 
After a moment the window brightened as if the four panes of it had been stained 
with blood, and a quick ear might have been led to imagine the fire-imps calling 
and calling, clan joining clan, gathering to the colors. [461] 
 
The organization of clauses in this sentence presents the experiences of seeing and 
hearing as inextricably linked. The “and” that joins the first two clauses suggests that the 
sight of the fiery panes of glass inspires the narrator’s image of an aural imagination and 
the sound of the “fire-imps calling and calling” that such an imagination might produce. 
The narrator’s hearing is not just sensitive to sight, it is also a sense that can “imagine” all 
on its own, seemingly without the help of a mind to interpret what it hears.80 Crane’s 
collapsed version of imagined sound—a version that ascribes the power of imagination to 
an isolated sense—conflates the body and the mind, insisting on a mode of perception 
that hears and imagines all on its own.  
 Such an ear seems to belong to the narrator alone: the next sentence reiterates the 
deceptively quiet and peaceful sight of the house in a way that distinguishes the narrator’s 
impression of the fire from the more “public” appearance of the house:  
                                                 
80 The idea of being led to imagine could also easily describe the situation that spectators of early film 
found themselves in: the lecturer led them to imagine many things about the films he described/showed, 
and the sounds that films could not yet reproduce were always available to be—and often were—imagined 
and reproduced by the sound effects that accompanied most films in the 1890s. For a detailed discussion of 
such sound effects, see Stephen Bottomore’s “An International Survey Of Sound Effects In Early Cinema.” 
Film History 11.4 (1999) 485-498. 
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From the street, however, the house maintained its dark quiet, insisting to the 
passer-by that it was the safe dwelling of people who chose to retire early to 
tranquil dreams. No one could have heard this low droning of the gathering clans. 
[461] 
 
These sentences emphasize just how unlikely it would be for any “passer-by” in 
Whilomville to imagine the kind of metaphoric description of the fire’s beginning that the 
narrator puts forth in the previous sentence. The inability to hear the “low droning” reads 
not so much as a sensory insensitivity, but rather as a failure of imagination—a failure to 
imagine the fullness of sensory experience upon seeing a particular sight. The narrator is 
careful to emphasize that the house is actually quiet: the anonymous “passer-by” would 
be prevented from imagining the fire-imps by the house’s “dark quiet,” a description that 
makes use of the same synesthetic linkage of sight and sound that characterized the 
descriptions of the fading house and drifting smoke.  
 This kind of synesthetic perception is elaborated and interpreted by the narrator’s 
metaphoric understanding of the world he describes—an understanding that is repeatedly 
contrasted with the less insightful perceptions of Whilomville’s many “passer-bys.” The 
narrator’s declaration that “no one could have heard” the low droning of the fire-imps is 
the second time in this section that the narrator presents a metaphoric image that he 
insists is barely discernible to anyone but himself. In the paragraph that describes the first 
wisps of smoke drifting from an upstairs window of the Trescott home, the narrator ends 
his description by claiming that the phenomenon “was no more to be noted than if a troop 
of dim and silent gray monkeys had been climbing a grape-vine into the clouds.” 
Considering that it would indeed be quite unusual to see the kind of monkeys that the 
narrator imagines, it seems that his claim about the smoke’s obscurity is a sarcastic one. 
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The narrator’s initial emphasis on the copiousness and proliferation of the smoke 
corroborates such a reading:  
A wisp of smoke came from one of the windows at the end of the house and 
drifted quietly into the branches of a cherry-tree. Its companions followed it in 
slowly increasing numbers, and finally there was a current controlled by invisible 
banks which poured into the fruit-laden boughs of the cherry tree. [461] 
 
It seems unlikely that such a river of smoke—or a “troop of monkeys” would go 
unnoticed. Both this image of an abundant river of smoke and the outlandish image of 
monkeys climbing to the sky point to a mocking assessment of the perceptive powers (or 
lack thereof) of Whilomville’s “passer-bys.” However, the narrator’s sarcasm here is not 
completely untempered—the monkeys are, after all, “dim and silent,” suggesting that 
they might actually be difficult to perceive—not because of what they are, but because of 
how they appear. The narrator’s focus on the perceptibility of his own metaphoric image 
deflates the force of his irony, as if the brute facts of sight and sound overcome the 
sophisticated twists and turns of style that the narrator’s metaphor tries to achieve. 
 
Conclusion 
 By the end of The Monster, the narrator’s emphasis on his own uniquely 
perceived “facts” of sight and sound gives way to an emphasis on an even more 
subjective and arbitrary “fact,” one that undermines both the narrator’s authority as a 
seeing, sensing mediator and the authority of the novella’s generally recognized “moral 
center,” Dr. Trescott. The Monster’s final scene depicts Dr. and Mrs. Trescott in the 
latter’s drawing-room, contemplating the table of unused teacups and uneaten cake 
intended for the friends who have shunned them as a result of their continued support of 
Henry Johnson. Most of this scene unfolds through dialogue between Dr. and Mrs. 
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Trescott, with the most significant commentary from the narrator directed at describing 
Dr. Trescott’s perceptions of the scene—the “example.” In the final sentences of the 
novella, however, the narrator’s free indirect discourse suggests an intimacy with Dr. 
Trescott that includes not just access to his thoughts, but also the same experience of a 
mental “glitch” or repetition that Trescott experiences. As he begins to understand his 
wife’s abandonment by her friends, Dr. Trescott  
glanc[es] down at the cups [and] mechanically counted them.  There were fifteen 
of them. "There, there," he said. "Don't cry, Grace. Don't cry." The wind was 
whining round the house, and the snow beat aslant upon the windows. Sometimes 
the coal in the stove settled with a crumbling sound, and the four panes of mica 
flashed a sudden new crimson. As he sat holding her head on his shoulder, 
Trescott found himself occasionally trying to count the cups. There were fifteen 
of them. [508] 
The narrator’s repeated description of Dr. Trescott’s “mechanical” impulse to count his 
wife’s teacups and statement of their number suggests that the narrator, too, has taken 
refuge in a kind of mechanized perspective, one that is perceptive enough to know the 
details of a character’s thoughts, but hardly discerning enough to pick and choose which 
are significant enough to share through description. The narrator’s initial description of 
Trescott’s cup-counting is significant in that it conveys just how many women have 
shunned Mrs. Trescott, but the repetition of both the description of Trescott’s mental 
exercise of counting and the number of cups concludes the novella with a narrative 
gesture that is as arbitrary as it is insightful: the narrator’s final piece of privileged 
knowledge is actually a performance of just the sort of cognitive-perceptual “glitch” that 
might affect the witness of a traumatic or shocking scene.  
 The narrator’s final comment about Mrs. Trescott’s fifteen cups is also an 
observation of precisely the sort of fact that would require neither explanation nor 
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mediation—at least not for a reader even minimally attentive to textual details. Such a 
fact would also be easily legible to any sort of seeing, thinking audience that might 
perceive it in a filmic image—and yet, in 1899, moving picture lecturers were still on 
hand to indicate, explain and dramatize such facts. The Monster’s conclusion enacts the 
futility of precisely this sort of deictic mediation, one that insists on showing audiences 
what they could see well enough for themselves. Within the next ten years, the moving 
picture lecturer’s practice would be rendered largely obsolete by the advent of narrative 
films—films whose purely visual technique of storytelling made the moving picture 
lecturer’s practice seem as redundant as a repeated statement of how many unused 
teacups sit on a table. In The Monster, the narrator’s final display of narrative futility is 
perhaps the novella’s clearest answer to the epistemological and ethical questions it 
persistently raises: the narrator may see, feel and know more than any of Whilomville’s 
gossiping, spectacle-loving citizens, but none of these perceptual and cognitive privileges 
can definitively guarantee him the privilege of mediating their sensational experience or 
the sense they make of it. 
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Chapter 3 
The Brute Learns to See: Snapshot Photography and Henry James’s What Maisie Knew 
 
 
The thing had been done in the cloakroom where the kindergarten children hung their 
hats and coats…About half past eight, two or three five-year-olds, one a little colored 
girl, came into the schoolroom of the kindergarten with a great chatter of voices, going 
across to the cloakroom to hang up their hats and coats as they had been taught…Then 
the tallest of the little girls swung the door of the little cloakroom wide open and they all 
ran in. 
--Frank Norris, McTeague
81
 
 
But the little boy remained very interested in watching Vandover, still on the floor, tying 
the last knots. As he finished, he glanced up. For an instant the two remained there 
motionless, looking into each other’s eyes, Vandover on the floor, one hand twisted into 
the bale rope about his bundle, the little boy standing before him eating the last mouthful 
of his bread and butter.  
--Frank Norris, Vandover and the Brute
82
 
 
 The scenes referenced by the preceding quotes represent the reader’s final 
glimpses of two of Frank Norris’s most hapless brutes—Trina McTeague and 
Vandover—as viewed through the eyes of children: observers who, at the end of the 
nineteenth century, could readily be identified as both a particular sort of observer and a 
particular sort of brute. Leaving the final images of Trina and Vandover in the keeping of 
these diminutive, observant brutes might seem like nothing so much as expressions of a 
conventionally naturalistic pessimism about the meaning of an individual’s experience: 
kindergarten children and Vandover’s boy observer are barely able to understand or
                                                 
81 Norris, Frank. McTeague: A Story of San Francisco. Ed. Donald Pizer. (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1996)  
82 Norris, Frank. Vandover and the Brute. (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1928)  
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 articulate the social or moral significance of what they see, a fact that points to the 
unlikelihood of these lives ever being told in a meaningful way. Such pessimism could 
certainly be read as equally applicable to the observers who attempt to document the lives 
of brutes: perhaps the naturalist author has as little hope of making meaning out of 
Trina’s or Vandover’s story as the inarticulate children who witness the final moments of 
these characters.    
 Yet these child observers are not exactly inarticulate, nor are they without the 
ability to interpret and complicate what they see for an audience of adult observers. One 
of the little girls in McTeague’s cloakroom scene nearly discerns what she is about to see 
by comparing the “funnee smell” of the cloakroom to the odor of her father’s butcher 
shop
83; and, in Vandover, the little boy’s repetitions of a jibe that initially provoked the 
delighted laughter of his adult companions eventually make them uncomfortably 
conscious of how much they have in common with the hapless Vandover.
84
 These scenes 
hint at the possibility that the child-brute is, in fact, a uniquely perceptive sort of 
observer. Yet the cloakroom scene especially suggests that this is a possibility Norris was 
unwilling to explore fully: his narrator stops short of describing the little girls’ reaction to 
what they see, a gesture that I read as a telling refusal to surrender control of the story he 
tells to narrators with a far better view of it than his own. Unlike Norris’s privileged, 
distanced narrators, who can advance or retreat from their subjects at will, his child 
observers—who have little control over where they go or what they see—cannot help 
their intimacies with the scenes they observe. The presence of children as the final 
                                                 
83 Norris, McTeague. 208. 
84 Norris, Vandover and the Brute. 309-311. 
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witnesses of Trina’s and Vandover’s decline indexes an uneasy awareness of their unique 
potential, as naive tellers of the stories they are forced to witness. 
 Unlikely as the juxtaposition may seem, What Maisie Knew—perhaps the most 
penetrating of Henry James’s interrogations into a mode of childhood perception that is at 
once naïve and uniquely knowledgeable—takes up the questions of observation and 
knowledge that Norris’s classic naturalist novels shrink from addressing. Maisie is a child 
whose observations, unlike those of Norris’s kindergarten girls or bread-munching little 
boy, are meticulously documented by a narrator who observes and interprets them from a 
perspective that is closer to that of Maisie herself than it is to the patronizing, distant eye 
of Norris’s narrator. What Maisie Knew could hardly be described as an example of 
naturalist fiction along the lines of McTeague or Vandover and the Brute; however, 
James’s novel takes up issues about the privileges of seeing, knowing and telling that 
animate the most recognizable and compelling of naturalism’s fictional illustrations of 
life at the end of the nineteenth century.
85
 
 The potential of the child as a quintessential witness, documentarian and observer 
of modern life that both Norris and James engage was hardly lost on the makers and 
promoters of the era’s most significant photographic innovation, the instantaneous 
camera. The advertising and promotion of America’s new photography hobby by 
                                                 
85 The question of whether or not James can or should be considered a naturalist writer has been much 
debated in the critical literature. See, for example, Lyall Harris Powers’s Henry James and the Naturalist 
Movement. (East Lansing: Michigan State UP, 1971); Donald Pizer’s American Realists and Naturalists. 
(Detroit: Gale, 1982), and Mark Seltzer’s (Bodies and Machines. New York: Routledge, 1992); and Hersan 
Al-Zubi’s "American Realism Versus French Naturalism: Henry James, Emile Zola and the Negotiation of 
Ideology." Journal of American Studies in Turkey 10 (1999): 17-37. More recent discussions of James and 
naturalism suggest that James’s interest in late-nineteenth century phenomena as varied as statistics 
(Colbey Emmerson Reid, “The Statistical Aesthetics of Henry James, or Jamesian Naturalism.” The Henry 
James Review  30.2 (Spring 2009): 101-114) and fashion and fads (Fleissner, Jennifer. Women, 
Compulsion, Modernity: The Moment Of American Naturalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2004).  
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Eastman Kodak—by far the best-known and most successful proprietor of the business of 
instantaneous photography—relied heavily on the idea of a child as both an ideal subject 
and practitioner of instantaneous photography. Snapshot photography was a practice that 
realized the anxious proto-imaginings of McTeague’s narrator at the close of his story: 
not only did it give “brute” observers (especially children) a means of documenting their 
own lives, it also allowed for the kind of distanced accuracy that McTeague’s narrator 
ultimately rejects as untenable.  
 The physical distance between photographer and subject that snapshot 
photography afforded suggests that it would be an ideal model of observation and 
documentation for a narrator too anxious to stand close enough to photograph his brute 
subjects in the conventional way. I would argue, however, that Norris and his fellow 
naturalists shrank from such a model rather than embracing it: we never do see Trina’s 
body through the eyes of the little girls who find it, and we never learn what kind of 
image Vandover is to the little boy who “narrates” his final scene of decline. These child-
brute observers may be eyewitnesses to the lives of people like Trina and Vandover, but 
their childish lack of experience and knowledge about these lives puts a different sort of 
distance between them and the people they see, one that the naturalist narrator cannot 
accept. The children in McTeague and Vandover and the Brute are observers who see 
without knowing, a mode of observation that was epitomized by the popular practice of 
snapshot photography. Rather than naturalism’s insistence on the precise correlation 
between seeing and knowing, where seeing equals knowledge, the mode of observation 
shaped by instantaneous photography was characterized more by the gaps between sight 
and knowledge than it was by their convergence. Norris’s palpable yet unexplored 
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anxiety about the possibilities of child observers gestures toward a broader cultural 
anxiety about the freedom of observation and documentation that snapshot photography 
offered to virtually anyone—even those who might be considered brutes.  Eastman 
Kodak’s robust advertising campaigns—especially those that drew on the innocence of 
the child photographer—strove to erase anxieties about the democratizing potential of 
snapshot photography. In What Maisie Knew, however, the methods of seeing, knowing 
and telling that occupy Maisie’s narrator and James’s perceptive subject confront these 
anxieties directly, and ultimately point toward an intuitive epistemology that depends on 
a so-called “brutish” mode of perception and understanding as the ideal way in which to 
bear witness to the reality of modern life. Like the wide-eyed children who populated 
Kodak’s advertisements, James’s Maisie learns to see with a naivete that renders her 
uniquely suited to apprehend the world she confronts. Both Kodak’s ads and James’s 
novel suggest that the best observers are those who don’t quite understand what they 
see—a suggestion that the nineteenth century’s realist and naturalist authors were 
distinctly unwilling to entertain seriously. Unlike the majority of naturalism’s well-
informed narrators, Maisie contemplates the realities of a changing social and urban 
landscape without the reassurance (debatable though it may be) of knowing—or 
believing that she knows--what came before or what to expect from the world that 
surrounds her. 
 
Seeing The Brute And The Seeing Brute In What Maisie Knew  
 In James’s novel, the growth of Maisie’s understanding takes place in the kind of 
curious separations between sight and knowledge that were epitomized by the era’s 
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ubiquitous image of a Kodak camera wielded by a child. For Eastman Kodak, children 
were both an ideal market demographic and, as the “stars” of myriad advertisements and 
promotional statements, an appealing trope that mitigated the cultural anxieties associated 
with snapshot photography. George Eastman’s comments in letters, promotional 
materials and interviews about the Kodak’s debut suggest that the company’s association 
of their snapshot cameras with the idea of the child was almost immediate: in one such 
statement, Eastman likens the joy of one of his principal stockholders at receiving a 
Kodak to that of a “boy over a top,”86 while elsewhere, when asked about the origin of 
the name “Kodak,” Eastman claimed that the word was appealing only on the basis of its 
definitive, hard sound—otherwise, it was “as meaningless as a child’s first ‘goo.”87  
 Comments like these predict the force with which Eastman’s company would 
soon deploy the image of the child in the advertisements that filled popular “family” 
magazines and newspapers. Ads like these [Fig. 1] pictured children as happy, curious 
practitioners of snapshot photography, wielding their cameras much as they would any 
other new toy. Equating the snapshot camera with a harmless toy suggested that the 
practice itself was just as harmless—a gesture that was necessary in the face of the 
growing social and cultural anxieties about the ease with which snapshot photography 
enabled just about anyone to take a picture of anyone else.88 Perhaps the most pointed 
example of this deployment of children as the representatives of a harmless—even 
                                                 
86 Jenkins, Reese. “Technology and the Market: George Eastman and the Origins of Mass Amateur 
Photography” Technology and Culture 16 (1): 1975, 1-19. 17. 
87 Conniff, Richard. “When “fiends” pressed the button, there was nowhere to hide.” Smithsonian 19 (3): 
1988. 106-116. 110. 
88 Robert Mensel, in his account of the Kodak’s influence on the development of privacy rights, claims that 
newspapers, who of course wanted photographs, attempted to dismiss complaints like these as irrational 
over-reactions to what were only “boyhood pranks.” See Mensel, Robert. "Kodakers Lying in Wait": 
Amateur Photography and the Right of Privacy in New York, 1885-1915. American Quarterly 43.1 (March 
1991) 24-45. 34. 
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morally and socially edifying—practice was occasioned by Kodak’s introduction of the 
widely popular Brownie camera in 1900. As Marc Olivier claims in his study of the 
cultural reception and history of the Brownie camera, the device was directly marketed to 
children, a gesture that “redefined not only who could take photographs, but for what 
purpose.”89 Olivier notes that the camera was named after the Brownies, a group of well-
known, cartoonish characters who appeared in a popular series of children’s books and “a 
series of illustrated poems and an unprecedented number of product endorsements that 
had appeared in popular women’s and children’s magazines from the 1880s onward.”90 
The Brownie books often detailed the adventures of these mythical sprites in the modern 
world of technology, telling stories of how they confront modern marvels like trains, 
telephones or electricity. In stories like these, claims Olivier, “the Brownies help anchor 
the shock of new technologies to traditions of unseen forces and magical helpers,”91 a 
feature that would be surely appeal to Eastman Kodak as a means of downplaying the 
snapshot camera’s unsettling potential to “shock” unsuspecting subjects.  
 Olivier emphasizes that Kodak’s promotion of the Brownie depended on the 
notion of the child’s “brutish” characteristics, i.e., his naivete and his ability to realize a 
purportedly “primitive urge toward visual communication.” In Kodak and the Lens of 
Nostalgia, Nancy Martha West offers a similar reading of Kodak’s deployment of 
children in their advertising campaigns, noting their emphasis on snapshots as “simple, 
spontaneous and accessible to children”—a characterization West claims was an attempt 
                                                 
89 Olivier, Marc. “George Eastman’s Modern Stone-Age Family: Snapshot Photography and the Brownie,” 
Technology and Culture 48 (January 2007) 1-19.  
90 Olivier 1. 
91 Olivier 6.  
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to render the “subversive,” unruly aspects of snapshot photography, i.e., the randomness 
of what the early, viewfinder-less snapshot cameras could and did capture.
92
  
 But while Kodak’s advertisements drew on the child’s naivete to emphasize the 
“innocence” of the practice more generally, What Maisie Knew asserts that the child’s 
attempt to puzzle out the mysterious connections between what she sees and what she 
knows are among the most potent of epistemological methods for building an accurate 
picture of modern life. What Maisie Knew recounts the life of a little girl tossed between 
her selfish, divorced parents—and later, her step-parents—as the token of their mutual 
hostility and bitterness. Yet as James’s narrator suggests in an early description of 
Maisie, the novel also documents what he describes as the “fated” growth of Maisie’s 
knowledge about her own situation:  
It was the fate of this little girl to see much more than, at first, she understood, but 
also, even at first, to understand much more than any little girl, however patient, 
had ever understood before.
93
  
 
This early characterization of the unequal relationship between what Maisie sees and 
what she knows as her “fate” invites us to consider her childlike mode of vision—one 
that is distinctly camera-like in its mechanical absorption of visual data—as an alternative 
version of naturalism’s insistence on the privilege of seeing and knowing as part of a pre-
determined or “natural” set of abilities and characteristics. In the classic structure of the 
naturalist novel, the spectators who see and the brutes who are seen are cast in their 
respective roles by factors beyond their control—their biological inheritances, or the 
inexorable power of industrial capitalism’s social and economic forces. Maisie’s 
                                                 
92 West, Nancy Martha. Kodak and the Lens of Nostalgia. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 
2000) 181. 
93 James, Henry. What Maisie Knew. (New York: Library of America, 2003) 401. All subsequent page 
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spectatorial potential, however, pointedly complicates naturalism’s high-contrast split 
between its all-knowing spectators and its oblivious brutes. Unlike the brutishness of the 
brutes of naturalism who are relentlessly explained and patronized by the narrators who 
tell their stories, Maisie’s brutishness is confined to the misperceptions of her ill-behaved 
caretakers and, even more intriguingly, to the façade of idiocy that Maisie herself 
cultivates to resist their manipulations. James’s pointed evocation of the brute as a 
deceptive illusion questions any mode of knowledge production—like the naturalist 
novel—that depends on an assumption that any individual’s perceptions are “fated” 
products of his or her race, ethnicity or class. Situating the evolution of Maisie’s sight 
and knowledge as the “fate” that the novel will trace interrogates—and ultimately 
unsettles—the structure of spectator and brute that defines the naturalist novel.  
 
The Child Photographer Vs. The Kodak Fiend: A History Of Anxiety About 
Snapshot Photography 
 Maisie’s complication of naturalism’s spectator/brute dichotomy is also a 
reflection of the late nineteenth century’s cultural anxieties about the newly expansive 
opportunities for seeing, knowing and telling represented by snapshot photography. 
Maisie’s early adventures with the housemaid Susan Ash, in which the latter is 
“haunted…[by] the fear of being, as she ominously said, “spoken to,” even as she 
continually urges Maisie to “look at ‘er!” [437]—are a telling indication of Maisie’s 
familiarity with the dangers and thrills of a modern world in which everything—and 
everyone—was more visible than ever before. James’s unusually perceptive and knowing 
protagonist is an ironic inversion of the naïvely innocent child whose playful 
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photographic practice animated Eastman Kodak’s advertisements throughout the 1890s. 
This benign image of the child photographer suggested a practice that was as harmless as 
it was easy—a suggestion that countered the growing cultural awareness of the harm that 
a snapshooter’s surreptitiously obtained photograph could do to the privacy, reputations 
and social standing of people for whom such things mattered. Both the technologies and 
the marketing strategies developed by Eastman Kodak appealed to a market that was 
significantly more socially and economically diverse than the wealthy elites who defined 
the pre-Kodak cultures of amateur photography. All anyone had to do was “press a 
button,” and as Kodak’s bevy of ads proclaimed, the company would “do the rest” [Fig. 
2] of the work involved in creating an enduring record of what even the most unskilled 
and naïve of photographers captured with their instantaneous cameras.  
 Eastman Kodak promoted snapshot photography as a means of producing a 
certain kind of knowledge without the need to know very much at all. Snapshots 
transformed the ordinary moments of every day life into material pieces of evidence that 
could be framed, captioned or otherwise assembled into documents that represented rich 
sites of cultural and social knowledge about middle class life at the turn of the nineteenth 
century, but the owner of a Kodak hardly needed to know anything about photography—
or indeed, about her subject—in order to make such records. Snapshot photography also 
freed potential snapshooters from the need to know and be known to their photographic 
subjects: the ever-diminishing size of Eastman Kodak’s cameras made it increasingly 
easy to take someone’s picture without their knowledge94.  
                                                 
94 Robert Taft, in Photography and the American Scene (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1964), 
discusses the rise of so-called “detective” or “pocket” cameras as enabling a sort of surreptitious, amateur 
photography that its practitioners were nevertheless “troubled, or at least felt guilty about.” and that 
amateurs nevertheless “felt guilty about photographing of strangers in public a major contributor to the 
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 Snapshot photography’s liberation of photographers from the weight of both 
technical knowledge and the need to make themselves known to their potential subjects 
was certainly a contributing factor to the popularity of the practice. However, widespread 
anxieties about the voyeuristic and incriminating potential of snapshot photography—
expressed most pointedly in the popular press’s discourse about the “Kodak fiend”—
point to a distinct uneasiness with snapshot photography’s emphasis on seeing at the 
expense of knowing. The appearance of the first snapshot cameras is a telling illustration 
of just this sort of imbalance between seeing and knowing: the earliest instantiations of 
the technology had no viewfinders, requiring the photographer to “point and shoot” at his 
or her subject with no confirmation of what would actually be captured by the camera. 
[Fig. 3]  
 The introduction of finders made it possible for the photographer to know the 
precise physical details of what he or she was photographing, but Kodak’s early, finder-
less cameras were a prescient illustration of snapshot photography’s enduringly unsettling 
potential to capture sights that were not fully “known,” or even registered as distinct 
phenomena, to their photographers. By the 1890s, the technology and availability of 
snapshot photography made it possible for virtually anyone to take a picture of anyone 
else—often without the act of being visible. Anxiety about being photographed during an 
embarrassing or incriminating moment that might later be immortalized in the era’s 
proliferating newspapers, scandal sheets, and magazines95 shaped the era’s discourse 
                                                                                                                                                 
heightened anxiety about being photographed in public. 376   
95 As Frank Luther Mott indicates in A History of American Magazines, 1741-1930, Vol. 4. (Boston: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: 1958-1968), during the years 1895-1905, “newspapers 
flourished, books at low prices multiplied, the platform was active, but of all the agencies of popular 
information, none experienced a more spectacular enlargement and increase in effectiveness than the 
magazines.” (Mott 2). For more on the “explosion” of nationally distributed periodicals during this time 
period, see Mott 1-15; and Richard Ohmann, Selling Culture: Magazines, Markets and Class at the Turn of 
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about the ruthless and secretive “Kodak fiend,” a representative figure who was richly 
described, caricatured and criticized in the popular press. Douglas Nickel, in an essay on 
the history of snapshot photography from 1888 to the present, notes that “the camera 
‘fiend’ became a recognized threat,” to privacy and decency, and that “editorials openly 
worried about the lack of protocol regulating this new lens culture.”96 And, in an article 
exploring the role of snapshot photography in the development of modern privacy rights, 
Robert Mensel draws on commentary from New York periodicals during the late 1880s 
and 1890s to conclude that  
…New Yorkers responded to amateur photographs with exceptionally intense and 
remarkable feelings. Cameras themselves…were described in terms that 
suggested their sinister, dangerous nature. They were ‘deadly weapons,’ and 
‘deadly little boxes.’ The click of their shutters was ‘ominous’ and ‘dreadful.’ The 
so-called detective cameras were especially disturbing: “many are never noticed, 
but they are just as deadly.”97 
 
It was, in fact, the potential of not noticing when one’s picture was being taken that many 
Americans found most disturbing about the ubiquity of the so-called “Kodak fiends.” 
Richard Conniff interprets the popular press’s foreboding warnings about lurking 
snapshooters as expressions of the “terror…of being immortalized at some foolish 
moment in a snapshot that might be passed among one’s acquaintances,”98 and 
contemporaneous writers railed against the possibility of snapshots being used to “make 
[one] ridiculous for the benefit of posterity,” or to portray the subject “in newspapers and 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Century. (New York: Verso, 1996) 24-27. Thanks to a series of new technologies for reproducing 
photographic and other images—most notable the half-tone reproduction process—that emerged during this 
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content than ever before. For a thorough explanation of the “half-tone effect” and the other technologies of 
mass reproduction that influenced publishing practices in the 1890s, see Neil Harris,“Iconography and 
Intellectual History: The Half-Tone Effect” in John Highman and Paul Conkin, eds. New Directions in 
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96 Nickel, Douglas. Snapshots: The Photography of Everyday Life, 1888 to the Present. (San Francisco: San 
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97 Mensel 29. 
98 Conniff 107. 
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other publications in embarrassing and uncomplimentary attitudes, or side by side with 
the debased, the criminal and the degenerate.”99  
 Complaints about the “Kodak fiend’s” practice are essentially protests against the 
snapshot’s remarkable ability to emerge and circulate in a manner unmediated by either 
the photographer’s or the subject’s “background” knowledge about the photograph. No 
single instant could tell the complete story of a subject’s life or personality, but the 
“Kodak fiend’s” purported eagerness to capture what were the most embarrassing or 
sensational of these moments threatened to immortalize instants like these as the 
definitive representation of the photographic subject. The Kodak fiend’s incriminating 
snapshots were representations freed from the knowledge about who and what their 
subjects were—a freedom that enabled their use as “evidence” of sensational or lurid 
stories that may or may not have had much to do with the real lives of their subjects.  
 The condition of spectatorship that Henry James identifies as Maisie’s perceptual 
“fate”—to “see much more than she understood”—is an apt illustration of the audience 
courted by the Kodak fiend’s sensational images. The force and appeal of such images 
often depended on the lack of any knowledge about the snapshot’s subjects that could 
mitigate their sensational appeal. Snapshooters seeking a market for such images—as 
well as the publications that printed them—counted on a public that was content to revel 
in the voyeuristic thrill of seeing much more than it understood. Maisie’s childhood 
impressions of her parents and their debased milieu are rich with the kind of lurid 
imagery eagerly courted by the era’s Kodak fiends, but unlike the complacent viewers of 
such images that the popular press depended on, Maisie’s reception of such images 
                                                 
99 Ibid. 114.   
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initiates a pursuit of knowledge that is intimately tied to her survival—and one that, as 
James explains, guides the novel’s narrative progression:    
I recall that my first view of this neat possibility was as the attaching problem of 
the picture restricted (while yet achieving, as I say, completeness and coherency) 
to what the child might be conceived to have UNDERSTOOD--to have been able 
to interpret and appreciate. Further reflexion and experiment showed me my 
subject strangled in that extreme of rigour. The infant mind would at the best 
leave great gaps and voids; so that with a systematic surface possibly beyond 
reproach we should nevertheless fail of clearness of sense. I should have to stretch 
the matter to what my wondering witness materially and inevitably SAW; a great 
deal of which quantity she either wouldn't understand at all or (x) would quite 
misunderstand--and on those lines, only on those, my task would be prettily cut 
out.100 
 
James’s evocation here of a “systematic surface beyond reproach” evokes the unique 
accuracy of any photograph: an indexicality that renders what the camera captures as 
“beyond reproach” in the undeniable fact of its having been present at the moment of the 
photograph’s making. Yet the “systematic surface” that James here describes is not 
Maisie’s field of vision, but rather the impressions of her mind: impressions that are, by 
virtue of their naivete, just as immune to reproach as the camera’s mechanically obtained 
images.  
 James’s evocation of the photograph’s surface-level accuracy as a description for 
Maisie’s thoughts is a photographic metaphor that interrogates the kind of boundaries and 
exclusions between seeing and knowing that snapshot photography perpetuated—and that 
Kodak’s promotional campaigns strove to conceal. The use of a photographic metaphor 
to describe Maisie’s mind suggests a certain ambiguity about the relations between what 
Maisie sees and what she knows—an ambiguity that continues to animate the metaphors 
that the novel’s narrator uses to describe Maisie in the early chapters of the novel. Maisie 
                                                 
100 James, Henry. Preface to What Maisie Knew. New York Edition, 1908. ix-x. Etext prepared by Richard 
Hathaway, SUNY New Paltz. http://www2.newpaltz.edu/~hathawar/maisie1.html v-xxii.  
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is a “boundless receptacle,” [405]; “a ready vessel for bitterness [398]; but she is also “a 
deep little porcelain cup in which biting acids could be mixed” [398]. These metaphors 
suggests that Maisie’s mind is indeed as passive and sensitive as the photographic 
“receptacles”—the photographic film and the camera itself—that capture images; 
however, as a receptacle for “biting acids,” Maisie’s mind seems more like a crucial part 
of the apparatus of the pre-snapshot photographer who painstakingly brings his or her 
images to life with the “biting acids” of the darkroom. 
 The visions that Maisie sees are as lurid as any Kodak fiend’s finest work and, in 
terms of the novel’s narrative logic, infinitely more telling. James’s representation of 
what Maisie both sees and knows—and his choice of a protagonist for whom these 
entities are distinctly different—highlights the deliberately fragmentary nature of a 
photographic practice whose images circulated with no mediating knowledge of what lay 
beneath their “systematic surfaces.”  Yet the eventual convergences between what Maisie 
sees and what she knows represent a threat even deeper than that of the Kodak fiend’s 
potential to publicly humiliate or misrepresent his subjects. The ways in which Maisie 
comes to see and know the social and moral laws of her familial world depend on a 
materialization of vision that mirrors the snapshot’s translation of fleeting moments into 
tangible, easily circulated objects. Maisie learns about that which is impossibly close to 
her—i.e., herself and her parents—by looking from the kind of distance that any amateur 
photographer might have gained from his subject by taking its picture. Maisie’s 
successful discernments testify to the epistemological power of a certain kind of 
photographic distance—a power that, as a function of snapshot photography, was just as 
accessible to the brute as it was to the spectator.  
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 In What Maisie Knew, the potential threat of what the novel suggests about the 
relations between distance, sight and knowledge is emphasized by the fact that it is a 
mere child who turns these relations to her advantage. James’s use of the child to convey 
a sense of just how fraught the relationships between seeing and knowing could be 
contrasts sharply with Eastman Kodak’s deployment of the child as the redeemer of 
snapshot photography’s voyeuristic sins. From a marketing standpoint, Eastman Kodak’s 
targeting of children as both subjects and practitioners of snapshot photography was 
hugely successful. Yet the image of the innocent child featured in so much of Kodak’s 
advertising and promotional materials was unable to fully cover over the broad cultural 
discomfort with the opportunities for observation and documentation that snapshot 
photography offered to even the most untutored and inexperienced practitioners. Both the 
efforts of Eastman Kodak to position the child as the innocent redeemer of snapshot 
photography’s voyeuristic potential and the discomfort that lingered in spite of these 
efforts are apparent in the significant body of juvenile fiction101 that used the concept of 
snapshot photography as a major theme or plot device. Along with the ubiquitous 
advertisements for Eastman Kodak, the popular “family” magazines of the 1890s were 
frequent publishers of short stories and poems that featured the idea of snapshot 
                                                 
101Novels for young adults, like Alexander Black’s Captain Kodak; A Camera Story. (Boston: Lothrop 
Publishing Company, 1899), featured young protagonists using their trusty Kodaks to solve mysteries or 
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while others echo some of the same themes (“snapshooting” as a mode of adventure or detection) explored 
in the young adult novels mentioned above. 
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photography in some significant way. In particular, the “Kodak fictions” 102 that adhered 
to the morally didactic genre of the children’s story often appeared in such magazines; 
they are particularly revealing in terms of what they suggest about the complexity of 
snapshot photography’s voyeuristic potential and the child’s potential to mitigate it. Such 
tales are also an especially pointed complement to the troubled genesis of what Maisie’s 
nurse, the upstanding Mrs. Wix, would call the “moral sense” of her young charge. 
 In the Kodak fictions I consider below, the snapshot is figured as a powerful 
means of moral correction, one whose image of its subjects’ bad behavior has a 
seemingly instantaneous effect on the evolution of their “moral sense.” In these stories, 
the young subjects of surreptitiously obtained photographs are rehabilitated by looking at 
images of themselves—for Maisie, however, her internalized image of herself reveals 
more about the dissolute adults around her than it does about her own “moral sense.” 
 For example, in “The Boy With the Kodak,” published in Zion’s Herald in 
1891,
103
 a mysterious “tall boy” takes a snapshot of brother John and sister Flora just as 
one of their regular arguments reaches its highest pitch. The snapshot shows Flora “with 
her clenched fist raised, and in the act of striking her brother, while on her face was a 
most unbecoming expression of rage and revenge;” and John with a “deep frown and 
distorted features that were anything but pleasant to look upon.” When the tall boy 
returns to their home the next day to show them the snapshots, John and Flora are 
horrified by what they see. Like the images of philandering husbands or immodest 
women circulated by the “Kodak fiend,” the tall boy’s images show John and Flora at 
                                                 
102No comprehensive survey of magazine “Kodak fiction” exists. My claims about the themes and variety 
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 103 “The Boy With The Kodak.” Zion’s Herald. (Boston, MA) 6 May 1891, 142. 
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their worst. However, rather than complaining about the tall boy’s intrusion into their 
personal lives, John and Flora are immediately sorry for their bad behavior. After seeing 
the photographs, John and Flora resolve “not to fight anymore,” and the narrator closes 
the story by noting that “ever after that day, when they felt that they were getting angry, 
the remembrance of a picture which their sister had tacked up in each room caused them 
to change their tactics instantly.” 
 “The Boy With the Kodak” rewrites the Kodak fiend’s threatening, voyeuristic 
practice not just as a harmless childhood hobby, but as a morally didactic means of 
educating children about proper social behavior. The “tall boy” seems well on his way to 
becoming a Kodak fiend himself, but the aspects of his practice that reflect the fiend’s 
most egregious offenses are pointedly explained away. The “tall boy” has watched John 
and Flora secretly, “from my window across the street,” but he readily admits to having 
done so when his efforts to capture their arguments fail. In addition, his crucial snapshot 
is taken openly, as he climbs into John and Flora’s front yard. The “tall boy” may harbor 
a “stack of pictures of people who little dream that [he] has photographed them in all 
their moods and tenses,” but his identity as a “boy” and his willingness in this instance to 
give his incriminating photo to its subjects suggests that his collection of unflattering 
images will remain private.  
 The attempts of “Boy” to rewrite the Kodak fiend’s practice as a kind of harmless 
“child’s play” also evoke a longstanding belief about the photograph’s connection to its 
subject’s character. Throughout much of the nineteenth century, photographic portraiture 
was shaped by beliefs about the photograph’s uncanny, almost supernatural power to 
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reveal the truth of its subject’s moral and ethical character.104 In this, and another similar 
story, “A Kodak Valentine,” the snapshots of the children are described in precisely these 
terms. In “A Kodak Valentine,” published in Youth’s Companion in 1896,105 young 
Gracie (with the help of her adult cousin Prue) uses a snapshot to apologize to her mother 
for a recent burst of bad behavior. “Valentine’s”narrator remarks that, as Cousin Prue 
snaps her picture, Gracie “was doing her level best, so of course she was happy, and 
looked as fresh and pretty as any of the blossoms that nodded at her through the lattice.” 
In this passage, Gracie’s “fresh and pretty” appearance is the direct result of her happy 
industry, and the narrator’s “of course” suggests that such an appearance is the natural 
result of the kind of happiness that springs from virtuous behavior. In “Boy,” too, the tall 
boy’s snapshots are effective precisely because they show, in Flora’s case, the “most 
unbecoming expression of rage and revenge,” one that Flora had “never before seen.” 
“She had no idea that it [her face] could become thus transformed,” claims the narrator, 
an observation that identifies the snapshot as the bearer of information new and 
previously hidden (even from Flora herself) about Flora’s character.  
 Framing snapshots as objects that can reveal this sort of information about inner 
character aligns the images in “Boy” and “Valentine” with a particular idea about 
photography and character that was more characteristic of mid-century attitudes about 
more traditional modes of photography than it was of emerging attitudes about the 
                                                 
104 In “Recognizing Lincoln: Image Vernaculars in Late-Nineteenth Century Visual Cultures,” Rhetoric and 
Public Affairs 8:1 (2005): 31-58, Cara Finnegan states that “in the nineteenth century, portraits were 
thought to be ekphrastic—that is, they were believed to reveal or bring before the eyes something vital and 
almost mysterious about their subjects. It was assumed that the photographic portrait, in particular, did not 
merely “illustrate” a person but also constituted an important locus of information about human character.” 
(Finnegan 42). For more on popular beliefs about the photograph’s uncanny ability to capture the truths of 
character and virtue in the nineteenth century, see Smith, Shawn Michelle. American Archives: Gender, 
Race and Class in Visual Culture. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), especially  ch. 3, 
“Superficial Depths,” 51-112. 
 105 Bumstead, Eudora Stone. “A Kodak Valentine.” The Youth’s Companion. 13 February 1896: 85. 
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snapshot during the 1890s. And while it is likely true that ideas about photographs as 
“windows to the soul” 106 persisted throughout the 1890s, I would argue that the vitriolic 
responses to the “Kodak fiend’s” photographic practice suggest a growing skepticism 
about any unquestioning belief in the photograph’s ability to expose the true nature of a 
soul.
 107 John, Flora and Gracie accept the snapshots of themselves as indubitable 
evidence of who they are, but their non-fiction contemporaries who complained about 
being “caught” by the Kodak fiend’s prying lens were protesting against the potential 
distribution of an image that misrepresented their true selves. In fact, complaints such as 
these are expressions of a far more modern understanding of the photograph’s potential to 
lie, distort or otherwise manipulate representations. Unlike older modes of portrait 
photography like daguerreotypes and wet-plate studio portraiture, snapshots required 
exposure times of only seconds. It’s hardly surprising, then, that the ease and efficiency 
of such a method would seem less adept at “perceiving” and illustrating the hidden depths 
of a soul than photographic methods that required longer confrontations between sitter 
and camera. 
                                                 
106 Finnegan, 33. Finnegan’s “Recognizing Lincoln” offers an intriguing case study of a particular body of 
1890s-era cultural responses to what was a decidedly pre-snapshot-era photographic image. Finnegan 
convincingly shows how the responses from readers of McClure’s to that magazine’s publication of a 
photographically reproduced daguerreotype of a young Abraham Lincoln affirmed beliefs about 
photographs as “keys to understanding [the] mythic greatness” and “valuable evidence as to [the] natural 
traits” of revered figures like Lincoln. Finnegan regards such statements as evidence that “the discourses of 
physiognomy still offered a potent image vernacular” during the 1890s. However, she also points out that 
the reproduced image of Lincoln was clearly a “standard-issue early daguerreotype: its pose stiff and 
formal, body and head held firm to accommodate the long exposure times of 1840s photography,” and that 
McClure’s editors “used an elaborate line drawing to frame the image, perhaps attempting to signal to 
viewers its daguerrean origins.” Finnegan claims that, despite these framing efforts, the image would have 
appeared as modern as any other of the half-tone illustrations that filled the pages of 1890s periodicals, but 
I would argue that the image’s “daguerrean origins” were perhaps more powerful influences on the 
responses to the image than Finnegan allows.  
107 On this point, I am in disagreement with Mensel, who points to the “contemporary notion that the face 
was the window to sincere sentiment” (30-31) as the primary reason for the anxiety about the Kodak 
fiend’s practice.  
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  “Boy” and “Valentine” may evoke ideas about the connections between 
photography and morality that are based on a mode of photography quite different, and 
much older than snapshot photography, but their evocation of the idea points to its 
enduring resonance, even in the 1890s. Eastman Kodak’s deployment of the child as an 
ideal practitioner of snapshot photography depends not only on widespread ideas about 
the child’s innocence, but also on the resonance of this earlier idea about photography’s 
inherent connection to the character and morality of the people who practice it—both 
subjects and photographers. Insisting on children as ideal practitioners of snapshot 
photography was tantamount to a suggestion that the innate innocence of the child was 
magically transferred to the photograph itself, in much the same way that the morality of 
a photograph’s subject was thought to be transferred to the photograph that depicted him 
or her108.  Kodak is banking on the resonance of this older idea as a way to mitigate the 
threat of the Kodak fiend. 
 In “The Boy With the Kodak,” the threat of the Kodak fiend is evoked and 
immediately relieved, largely through a recasting of the “fiend” and his subjects as 
children. The bad behavior of children is hardly as reprehensible as that of the real Kodak 
fiends’ adult subjects, and their “natural” curiosity is a far more palatable version of the 
fiend’s calculated voyeurism. The child’s naivete was not, however, completely 
unproblematic in terms of mitigating the anxiety stimulated by snapshot photography: 
fictional marriages of snapshot photography and morally didactic tales for children also 
register the potential limitations of snapshot photography’s naïve practitioners. In 
“Valentine,” Gracie presents her mother with a snapshot depicting a moment of good 
                                                 
108 See Alan Trachtenberg’s chapter “Illustrious Americans” (21-70) in Reading American Photographs: 
Images As History, Matthew Brady to Walker Evans. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), for further 
discussion of this idea.  
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behavior, as an apology and a promise that a recent fit of temper will not be repeated. The 
snapshot’s image shows Gracie happily washing dishes—a direct reference to the 
moment of bad behavior that Gracie regrets, when she “got kind of a mean streak” and 
refused to perform that chore. Gracie’s snapshot, however, is mediated by a poem that 
explains its significance. Written on the back of the snapshot by her adult cousin Prue 
(who is also the surreptitious photographer who takes the snapshot), the poem promises 
“…true that daily/I’ll make the dishes shine/And rub the glasses gaily/For I’m your 
Valentine!”  
 Cousin Prue’s poem suggests that the mere image of Gracie dutifully washing 
dishes is not a sufficient motivator for her future good behavior. That Prue recognizes the 
need for such a mediating force—for a text that insists on the endurance of the fleeting 
moment that the snapshot captures—points to what was a particularly complex—and 
even dual—aspect of the figure of the child as an ideal practitioner of snapshot 
photography. The child’s attachment to the present moment was part of what made the 
child such an appealing figure for Kodak—but this attachment was also somewhat 
limiting or threatening, in a way that’s illustrated by “A Kodak Valentine” and the 
anxieties about the Kodak fiend. Snapshot photography was defined by its instantaneity, 
its capture of isolated, fleeting moments that might otherwise be unnoticed, concealed in 
their convergence with many other moments that make up a memory or an event. The 
snapshot had a unique ability to isolate moments that wouldn’t otherwise be seen or 
understood. That such moments were extracted from the other moments that mediated 
them had the potential to make them threatening, or at least not comprehensible by their 
viewers. This is of special concern in terms of the child subject, given the stubborn 
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attachment to the present moment that defines any child’s worldview—indeed, what 
could even be called the child’s inability, cognitively speaking, to effectively apprehend 
the reality of either the past or the future. Such is the case with Gracie’s snapshot: the 
mere depiction of her good behavior is not enough to ensure that such behavior will 
continue: Gracie must be reminded that the moment depicted is one that must be repeated 
regularly. Prue’s addition of the poem is essentially a gesture that tries to overcome the 
snapshot’s instantaneity, pointing to its inadequacy for the didactic purposes that these 
stories try to make their snapshots fulfill. The mediation of Gracie’s snapshot with a 
textual reminder is a telling recognition of how unstable/volatile a child’s “morality” can 
be. Cousin Prue’s addition of the poem underscores just how fleeting and—perhaps—
anomalous Gracie’s moment of good behavior might be: she needs the reminder of the 
poem to ensure that her moment of good behavior will endure beyond her present sense 
of remorse.  
 
Maisie And Materialized Sights  
 Cousin Prue’s poem is an attempt to productively educate and expand that 
particular feature of the child’s consciousness that James, in What Maisie Knew, calls 
“that lively sense of the immediate which is the very air of a child’s mind.” [405] In both 
“A Kodak Valentine” and What Maisie Knew, a “child’s sense of the immediate” is 
implicitly recognized as a feature that contributes to a certain moral vulnerability. For 
Gracie, it seems, such vulnerability is effectively countered by her cousin’s textual 
reminder continually to reenact the moment depicted in a snapshot. For Maisie, however, 
quite the opposite is true: rather than protecting Maisie from the threat that their personal 
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animosities might pose to her moral development, Maisie’s parents take full advantage of 
her childish attachment to the present in order to further their own feud with each other. 
Part of what makes Maisie such a willing messenger for insults volleyed back and forth 
between parents is her “age,” the “age for which all stories are true and all conceptions 
are stories. The actual was the absolute; the present alone was vivid.” [405] As an 
observer whose particularly childlike mode of observation has already been subjected to 
moral degradation, Maisie is a distinctly different kind of observer than the child 
photographers depicted in Kodak ads or in Kodak fictions. Maisie’s realization of the 
consequences of her inability to see beyond the present moment, i.e., her realization of 
her role as a “centre of hatred and a messenger of insult” between her feuding parents, 
amounts to what James calls a “moral revolution.”  
 James’s account of this childhood revolution is essentially an interrogation of the 
anxieties about visibility, knowledge and power that snapshot photography provoked. 
Eastman Kodak’s version of a child’s photographic vision attempted to align the 
perceived innocence of the child with a practice that was increasingly viewed as 
threatening. James’s observant Maisie, however, raises pointed questions about the 
opportunities to see and know that snapshot photography offered practitioners who were 
as innocent—or, as some might claim, as brutish—as a child. Maisie may not, at first, 
understand the sights she sees, but her method of learning how they illustrate the dubious 
“moral sense” that informs the decisions of her adult guardians is essentially an 
instinctual kind of seeing, one in which Maisie’s supposedly “brutish” senses—of 
hearing, smell and touch; but also of tenderness and danger—contribute to a material sort 
of knowledge that matches the power of the snapshot’s claims to tell a truth indisputable 
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on the grounds of its status as material evidence. For Maisie, however, her childish mode 
of ignorant sight produces a sophisticated “moral sense” that transcends the limited 
reserves of self-consciousness allotted to either the children or the brutes of the late 
nineteenth century’s literary imagination. Maisie’s mode of seeing and knowing depends 
on a materialization of sight that reflects the era’s proliferating, widely circulated 
snapshots—a materialization that offers Maisie a distanced perspective from which she 
might view herself and her parents. Such distance ultimately gives her access to the 
knowledge that she needs to take control of her own fate. Those who railed against the 
practice of the Kodak fiend feared that the snapshot’s material accuracy would effectively 
obliterate any other representation that might mitigate its potential to incriminate its 
subjects: in other words, they feared the damage that the snapshot’s materiality could do 
to those who were used to the privilege of observation. Maisie, however, represents the 
potential of the snapshot’s materiality to enrich and expand the knowledge of the “brutes” 
who were more familiar as subjects of literary and scientific observation than as active 
participants in the determination of their own fates. Maisie evokes the specter of the brute 
who can effectively see itself and its own image through the eyes of others—a power that 
threatened not merely to disrupt the position of privileged individuals, but to obliterate 
the standards that define such hierarchies from the start. 
 The novel’s first and fullest description of the process by which Maisie comes to 
know figures the process as the transformation of purely visual, intangible impressions 
into Maisie’s tangible possessions—possessions that, though still troubling, are 
nevertheless hers to observe and consider. In a metaphor that evokes the pre-Kodak 
entertainment of the magic lantern show, the narrator describes Maisie’s initial 
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experience of the new set of conditions created by her parents’ divorce as one of 
uncomfortable intimacy with frightening visions:  
She was taken into the confidence of passions on which she fixed just the stare 
she might have had for images bounding across the wall in the slide of a magic 
lantern. Her little world was phantasmagoric—strange shadows dancing on a 
sheet. It was as if the whole performance had been given for her—a mite of a 
half-scared infant in a great dim theatre. [401] 
 
Maisie’s misperception of her parents’ “show” of passions as one enacted exclusively for 
her marks her difficulty in perceiving the behavior of her parents as separate from herself. 
This frightening perception is characteristic of a child’s unavoidably self-centered 
perspective,109 one that is unable to distance itself and the actions of the adults who are 
responsible for it. Maisie, however, gradually comes to see her “phantasmagoric” world 
in more material terms. When Maisie does come to understand the mystifying stream of 
adult commentary on her situation, the process is figured as the materialization of  
a collection of images and echoes to which meanings were attachable—images 
and echoes kept for her in the childish dusk, the dim closet, the high drawers, like 
games she wasn’t yet big enough to play. [403] 
 
Maisie’s lack of understanding of these images and echoes is figured as a decidedly 
physical problem, i.e., the “great strain” of being unable to “carry [them] by the right 
end.” As Maisie grows “sharper,” however, she is able to “attach” meanings to these 
images and echoes, to the “wonderful assortment of objects of this kind” that she 
discovers in her mind, “all tumbled up too with the things, shuffled into the same 
receptacle, that her mother had said about her father.” Maisie’s realization of how to 
                                                 
109…and indeed, characteristic of the naturalist emphasis on fate as well. Assuming that everything happens 
for a reason—that one is the object of a universal fate—denies the possibility of any distance between the 
individual and the forces of the universe.  
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“carry” such objects “by the right end” is essentially a realization of how she actually has 
been at the center of a particular performance enacted by her parents—but not as a 
spectator, as the narrator’s initial metaphor of the magic lantern show suggests; rather, 
Maisie realizes herself to have been a central actor in the perpetuation of her parents’ 
feud. Maisie’s first great lesson is a “vision, private but final, of the strange office she 
filled,” but this vision is one that understands her role in material terms. Like the insults 
that “rattle” in the “pillar-box” of her brain with the weight and sound of material objects 
[405], Maisie’s understanding of her role as the deliverer of such messages is figured as 
an encounter with a material object:  the “moral revolution” of Maisie’s realization is one 
in which “the stiff dolls on the dusky shelves began to move their arms and legs: old 
forms and phrases began to have a sense that frightened her.”  
 Maisie may be confronted with a collection of material objects that frighten her, 
but they are nevertheless objects that belong to her and that she is thus able to do with as 
she wishes. Maisie “keeps” her parents’ insults to herself, both in that she refuses to 
repeat them aloud and in that their lingering resonance within her own body produces a 
pleasure that is decidedly sensuous:   
Her parted lips locked themselves with the determination to be employed no 
longer. She would forget everything, she would repeat nothing, and when, as a 
tribute to the successful application of her system, she began to be called a little 
idiot, she tasted a pleasure altogether new. [406] 
 
Maisie “tastes” the pleasure of appearing like an idiot—of appearing like a brute—behind 
lips that she has “locked” as she might a cabinet or chest of treasures.  
 The pleasure that Maisie derives from “tasting” her parents’ insults is the pleasure 
of self-knowledge: Maisie understands the position into which her parents have forced 
her, and this knowledge enables her to gain a measure of control over her life that has 
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hitherto been unknown to her. Maisie’s process of gaining this knowledge, however, is as 
physically unpleasant as her enjoyment of it is sensually pleasurable. Some of Maisie’s 
earliest intimations of her new position are spurred by her experiences of bodily touch, in 
which    
The greatest effect of the great cause was her own greater importance, chiefly 
revealed to her in the larger freedom with which she was handled, pulled hither 
and thither and kissed, and the proportionately greater niceness she was obliged to 
show. Her features had somehow become prominent; they were so perpetually 
nipped by the gentlemen who came to see her father and the smoke of whose 
cigarettes went into her face. Some of these gentlemen made her strike matches 
and light their cigarettes; others, holding her on knees violently jolted, pinched the 
calves of her legs until she shrieked—her shriek was much admired—and 
reproached them with being toothpicks. [401] 
 
The various ways in which Maisie’s body is touched by others—handled, kissed, nipped 
and pinched—is Maisie’s first clue to her own (and still mysterious) “greater 
importance.” That it is the touch of other people that grants Maisie her first vital bit of 
self-knowledge evokes the physical processes of photography itself, in which the “touch” 
of bodies and photographic film by light creates a material object that can then be 
handled and regarded at a distance by the subject it pictures.110 
 The quick carelessness of the touches that Maisie endures is especially evocative 
of snapshot photography, with its ease of use and rapid exposure times, and the bits of 
knowledge about her own “greater importance” that Maisie gleans from these pinches 
and nips are hers to keep as much as any snapshot. Maisie’s retention of one of these 
early impressions in particular—that of her “toothpick” legs—is crucial to what is 
                                                 
110 The suffering and bodily violence that Maisie endures as her knowledge is made material evokes Roland 
Barthes’s description, in Camera Lucida, of “photography transform[ing] subject into object, and even, one 
might say, into a museum object: in order to take the first portraits (around 1840) the subject had to assume 
long poses under a glass roof in bright sunlight; to become an object made one suffer as much as a surgical 
operation.” 13. Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida (New York: Hill and Wang, 1980) 13.   
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perhaps Maisie’s most valuable/portentous realization. Hearing—and feeling—her legs 
treated as toothpicks prompts Maisie to regard them critically herself, comparing them to 
those of other children and “ask[ing] her nurse if they were toothpicks.”  The narrator’s 
explanation of Maisie’s critical regard for her own body is, in part, that she is “leaving 
behind the time when she had no desires to meet…a feeling from this time that she was 
deficient in something that would meet the general desire.” [402] At a much later point in 
the novel, Maisie observes Sir Claude in what proves to be an especially telling 
moment—one that, for Maisie, seems informed by her earlier consideration of her own 
physical inadequacy. During the time that Maisie spends with Sir Claude at Folkestone, 
just before their departure for France, Maisie learns exactly what it is that complicates Sir 
Claude’s attempts to commit fully to being her guardian. Sir Claude’s lingering regard for 
the “fine stride and shining limbs of a young fishwife who had just waded out of the sea 
with her basketful of shrimps” [562] renders his gaze “absent from her affairs,” an 
absence that predicts both the reason for and the inevitability of Sir Claude’s real absence 
from Maisie’s life. That Maisie notices Sir Claude looking at the “shining limbs” of a 
fishwife; that her observation dovetails with her realization that Sir Claude has been more 
involved with Mrs. Beale than she had thought; and particularly, that she intuits some 
connection of these facts as evidence of the “natural divergence between lovers and little 
girls” [540], suggests that Maisie’s emerging understanding of Sir Claude’s sexual 
weakness and desire is informed by her knowledge of her own “deficiency,” as figured in 
her perception of her own skinny legs as distinct from the shiny limbs of the fishwife that 
hold Sir Claude’s attention.  
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 Maisie’s awareness of the way others see and touch her body will ultimately 
prove to be her most sophisticated epistemological tool, and one that reflects the threat of 
the seeing, knowing brute that snapshot photography enabled. The painful apex of 
Maisie’s knowledge is what she learns about Sir Claude, and thus it is the moments in the 
text that mark the progress of this particular lesson that offer the clearest depictions of 
Maisie’s brutish, snapshot-like mode of seeing. After Maisie’s conversation with Ida’s 
latest paramour, the Captain, during a chance meeting with the new couple, Maisie 
cultivates the same façade of idiocy that she once assumed before her parents. What 
prompts Maisie’s behavior is the unusual and alarming sight of Sir Claude’s face:  
She had never seen Sir Claude look as he looked just then; flushed yet not 
excited—settled rather in an immovable disgust and at once very sick and very 
hard. His conversation with her mother had clearly drawn blood, and the child’s 
old horror came back to her, begetting the instant moral contraction of the days 
when her parents had looked to her to feed their love of battle. Her greatest fear 
for the moment, however, was that her friend would see she had been crying. The 
next she became aware that he glanced at her, and it presently occurred to her that 
he didn’t even wish to be looked at. At this she quickly removed her gaze, while 
he said rather curtly: “Well, who in the world is the fellow?” [507] 
 
The narrator’s detailed account of Maisie’s intuitions in this scene repeatedly emphasizes 
her visual impressions of Sir Claude’s face and her perceptions of how her own face 
might look to him. What Maisie is most immediately conscious of in this passage is the 
physical evidence of what has transpired between Sir Claude and her mother, as well as 
between herself and the Captain —the “blood” that is visible on the surface of Sir 
Claude’s flushed face; his expression that he “didn’t even wish to be looked at;” and the 
traces of her tears on Maisie’s own face. Her perceptions of both Sir Claude’s anger and 
her own distress are like snapshot versions of the complex and painful conversations that 
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these physical signs indicate: they attend to and capture surface details that are as telling 
as they are fleeting.  
 These detailed snapshots of what Maisie sees highlights all that she doesn’t know 
about exactly what transpired between Sir Claude and her mother, but in terms of 
enlightening her about Sir Claude’s character, they are ultimately just as useful to Maisie 
as a more complete understanding of the situation might be. Her impression that Sir 
Claude’s conversation with her mother has “drawn blood” instantly provokes a recourse 
to her old technique of “playing dumb,” as if the similarity of Sir Claude’s look to those 
that she remembers on the faces of her parents indicates that perhaps Sir Claude is as 
vulnerable to the heat of battle as her parents were. Maisie’s impressions of adult anger in 
this scene—both present and remembered—evoke what Nancy Martha West has called 
the snapshot’s tendency to reduce any subject’s individuality to a stereotype, one that 
produces not specific knowledge, but rather a generalized nostalgia.111 But this 
generalizing tendency is, in a sense, exactly what serves Maisie best in terms of gaining 
knowledge of the situation. Comparing her past impression of her parents’ faces with her 
current one of Sir Claude’s leads her to assume her old role of a little idiot with Sir 
Claude. That Maisie seems “not to have taken in” anything much during her conversation 
with the Captain angers Sir Claude, but his apologetic note to Maisie leads Mrs. Beale to 
admit that she and Sir Claude have been in communication—a concrete piece of 
knowledge that, along with her intuition of Sir Claude’s vulnerability to her mother’s 
attacks, Maisie adds to her growing store. 
 Both Maisie’s photographic attention to the physical details of faces and looks 
and her refusal to elaborate on anything deeper she might know about such details evoke 
                                                 
111West 174-187.  
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the style and the secrecy of the Kodak fiend’s photographic practice. Complaints about 
“fiends” in the era’s popular publications certainly figured these photographers as brutal, 
both in terms of their “preying” on unsuspecting citizens and of their role in perpetuating 
a base, vulgar sensationalism. James’s narrator, too, suggests that a certain kind of 
brutishness is associated with the kind of snapshot seeing that triggers Maisie’s recourse 
to the “moral contraction” of appearing “not to take things in.” Unlike the Kodak fiend, 
however, whose brutality was both predatory and predicated on his invisibility, the 
narrator’s descriptions of Maisie-as-brute figure her as a victim, highly visible and highly 
vulnerable. In Maisie's memories of her own past performances of ignorance, she is both 
called a brute and treated as one, as “when her father, for her blankness, called her a dirty 
little donkey, and her mother, for her falsity, pushed her out of the room.” Sir Claude's 
angry dismissal of Maisie into a cab may not be as physically brutal as Maisie's parents' 
treatment of her, but the “sweet sense of success” that Maisie experiences as the cab 
drives away is one that she associates with one of the novel's few explicitly described 
moments of physical brutality,  
...an occasion when, on the stairs, returning from her father's, she had met a fierce 
question of her mother's with an imbecility as deep and had in consequence been 
dashed by Mrs. Farange almost to the bottom. [430-431] 
 
For Maisie, being seen—and even more importantly, being touched—as a brute provides 
her with a satisfying form of physical evidence that testifies to the importance of the 
knowledge she withholds. The abuse that Maisie endures is also a pointed indication of 
just how threatening the seeing brute could be—more so, even, than the Kodak fiend’s 
ruthless distribution of revealing photographs. What makes Maisie's knowledge so 
maddening is its concealment: no one—not even Maisie—can accurately gauge its depth 
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or scope, and like the “tall boy’s” private stack of incriminating snapshots, Maisie’s 
hidden, unanalyzed knowledge poses a threat to its subjects that far exceeds the Kodak 
fiend’s ruthless—yet predictable—quest to expose and embarrass his subjects.    
 What Maisie learns about Sir Claude represents her deepest and most painful store 
of knowledge—a collection of precisely the kind of human sympathies and contradictions 
that, according to complaints about the fiend, the snapshot could never contain. After Sir 
Claude returns to Maisie and Mrs. Wix in France, Maisie notices a difference in Sir 
Claude, one that makes her  
[conscious] that she had never seen him in this particular state in which he had 
been given back. 
 Mrs. Wix had once said--it was once or fifty times; once was enough for 
Maisie, but more was not too much--that he was wonderfully various. Well, he 
was certainly so, to the child's mind, on the present occasion: he was much more 
various than he was anything else. [622-623] 
 
Characterizing Maisie’s hard-won knowledge of Sir Claude as “various” suggests that 
what keeps Maisie from possessing Sir Claude himself is precisely the kind of 
psychological complexity that eluded the snapshot’s representation of a person—but not, 
perhaps, the representation produced by a collection of snapshots—a material collection 
of telling images not unlike Maisie’s other “family album,” that collection of insults 
exchanged by her parents that “rattle” in the “pillar-box” of Maisie’s brain. Sir Claude’s 
“variety” is revealed by Maisie’s distinctly modern mode of photographic seeing, one 
that corrects the impression she initially derives from the novel’s only actual photograph, 
the cabinet photograph of Sir Claude that offers Maisie her first glimpse of her 
prospective stepfather. Maisie's initial impression of Sir Claude is overwhelmingly 
positive—an opinion that is hardly surprising in light of the way in which cabinet 
photographs were processed and consumed. After the initial introduction of the new 
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“cabinet size” (slightly larger than the familiar carte-de-visites size) photograph in 1866, 
this new format quickly became the means for producing a newly flattering—and, as 
such, not altogether accurate—type of photographic portrait. Robert Taft, in Photography 
and the American Scene, explains how the cabinet photograph’s larger size occasioned “a 
turning point in the annals of the profession,” one that ushered in a novel mode of 
retouching photographic negatives. In cabinet photographs,  
flaws which were not particularly obvious in the small card sizes now became 
conspicuous, so that greater skill in the mechanical routine of making portraits 
was required…The new type of retouching was the manipulation of the negative 
to remove wrinkles and facial blemishes, to smooth the hair, and to secure a 
greater variety of intermediate tones than the collodion negative was capable of 
recording.112 
 
The discrepancy between the beauty of Sir Claude’s cabinet photograph and its subject’s 
moral weakness emphasizes the deceptive potential of the kind of photograph Taft 
describes. Maisie “lost herself in admiration of the fair, smooth face, the regular features, 
the kind eyes, the amiable air, the general glossiness and smartness of her prospective 
stepfather;” while Mrs. Wix immediately decides that Sir Claude “promised [Maisie] a 
future…on the strength of his charming portrait.”113 Yet by the end of this scene, Maisie 
correctly intuits the real meaning of the photograph, and it is one that has little to do with 
how beautiful Sir Claude’s cabinet photograph makes him appear. It is, in fact, the 
relations of the three women in this scene regarding who will possess the photograph that 
actually predict the truth of Sir Claude’s character. Despite her protestation against 
“touching anything belonging to Mrs. Wix,” it is Miss Overmore who ends up possessing 
the photograph, despite the earnest desires of both Maisie and Mrs. Wix to retain it for 
                                                 
112 Taft 324-325. 
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themselves—just as, by the end of the novel, it will be Miss Overmore who possesses Sir 
Claude rather than Maisie or Mrs. Wix.  
 The ironic force of this scene lies not in what the photograph pictures, but in who 
possesses it. Snapshot photography—particularly as it was used to contribute sensational 
illustrations to the era’s popular newspapers and magazines—attached a new importance 
to the question of who possessed particular photographs. Such an importance is one that 
seems to inform Maisie’s immediate wish to possess the photograph: her desire reflects 
both the traditional belief in the photograph’s status as material proof of its subject’s 
character and the more modern threat of the snapshot’s potential to reshape its subject’s 
character—or at least, the public perception of that character—according to the will of 
the snapshot’s owner. The narrator, however, seems to believe even more fully in the 
connection between Sir Claude himself and his photograph. When Maisie asks for the 
photograph, she implores to keep “it,” referring to it correctly as a material object. Yet 
when the narrator describes Miss Overmore’s “theft” of the photograph, he refers to it as 
the man himself, noting that, as Maisie and Mrs. Wix embrace, “their companion had had 
time to lay a quick hand on Sir Claude and, with a glance at him or not, whisk him 
effectually out of sight.” The narrator seems to speak what Maisie only intuits, taking on 
the role of the naïve child who believes in the truth of appearances. In terms of the 
novel’s plot, however, Maisie’s childish intuition about the importance of possessing the 
photograph dovetails with the kind of privileged knowledge about the novel’s conclusion 
that only the narrator would have.  
 Even at this early moment in the progress of Maisie’s painful education, she 
knows as much as the enlightened, insightful narrator who painstakingly documents her 
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tale. Maisie’s knowledge ultimately affords her a means of ordering and choosing the 
parameters of her own life: by the end of the novel, she is able to clearly see and compare 
what it would be like to live with Sir Claude and Mrs. Beale; or with Mrs. Wix. Maisie, 
in short, learns how not to be a brute, through a distinctly modern means of photographic 
sight—one that, through Kodak’s ubiquitous snapshot cameras, was ready to teach the 
same lesson to anyone with the means and motive to learn..
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Figure 1. “Circa 1900 Brownie Boys--It works like a Kodak” From the George Eastman 
House Kodak Advertising Collection. Used with permission.   
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Figure 2. 1889. The Kodak Camera: Hands holding up camera with text "You press the button" 
Price $25. From the George Eastman House Kodak Advertising Collection. Used with 
permission.   
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Figure 3. 1888 Kodak camera (barrel shutter) E131.00003. From the George Eastman House 
Kodak Technology Collection. Used with permission. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Hearing the Real: Image and Sound in Kate Chopin’s The Awakening and Early Cinema 
  
“I never dreamed of Mrs. Pontellier making such a mess of things and working out her 
own damnation as she did…But when I found out what she was up to, the play was half 
over and it was then too late.”114  
 
 In Kate Chopin’s sardonic response to negative reviews of The Awakening, the 
author imagines an impossible literary character, one who comes to life with a force 
strong enough to determine the outcome of her own story. Blaming Edna Pontellier for 
what some reviewers found shocking or offensive may have been little more than 
Chopin’s flippant refusal to apologize for her novel, but her playful characterization of 
The Awakening’s protagonist also hints at the novel’s fascination with observers, artists 
and storytellers who have a curious lack of control over their own perceptions and 
creations.  
 Despite what Chopin jokingly claims about Edna’s mastery of her own story, The 
Awakening is full of instances in which Edna seems just as powerless over her own 
creations as Chopin claims to be. In terms of The Awakening’s engagement with the 
themes and techniques of literary naturalism, such a lack of agency hardly seems 
surprising: the super-sensual Edna’s inability to deviate—by way of her art or any other 
means—from what the narrator calls the “path to which Fate had directed her
                                                 
114 Chopin, Kate. response to critics of The Awakening, published in Book News, July 1899. Quoted in 
Walker, Nancy A. “Biographical and Historical Contexts,” in The Awakening. Ed. Nancy A. Walker. 
(Boston & New York: Bedford Books for St. Martin’s Press, 1993). 14.  
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 footsteps”115 seems to cast her as yet another of naturalism’s brutes, doomed by (among 
other things) their inborn vulnerability to the sensory onslaught of the modern world. 
Edna Pontellier epitomizes the kind of hypersensitivity to sensory stimuli that haunts 
naturalism’s brutes, but the intensity of her sensory life models a mode of knowing and 
representing experience that the novel’s narrator eagerly echoes and imitates.  
 The echoes of the kind of sensations and perceptions that I consider in the chapter 
that follows are precisely that: mimetic imitations of sounds and voices that seem to offer 
a newly “true” way of representing experience, one that embodies both the guarantee of 
accuracy suggested by the camera’s indifferent automatism and what was increasingly 
perceived as the “truer” reality of any individual’s uniquely subjective experience. The 
role of music in The Awakening has been well-studied116; however, the odd and often 
cacophonous soundscape that pervades the novel has received less attention. I argue that 
The Awakening’s aural details and metaphoric descriptions are a distinctly modern 
answer to the turn-of-the-century’s mounting skepticism of any realistic representation’s 
claim to truth or accuracy. Just as the unquestionable accuracy of photography was met 
with increasing skepticism in the final two decades of the century, so, too, was the 
preeminence of those literary styles that were defined by their investment in a kind of 
knowledge production that was profoundly visual. For The Awakening’s narrator, the 
                                                 
115 Chopin, Kate. The Awakening. Ed. Nancy A. Walker. (Boston & New York: Bedford Books for St. 
Martin’s Press, 1993) 25. All subsequent page numbers from this edition will be noted in the text.  
116 For an overview of the critical treatment of music in The Awakening, see Nicole Camastra’s “Venerable 
Sonority in Katie Chopin’s The Awakening” American Literary Realism 40.2 (2008): 154-166. Camastra 
argues for the significance of Frederic Chopin on The Awakening, even as she acknowledges that most 
critics have focused on the parallels between Chopin’s novel and the themes and cultural milieu associated 
with Richard Wagner’s music. See also: Melanie Dawson, "Edna and the Tradition of Listening: The Role 
of Romantic Music in The Awakening," Southern Studies, 3 (Summer 1992) 87–98; Carol S. Corum, 
"Music in The Awakening," Mount Olive Review, 8 (1995–96) 36–43; Lynda S. Boren, "Taming the Sirens: 
Self-Possession and the Strategies of Art in Kate Chopin's The Awakening," Kate Chopin Reconsidered: 
Beyond the Bayou, ed. Boren and Susan deSaussure Davis (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 
1999) 181–96; Barbara C. Ewell, Kate Chopin (New York: Ungar, 1986) 154–55. 
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promise of a representation that actively courted the interplay of sound and image is the 
promise of an accuracy that could still exist in the wake of the era’s scientific and 
aesthetic endorsement of subjective, individual perceptions and sensations as powerful 
influences on both the production of knowledge and the pleasures of spectatorship—
influences that were at least as potent, if not more so, than the visually oriented realisms 
that had dominated the cultures of both science and entertainment throughout the century.  
 Literary naturalism and “silent” film were, arguably, the cultural forms that 
represented the late 19
th
 century’s most highly evolved forms of realistic representation—
an evolution that, as many have argued, could not help but become the more sophisticated 
realisms of literary modernism and the “classic” Hollywood cinema that emerged in the 
early decades of the 20
th
 century. The Awakening’s narrative fascination with sound, 
sensation and metaphor articulates a fantasy of realistic representation that was eagerly 
shared by the makers and spectators of early film, and one that also relied on the potential 
of sound to define, shape or alter an image. In 1899, films employed a wide range of 
sound accompaniments, most of which were intended to intensify a film’s overall 
realism. In the pre-talkie era, sound was the sign of a cinematic representation that would 
exceed all others: a representation of reality convincing enough to evoke the kind of 
naïve surrender to an illusion that, in 1899, hardly existed any longer among spectator 
well acquainted with the technological tricks and conventions of photography and film. 
The era’s actual cinematic soundscapes, however, represented a reality that was quite 
different from this sort of overwhelming illusion. Rather than enhancing a completely 
convincing illusion of reality, the gaps between sound accompaniments and cinematic 
images offered audiences opportunities to shape their own experience of a film and 
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derive its meaning. Cinematic sound forced filmmakers and exhibitors to surrender at 
least some of their agency in the production of a film’s meaning to their audiences, just 
as, by the end of Chopin’s novel, her narrator surrenders her responsibility for bridging 
the impossible gaps between one person’s subjectivity and another’s. 
 
Early Film And The Reality Of Sound   
 The characteristic entertainments—literary, visual and otherwise—of the 
American 1890s were those that openly courted their audiences’ embodied sensations. As 
many historians have recently argued, audiences were increasingly resistant to being 
“taken in” by the illusions perpetrated by these visual entertainments. Such skepticism 
was not only due to the public’s growing knowledge about the mechanisms and 
technologies that produced realistic representations; it was also about the growing 
awareness of how influential individual perception was on what were previously thought 
to be wholly objective senses, particularly vision. Not only were audiences wise to the 
tricks of realistic representations like photography and film, they were also well aware 
that individuals saw things differently. Jonathan Crary, in his investigations on the 
scientific and cultural history of vision and perception in the nineteenth century, 
identifies “the relatively sudden emergence of models of subjective vision in a wide 
range of disciplines during the period 1810-1840,” and his work traces the influence of 
such models on the most influential writers and artists of the late nineteenth century. The 
work of ocular physiologists like Hermann von Helmholtz, for example, revealed that the 
human eye’s reception of light was, as Crary puts it, “anything but unmediated,”117 while 
                                                 
117 Crary explains Helmholtz’s discovery in the following way, and suggests that it underscored his 
insistence—which was eventually widely accepted—that “the retina is effectively a part of the brain:” 
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other physiological investigations, like those of Gustav Fechner, attempted to “quantify 
subjective experience” in an effort to rationalize, manage and discipline the experiences 
of human perception and attention. As Crary notes, however, such efforts pointed just as 
emphatically to the unruly and subjective nature of human perception as they did to the 
potential of taming it:  
Even as his [Fechner’s] work opened the vast rationalizing possibilities of 
psychometrics, at the same time it disclosed the qualitative discontinuities that 
irrevocably fragmented the apparently uniform fabric of perceptual 
experience…Even as attention is the site of quantification for Fechner, it 
simultaneously suggested subjective operations of repression and anesthetization, 
which were to be of considerable importance for Freud and others. [26]  
 
Crary identifies the work of scientists like Helmholtz and Fechner as the basis for the 
notion “that the functioning of vision became dependent on the complex and contingent 
physiological makeup of the observer, rendering vision faulty, unreliable, and, it was 
sometimes argued, arbitrary.” [12]  Cultural historians like James Cook, Miles Orvell, 
and, more recently, Nancy Bentley and Michael Leja, locate this notion of a “faulty, 
unreliable” or “arbitrary” vision in the late-nineteenth century penchant for visual media 
and entertainments that were obviously deceptions or “humbugs.” Cook’s work on both 
the notorious P.T. Barnum and his cultural milieu shows how a wide range of visual and 
performative entertainments—from the exhibition of sideshow-like “freaks” or 
mechanical wonders; to the vogue for tromp l’oeil painting— relied on some form of 
deception to attract audiences118. Miles Orvell, in his study of authenticity and imitation 
                                                                                                                                                 
When light enters this opaque “apparatus,” it is no longer as part of a geometrical optics, as 
rectiliniear rays traveling from point to point, but as a form of luminous energy that strikes a dense 
mosaic of receptors, setting off a complex of processes in this compound organ that culminate in 
visual perceptions. (153) 
Helmholtz’s optical discoveries underscored the kind of visual experimentation that defined the neo-
impressionist work of painters like Georges Seurat. 
118 Cook, James. W. The Arts of Deception: Playing With Fraud In The Age Of Barnum. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2001. 
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in nineteenth century America, identifies photography as a primary participant in the 
culture of deception that Cook describes, claiming that the “nineteenth century practice of 
photography was founded on an understanding of the medium as an illusion…in which 
the image offers the viewer a representation of reality, a typification, a conscious 
simulacrum—though a simulacrum that elicited a willing suspension of disbelief.”119 
Michael Leja identifies the popular practice of spirit photography, in which studio 
photographers produced photographic portraits of a sitter that were magically able to 
capture and display the ghostly images of the sitter’s dead loved ones, as one such 
example. Citing evidence from the sensational trial of William H. Mumler, a spirit 
photographer accused of fraud, Leja notes that one fellow spirit photographer’s testimony 
that his own spirit photographs were “bogus” “suggests that a market existed for spirit 
photographs based on their being appreciated as technological curiosities, tricks, or 
creative visualizations of spirit life.”120 Bentley suggests that “modern amusements” that 
traded on the body’s response to a perceived threat—the newly invented roller coaster, 
for example, or the “train films” that seemed to subject their audiences to the threat of an 
oncoming train,  
evince an eagerness for the “pleasurable vacillation between belief and doubt” 
that became possible only after the widespread decline of belief in miracles and 
marvels. Similarly, the “apparent miracles” performed by new mechanical 
amusements like the roller coaster were an exciting test of commonsense 
knowledge of physics at the same time that they channeled anxiety about modern 
technology into the electric sensation of the bodily thrill.
121
 
  
 Early film audiences reveled in the kind of “pleasurable vacillation between belief 
and doubt” that Bentley identifies as the era’s characteristic mode of spectatorship; 
                                                 
119 Orvell 77. 
120 Leja 35. 
121 Bentley 254. 
 138 
however, the new medium of film also suggested the possibility of a representation that 
was far closer to a “true” illusion than any of the era’s visual or aural entertainments. For 
the pioneering filmmakers and exhibitors during the late nineteenth century, the interplay 
of cinematic sounds and images provoked the fantasy of annihilating the skeptical 
resistance to illusion that characterized most film audiences. The possibilities for 
cinema’s sights and sounds to enhance, inspire or alter each other were a major 
preoccupation for those critics and filmmakers interested in the future of cinema. Taking 
Edison’s well-known mantra about film “doing for the eye what the phonograph does for 
the ear” as a succinct and telling example122, Tom Gunning emphasizes the film 
industry’s historic idealization of sound, claiming that for many of film’s early 
innovators, the technology began as “an image of sound,” one that was “part of a broader 
attempt to recreate and recapture the sensual world in several dimensions.”123 And indeed, 
the delight—or even the necessity—of “hearing” as well as seeing a film’s images was 
frequently noted by commentators in the trade press.  The tendency of contemporary 
viewers to find silent images unpleasantly eerie or uncanny has been well-documented by 
film historians, but cinema’s first spectators also seemed to perceive sound as a sensation 
that could enhance the visual experience of a film significantly enough to produce an 
experience quite different from that of viewing the film in silence. Noted film critic and 
sometime-lecturer Stephen Bush insisted on sound as not just a pleasant accompaniment 
to a film, but a necessary tool for making its images legible, “bringing out “by sound and 
                                                 
 122 For more on the relationship between Edison’s experiments with visual and aural technologies, see 
Gitelman, Lisa. Always Already New: Media, History And The Data Of Culture. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2006) and Kittler, Friedrich. Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1999). 
123 Gunning, “Doing For The Eye” 28.  
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language the beauties that appear but darkly or not at all until the ear helps the eye.”124 
And, in 1899, for example, an anonymous contributor to the industry periodical the 
Phonoscope marveled at the wonder of the Stereophone, one of the latest nickel-in-the-
slot, peepshow-style devices that provided lifelike sound effects along with its visual 
projections. Commenting on a series of “views” entitled “Going to the Circus,” the writer 
delights in an experience that evokes the possibility of multi-sensory spectatorship:  
Looking at the first scene you see the circus procession approaching and hear the 
band play, gradually becoming louder as if growing nearer. The next scene is a 
near view of the elephants, and you hear street cries and the band in the distance. 
Then other procession views are shown in regular succession, with accompanying 
street noises, the tramp of horses’ feet, etc. Then a view of the circus grounds is 
shown and you hear the hucksters’ cries and other well known circus sounds. 
Then a view inside the first tent, and you see the animal dens, with near views of 
the lion and hippopotamus, and a good imitation of the growl of the lion is heard. 
Then inside the big tent you see the old familiar scenes and hear the old familiar 
cries, Peanuts five a bag,” predominating; then “Tickets for the grand concert” is 
heard, finally ending with a chorus supposed to be sung by the concert troupe, and 
all in about three minutes and for five cents. Everything real as life except the 
odor of the sawdust and the animals, and doubtless this might be added.
125
  
 
For this writer, the realistic sound effects that accompany the images in “Going to the 
Circus” are part of a representation so “real as life” that it practically evokes the smells of 
the scene as well—or at least stimulates him to imagine the possibility of such a 
representations.   
 As Rick Altman notes in his study of early film sound, the enthusiasm of 
spectators like the writer quoted above was typical in its appreciation of the realistic 
sound effects that were nearly always a part of the late nineteenth century experience of 
cinema.126 Typical, too, is the way in which a film’s combination of sights and sounds 
                                                 
124 Lastra 109. 
125 Altman 83. 
126 Altman, Rick. Silent Film Sound. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). 42. See also: 
Bottomore, Stephen. “The Story Of Percy Peashaker: Debates About Sound Effects in the Early Cinema” in 
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seems to provoke an imaginative leap towards an experience of spectatorship that seemed 
even “realer” than it actually was: the many and varied experiments with cinematic sound 
often inspired claims that films really could produce the kind of awe-struck, naïve 
spectators who, according to most film historians/etc., were more a fiction of the 
industry’s hyperbolic self-promotion than an actual phenomenon. Stephen Bottomore’s 
quotation of Ben Jolly, an early film exhibitor, on the value of sound accompaniment for 
any film, is an excellent example of this tendency: 
If you ask me what brings in the crowds, I’ll say it’s the pipe organ and the effects 
box…Why, I can even make you believe some of those elephants are trumpeting 
in the jungle, and as for a lion roaring—say, I scared a lot of women this 
afternoon. And as for those ocean pictures—why, when I imitated the surf 
breaking on the rocks today, one girl screamed as if she had wet her feet!127  
 
What is notable about this quotation is the way in which Jolly credits the sounds of the 
film as the means of creating an illusion real enough to trick audiences—real enough, in 
fact, to make one spectator experience the “feel” of the film’s oceanic images as well as 
their look and sound. Jolly’s claims about his audiences’ extreme reactions may be 
largely exaggerated, but his evocation of their total-body response is nevertheless a 
telling example of the crucial link between a film’s sound and the possibilities for new 
modes of sensational spectatorship that it inspired.  
 Films with realistic sound effects may not have actually convinced spectators that 
their own bodies could be touched by a film, but they did produce a kind of cinematic 
realism that depended on/explicitly appealed to the embodied presence of the spectator in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Abel, Richard and Rick Altman, eds. The Sounds of Early Cinema. (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2001) and Bottomore, Stephen. “An International Survey Of Sound Effects In Early Cinema.” Film 
History 11.4 (1999) 485-498. 
127 Bottomore, “International Survey” 485. Jolly’s statements are of a piece with other such hyperbole that 
contributed to the myth of extraordinarily naïve film spectators—the myth epitomized by that of people 
running from the theater at the sight of an oncoming train. What’s notable about this quote, however, is that 
it isn’t the images but the sounds that create this supposedly overwhelming trick.   
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the theater. Several film historians have argued persuasively that the appeal of sound in 
the pre-talkie era was largely due to the kinds of connections between the audience and 
the musicians or “sound men” who provided the soundtrack for early film performances. 
Norman King argues that a film’s sounds, particularly those produced “live,” like effects 
and music, “produced effects in the cinema that recorded sound could not, a sense of 
immediacy and participation. Live sound actualized the image and, merging with it, 
emphasized the presentness of the perfomance and the audience.”128 James Lastra, in his 
study of American cinematic sound, provides a detailed articulation of this claim through 
a description of the way in which sound practitioners directly addressed and pushed 
audiences to participate actively in the film experience. A film’s soundscape, Lastra 
argues, 
spoke directly to audiences in a celebration of their fleeting community. Whether 
through sing-a-longs, virtuoso musical or vocal performance, ethnic or national 
music, conspiratorial mockery of the film, or simply their bodily presence, 
musicians and sound performers decisively mediated the experience of silent 
films in the nickelodeon and in the picture palace…Like the barker, but in concert 
with the screen, the singer, pianist, and drummer directly acknowledged their 
audiences, and even elicited their response through cleverness, ingenuity, and 
above all spot-on performances stressing synchronism…these and other sound 
practices stressed performance to such an extent that audience attention often 
seemed split between the world on the screen and the performers in the theater.
129
  
 
The scene of spectatorship that Lastra describes is one in which the active participation of 
audience members depends on the degree to which a film’s sound practitioners are able to 
make a film “real.” This was a realism that, according to Miriam Hansen, had less to do 
with an audience being duped and much more to do with integrating the experience of 
                                                 
128 King, Norman, quoted in Hansen, Miriam. Babel and Babylon: Spectatorship in American Silent Film. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991. 43. 
129 Lastra 97-104. 
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film with the actual experience of being in the world. The variety and variability of sound 
practitioners’ contributions to a film  
allowed for locally and culturally specific acts of reception, opening up a margin 
of participation and unpredictability. In this margin the cinema could assume the 
function of an alternative public sphere for particular social groups, like 
immigrants and women, by providing an intersubjective horizon through—and 
against—which they could negotiate the specific displacements and discrepancies 
of their experience.
130
  
 
In Hansen’s description, a film’s soundscape offered audiences an opportunity to claim a 
film as specific to their own social and cultural experience, even if the images on the 
screen had little to do with who they were. That sound practitioners frequently tailored a 
particular film’s soundtrack to the specific tastes of their local audiences meant that they 
cast these spectators as the experts on how well or poorly an overall film was exhibited in 
the context of reception. And, as Lastra argues, the criteria by which such “experts” 
judged had a great deal to do with the various ways in which a particular film could be 
made “real” through sound. Referring to the timing of music and sound effects, Lastra 
notes that “both lecturers and prop men understood “synchronization” as a category of 
evaluation.” According to Lastra and others, audience approval of a film’s soundtrack 
was based largely on a particular concept of realistic representation, one that readily 
acknowledged the production of cinematic sound as a trick engineered by skilled (or not 
so skilled) illusionists: “the tension between realism and the flamboyant displays of skill 
it took to produce it,” Lastra argues, “profoundly shaped attitudes toward sound 
effects.”131  
                                                 
130 Hansen 43-44. 
131 According to Lastra, skilled sound practitioners like Howe and others emphasized the question of how a 
real film could, should and did sound as a crucial part of the early film spectator’s experience of a film, one 
that effectively challenged the industry’s growing focus on film’s narrative potential: 
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 Both the “intersubjective horizon” that Hansen describes and Lastra’s argument 
for the relationship between sound practitioners and audiences suggest that, for many 
spectators, the experience of cinematic sound emphasized their identities as 
knowledgeable, discerning listeners and viewers. Eliding or resisting the fact that early 
film audiences often played this role has been part of film history’s now-debunked myth 
of the exaggeratedly naïve spectator who is taken in by every cinematic trick in the book, 
no matter how familiar or transparent. On account of both this projected identity and their 
actual identities, in the preponderance of contexts, as ethnic and social “others,” early 
film audiences were often portrayed by the trade and popular press as a particular version 
of naturalist brutes, defined (among other things) by their innate vulnerabilities to the 
sensations and vicissitudes of the physical world. The relationship between sound and 
realism in early film is only one of many characteristics of the early film experience that 
points to the inaccuracy of this characterization, but it is one that offers a particularly 
intriguing analogue to the ways in which The Awakening’s depiction of sound 
complicates the conventional trope of the brute in naturalist literature. The narrator’s 
fascination with aural details and especially with Edna Pontellier’s sensual vulnerability 
to music in The Awakening blurs the boundary between naturalism’s privileged, 
knowledgeable narrator and the (supposedly) brutish protagonist she describes. The 
narrator’s interest in Edna’s aural sensitivity echoes the myriad ways in which an early 
film’s audible narrators—lecturers, “sound men” or musicians—deferred their authority 
                                                                                                                                                 
By adhering to a practice that was discursive and performative, the effects man created new 
hierarchies within the image, drawing spectator attention to incidental features because they could 
make noise. Under his gaze, the image ceased to signify in a predictable way, but became a pretext 
for virtuoso displays of sound. (105) 
Lastra describes a performative practice that privileges a mimetic reproduction of detail over and against 
the delivery of narrative information, one that caters both to an audience’s delight in and capacity to judge 
the effectiveness of a well-wrought illusion. 
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to audiences whose “brutish” ears were as discerning—perhaps even more so—than their 
own.  
 
Sounds That Tell Without Knowing: Narrative Echoes And Transcriptions In The 
Awakening 
 As the prophet of a tantalizingly lifelike brand of realism that foretold ever-
greater thrills of spectatorship, cinematic sound shares something with the elaborate 
soundscape that occupies the narrator of The Awakening. Like film’s evolving 
soundtracks, the aural details of the novel function not only as contributors to an overall 
reality effect, but also as a suggestion of a representation whose “reality” could supersede 
that of even the most lifelike mimetic illusion.
 132 Sound in The Awakening is both the 
provocation for and the sign of the narrator’s longing to tell a story that might exceed its 
own investment in a visually oriented realism—a desire to tell a tale so accurate, so 
convincing—so real—that it could overcome the skepticism of a public that was 
increasingly put off by realism’s literary and visual tricks and techniques.  
 Leja, in his study of American art at the end of the nineteenth century, claims that 
such skepticism was part of a broader cultural tendency in which “modern life was 
coming to be distinguished by a gaping separation between appearance and truth.” 133 
According to Leja, such a tendency was responsible for the growing skepticism with 
which the realist aesthetic was regarded more generally: 
                                                 
132 I refer here to Roland Barthes’ definition of the term as those details that seem to fall outside the 
structural meaning of a text, those that “denote what is ordinarily called “concrete reality” (insignificant 
gestures, transitory attitudes, insignificant objects, redundant words).” Barthes, “The Reality Effect.” The 
Novel: An Anthology of Criticism, 1900-2000. 233. 
133 Leja 11. 
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…for the artists and critics who believed that truth was behind, beyond, above, or 
otherwise removed from appearances, realism and naturalism were humbug; 
artists like George Inness and Albert Pinkham Ryder found truth in vague, 
abstract, and disembodied visions.
134
 
Leja’s account of the “gaping separation between appearance and truth” is essentially an 
account of a broader representational crisis, one that produced not just the visual 
experimentations of artists like Inness and Ryder, but also one that informs the puzzling 
conflicts that seem to trouble Edna Pontellier and, even more especially, the narrative 
voice that tells her story. The Awakening’s narrator often seems torn between a 
commitment to the kind of objective, concrete descriptions so often associated with 
realism and naturalism; and the pursuit of the kind of “vague, abstract, and disembodied 
visions” that Leja identifies as the mark of truth for the period’s visual artists. What this 
conflict ultimately produces is a narrative focus on the sensory immediacy of Edna’s 
experience: a kind of compromise between the accuracy of observable physical detail and 
the subjective “truth” of individual experience—a truth that is often more easily heard 
than seen. Throughout the course of the nineteenth century, scientific progress pointed 
more and more emphatically toward the essentially subjective and highly variable nature 
of human sensation and perception; at the same time, however, the rapidly evolving 
technologies of scientific investigation promised ever more precise ways of measuring, 
quantifying and controlling these faculties.135 Nancy Bentley’s study of the impact on 
realist literature of the era’s preoccupation with sensory realities gestures toward the 
notion of sensory information as a solution to a problem faced by a number of disciplines 
whose methods of knowledge production were regarded ever-more skeptically. As she 
                                                 
134 Leja 15. 
135 As Crary and others have persuasively argued, the project of detecting, measuring and reproducing 
human sensation was a key component of what historians have described as the era’s decisive turn toward a 
systematic disciplining of the human body by social and political entities. 
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puts it, “for thinkers in a number of different disciplines, the textures of everyday 
experience and perception seemed to hold the secret to acquiring new knowledge.”136 
Bentley discusses Chopin specifically in this context, remarking on the crucial role of 
sensory experience in The Awakening:  
…once again, observation is a woman’s path toward agency, but the new 
consciousness Edna acquires is not purely cognitive; here and elsewhere the 
“awakening” or her understanding is more physical than analytical. 
Consciousness in Chopin is always sensory consciousness, awareness of and 
through the body’s senses.137  
 
According to Bentley, Edna’s “sensory consciousness” is inseparable from the insight 
about herself and her social reality that she will eventually gain, and an inextricable 
element of the newly acquired social mobility that Edna explores throughout the novel. 
Especially notable in terms of the relationship between naturalism’s observant narrators 
and their inarticulate subjects is the notion of this newly acquired power as a particular 
kind of resistance to being easily read and analyzed by an observer. For example, in a 
passage from Chopin’s short story “A Pair of Silk Stockings,” in which the protagonist, 
Mrs. Sommers, presents an unreadable exterior self—one that “puzzles” a fellow traveler 
on a streetcar—Bentley identifies such an attitude as a kind of affect that offers women a 
new measure of self-knowledge and a new measure of social power, what she calls a “site 
of sensory perception that is precognitive yet still socially meaningful.” Such 
unreadability offers its subjects the opportunity to elude the kind of precise and detailed 
scrutiny that—according to the tenets of realism—the landscape of urban modernity 
made perpetually available to even the most casual observers. In “Stockings,” as in “The 
Awakening,” “the real” comes to encompass more than the accurate appearances and 
                                                 
136 Bentley, Nancy. Frantic Panoramas: American Literature and Mass Culture, 1870-1920. (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009). 247 
137 Bentley 140. 
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recognizable social realities that were the stock and trade of conventional realist fiction, 
becoming, according to Bentley, something that “cannot be grasped by even the keenest 
outside observer who expects to find knowledge in legible social facts or relations.”   
 Bentley’s commentary here about the unavailability of “real” information about a 
fictional protagonist evokes the fraught relationships between naturalism’s privileged, 
articulate observers and the subjects they describe. In The Awakening, the narrator’s 
engagement with sound signals a desire to know a story at the level of sensation and 
perception—a terrain far more closely associated with naturalism’s markedly embodied 
brutes than with its distanced spectators.138 Even more significantly, sound in The 
Awakening signals the narrator’s desire to tell through reflection rather than 
representation; through mimetic imitation rather than interpretation. Such modes of 
knowing and telling echo Edna’s curiously passive and seemingly unconscious—yet 
highly embodied—way of being in the world. The narrator frequently notes her lack of 
awareness about even her most significant emotions or decisions—as most notably with 
her suicide, the ostensible reasons for which the narrator claims “she was not thinking of” 
as she walks “rather mechanically” [136] toward the ocean. The narrator’s account of the 
moments before her death are instead suffused with Edna’s sensory experience of being 
naked on the beach, “the water of the Gulf…gleaming with the million lights of the sun; 
the voice of the sea...whispering, clamoring, murmuring.” The voice of the sea “invites 
the soul to wander in abysses of solitude,” but given the narrator’s focus on Edna thrilling 
to the “delicious” experience of “standing naked in the open air, at the mercy of the sun,” 
feeling “the breeze that beat upon her,” [136] it seems that Edna’s body accepts the 
                                                 
138 See Howard, Form and History, especially chapter 4: “Slumming in Determinism: Naturalism and the 
Spectator” 104-141.   
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invitation more pointedly than her soul. The narrator’s account of one of Edna’s earliest 
instances of what is ostensibly an existential crisis is also strangely caught up with her 
immediate sensory experience. When Edna has “a good cry all to herself,” after her 
husband reprimands her about her mothering skills, the narrator emphasizes Edna’s 
mental experience of this episode as a kind of blank mystery, describing her feeling as 
one of  
indescribable oppression, which seemed to generate in an unfamiliar part of her 
consciousness, filled her whole being with a vague anguish. It was like a shadow, 
like a mist passing across her soul’s summer day. It was strange and unfamiliar; it 
was a mood. She did not sit there inwardly upbraiding her husband, lamenting at 
Fate, which had directed her footsteps to the path which they had taken. She was 
just having a good cry all to herself. [25] 
 
And although the narrator later identifies the incident described above as a significant one 
in the beginning of Edna’s “realization of her position in the universe as a human being,” 
the narrator is quick to point out that Edna is shaken out of her despair by the minor 
physical annoyance of the mosquitoes, whose “stinging [and] buzzing succeeded in 
dispelling a mood which might have held her there in the darkness half a night longer.” 
[25] 
 Even Edna’s artistic practice, arguably her most active expression of the 
“awakening” she experiences, is described as the result of her “natural aptitude” rather 
than any consciously practiced skill. When Edna tries to paint a portrait of Adele 
Ratignolle, for example, the resulting picture suggests that Edna’s intent is woefully 
irrelevant to influence the workings of her “natural” talent. Robert insists that the picture 
is “not bad,” that Edna “knows what she is doing;” however, the narrator claims, “the 
picture completed bore no resemblance to Madame Ratignolle.” Edna’s reaction to her 
work sounds as if she has only just noticed the picture rather than painted it herself—she 
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“finds”, to her “great disappointment,” that the picture “did not look like [Adele].” [30] 
Mme. Reisz, the novel’s prototypical “true artist,” offers an even more explicit statement 
about the separation of “natural” ability from acquired skill, claiming that being an artist 
“includes much; one must possess many gifts—absolute gifts—which have not been 
acquired by one’s own effort.” [83]  
 The notion of a mode of representation whose truth is guaranteed by an 
involuntary, mechanism over and above any conscious thought or skill evokes the 
shopworn promise of nineteenth century photography. That photographs could produce 
tricks and illusions just as well as any other medium was common knowledge; however, 
the ideal of a representation whose truth was guaranteed by its automatism was one that 
still had purchase.139 For The Awakening’s narrator, capturing and reproducing the sounds 
of her story as well as its visual details offers a means of approaching this ideal. The 
narrator’s experiments with particular combinations of sound and image in the novel 
range from transcriptions and echoes of the sounds that we might expect to emanate from 
the novel’s visual landscape to metaphorical descriptions that are virtually synesthetic in 
their insistence on the links between sight and sound: they are the hint of a representation 
that could be even realer than it was accurate140.  
 The narrator’s attention to the sounds of the LeBrun’s Grand Isle resort in the 
novel’s opening scene gestures toward a way of knowing characters and telling their 
                                                 
139 See, for example, Walther Benn Michaels’s claims in The Gold Standard and the Logic of Naturalism, 
about the appeal of photography and automatic writing as modes of representation whose arbitrariness 
guaranteed their accuracy. And Andre Bazin, in “The Ontology of the Photographic Image” Trans. Hugh 
Gray. Film Quarterly 13.4 (Summer 1960): 4-9, asserts the notion of automatism as a guarantor of 
authenticity or accuracy as late as 1960.   
140 As a neurological phenomenon in particular, synesthesia evokes the promise of a representation whose 
truth is guaranteed by a certain kind of automatism. The communication between the senses—the way in 
which they confirm each other’s impressions—experienced by the synesthete suggests that, at least for 
some, there is an objective standard for the evaluation of sensory perceptions.   
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stories through access to their sensations rather than their thoughts; that is, by sharing in a 
subjective experience of mingled sights and sounds that challenges the model of 
objective, visually oriented description that informs the naturalist novel. For both the 
narrator and Monsieur Pontellier, the array of irritating sounds at Madame Lebrun’s 
resort dominates their experience of the scene. The repetitive screechings of Madame 
Lebrun’s parrot make it impossible for Mr. Pontellier to “read his newspaper with any 
degree of comfort,” while the parrot’s mockingbird companion sings with a “maddening 
persistence.” The young Farival twins practice a duet on the piano; and Madame Lebrun 
continually gives orders in a voice that the narrator twice describes as “high” in a single 
sentence. Such sounds are powerful enough to disrupt Mr. Pontellier’s visual as well as 
his aural experience of the scene, even after he has quit the main house in an attempt to 
escape them. Still unable to concentrate on his newspaper, Mr. Pontellier “glanced 
restlessly” at “editorials and bits of news” and “once in a while…withdrew his glance 
from the newspaper and looked about him.” What Mr. Pontellier sees, however, are 
sounds rather than sights: the sentence that follows the narrator’s description of Mr. 
Pontellier “looking about him” states that “there was more noise than ever over at the 
house,” as if what Mr. Pontellier sees is more noise than image:  
The chattering and whistling birds were still at it. Two young girls, the Farival 
twins, were playing a duet from “Zampa” upon the piano. Madame Lebrun was 
bustling in and out, giving orders in a high key to a yard-boy whenever she got 
inside the house, and directions in an equally high voice to a dining-room servant 
whenever she got outside. She was a fresh, pretty woman, clad always in white 
with elbow sleeves. Her starched skirts crinkled as she came and went. Farther 
down, before one of the cottages, a lady in black was walking demurely up and 
down, telling her beads. [20] 
 
The narrator’s assumption of Mr. Pontellier’s aural as well as his visual perspective 
emphasizes a kind of sensory intimacy with her character, one in which the narrator’s 
 151 
privileged knowledge about her character is sensual rather than rational; embodied rather 
than cognitive. Here, the narrator’s privilege is evident not in what she knows about Mr. 
Pontellier, but in her uncanny ability to hear for Mr. Pontellier. It seems possible that Mr. 
Pontellier could still hear the birds and piano music, and perhaps even Madame Lebrun’s 
orders, from the porch of his own cottage, but highly unlikely that he could hear the 
crinkle of starched skirts or the sound of the lady in black “telling her beads.” These 
sounds of crinkling and telling, rather, are the privileged experience of a narrator who can 
be both everywhere and nowhere, both bodiless and keenly attuned to the sensory 
realities of bodily experience. In this passage, aural detail emphasizes the narrator’s 
omniscience at the level of perception rather than cognition—an emphasis that highlights 
a character’s subjective experience rather than the narrator’s informed interpretation of its 
meaning.  
 Hearing what Mr. Pontellier sees suggests that the narrator is determined to know 
her characters not only through naturalism’s privileged mode of distanced observation, 
but also by way of experiencing the subjective sensations and perceptions of the 
characters she describes. The narrator’s quotation of Madame LeBrun’s parrot, however, 
signals her pursuit of a new mode of telling—a mode that seems to place the same kind 
of emphasis on the subjective experience of a character as the aural details that are 
produced by the sights that Mr. Pontellier sees. The scene opens with the narrator’s 
quotation of a parrot—an animal whose characteristic chatter is both highly mimetic and 
(presumably) non-intelligent:  
A green and yellow parrot, which hung in a cage outside the door, kept repeating 
over and over: 
“Allez-vous-en! Allez vous-en! Sapristi! That’s all right!” [“Go away! Go away! 
For god’s sake!”] 
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He could speak a little Spanish, and also a language which nobody understood, 
unless it was the mockingbird that hung on the other side of the door, whistling 
his fluty notes out upon the breeze with maddening persistence. [19] 
 
The image of a parrot chattering suggests a specific, predictable sound, but not 
necessarily the words that it says: quoting the parrot directly makes its voice not just an 
accompaniment to its image, but also a sound with a message of its own. Its chatter may 
be only an imitation of human speech, empty of thought or intelligence. It nevertheless 
becomes a kind of narrative directive when Mr. Pontellier “obeys” the parrot and leaves 
the main house to read his paper in front of his own cottage. 
 Madame Lebrun’s parrot is both an invocation and a challenge to the conventional 
naturalist trope of the “dumb beast,” the brute who is marked as such by—among other 
things—his or her inability to speak. In this scene and elsewhere, the parrot’s apparently 
senseless chatter carries a certain narrative power that rivals that of the privileged, 
knowing narrator. In conventional realist/naturalist narrative, it is the narrator who is the 
master of an articulate, privileged mode of speech, one directed toward an audience 
whose social and ethnic makeup mirror his own, and one unintelligible to the brutish 
characters whose stories he tells. In Chopin’s opening scene, however, the parrot speaks a 
“privileged” language as well, one that “nobody” but one of his own kind (the 
mockingbird) understands. Yet the parrot’s language is not only privileged in the sense 
that it is intelligible only to an exclusive few. The parrot is free to speak whatever and 
whenever it likes, precisely because it is more brute than human: as the pet of the Lebrun 
family, the parrot “has a right to make as much noise as it wished,” protected from 
annoyed summer guests by its status as the property of the resort owner. Even the rudest 
utterances are permissible—not only because of who owns the parrot, but also because of 
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its lack of intelligence. During the piano performance of the young Farival twins, for 
example, the parrot utters its familiar refrain of “Allez vous-en! Sapristi!” [42] The 
narrator identifies this “impetuous outburst” as one that expresses a certain truth about 
the situation that no one has been willing or able to express, conceding that the parrot 
“was the only being present who possessed sufficient candor to admit that he was not 
listening to these gracious performances for the first time that summer.” The parrot’s 
outburst may be only another repetition of his familiar refrain, but it nevertheless 
expresses a hidden reality about the situation. Such candor seems to inspire the narrator 
to be just as truthful as the parrot: her account of the next “act” in the show bluntly states 
that “every one present had heard [the recitations given by a brother and sister] many 
times at winter evening entertainments in the city.” [42]  
 The parrot’s speech is senseless and virtually involuntary, an aural detail that 
seems to have little more than ornamental significance—and yet its words ultimately 
represent a uniquely true perspective on reality, one that is only made available to the 
narrator by a (presumably) senseless brute. Audible details that, like the parrot’s speech, 
index an alternatively “real” perspective through purely mimetic representations, 
abounded in the soundscapes of early film. The sound effects and music that 
accompanied early films may have sounded like little more than imitative, audible 
versions of a film’s images, but they were actually sophisticated registers of audience 
response. In much the same way, The Awakening’s details of sound and sensation—
particularly those that emphasize Edna’s passivity and sensual vulnerability—suggest a 
protagonist whose complex  perceptual capacity belies the conventional notion of the 
ignorant, inarticulate naturalist brute Sound effects and music were often received as part 
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of a film’s overall reality effect, but they were also often the index of a reality more 
palpable than the images on the screen: that of the audience’s store of knowledge, 
experience and perceptions. Like the parrot’s inadvertent revelation of what the audience 
of vacationers really thinks about the tired performances they witness, the sound effects 
and music that accompanied early films were often attempts to voice what the individual 
audience might think or feel about a particular film. These expressive “voices” were 
nearly always mimetic reflections/echoes of the on screen images, a characteristic that 
Rick Altman has called the “cued sound aesthetic.” The latter, he argues,  
is entirely based on the presence of sound cues (whether for music or effects) 
within the image. Note that this aesthetic is operative even when no 
accompaniment is provided. As we have seen, early witnesses to silent projections 
regularly express their experience as a lack, an what they claim to need is not just 
sound in general, but the specific sounds implied by the image. [92-93] 
 
Altman traces the “cued sound aesthetic” to the “values and practices” established by the 
popular phonograph concerts that both preceded and continued to flourish during the last 
two decades of the nineteenth century—“values and practices” that, in the context of a 
film, emphasized sound “as a product” of the cinematic image’s newly accurate 
representation of reality.  
 What Altman describes is a harmony between sound and image, in which both 
work together to produce the most lifelike “transcription” of reality possible.141 Sound 
was always tied to a film’s images in some way, but it could also work against the 
implied message or meaning of a film’s images in a way that played up the specific bits 
                                                 
141 As Altman explains, “just as the phonograph was primarily considered as an instrument capable of 
producing a record of reality, so early cinema was understood as a device for the reproduction of 
reality…Whether the film is complemented by “sound effects” or “music,” the sound is meant to be 
understood as a product of the image; the sound-makers are thus implicitly within the space implied by the 
image…The whole point of this early sound standard is to make the sound seem to be coming from the 
image, thus reinforcing the latter’s transcriptive powers.” Altman, Silent Film Sound 92. 
 155 
of local knowledge or preferences that exhibitors and theater staff perceived in their 
audiences. Altman notes that films could and often were radically transformed by the 
sound effects and music that accompanied a film—an accompaniment that depended 
primarily on the film’s venue, and as such was often provided by local “sound men” 
and/or musicians  
 Madame LeBrun’s parrot is hardly the only representative of an aural reality that 
is as mimetic as it is telling. In the scene that details Robert LeBrun’s conversation with 
him mother in her sewing room, the narrator’s account includes several onomatopoetic 
imitations of the sewing machine’s repetitive noise, interspersed with a transcription of 
the conversation between the two characters. The narrator’s attention to an ordinary, 
irritating sound of domestic work is perhaps the novel’s closest analogue to what Altman 
would describe as the “cued sound aesthetic,” and the scene as a whole looks and sounds 
a great deal like films that delighted audiences with their lifelike representations of 
“everyday,” often domestically oriented, scenes. The array of sounds in the scene 
between Robert and his mother produce one of the novel’s most pointed reversals of the 
relationship between the narrator and the “brutish” characters she describes—a reversal 
that was also suggested by both the “soundtracks” that accompanied films showing 
scenes of mundane domestic work and by stand-alone musical performances that also 
echoed the sounds of everyday work. Such “descriptive music,” as it was known, was a 
popular genre in its own right, and its popularity derived from its aural references to an 
everyday world of sound that was undergoing radical change. New machines for 
household work, communication and transportation proliferated at the end of the 
nineteenth century, and virtually all of these mechanized wonders made noise. 
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Sometimes the main event in musical programs,142 descriptive pieces relied on an 
audience’s delight in hearing what were often the mundane and monotonous sounds of 
work—like those of the newly introduced sewing machines—translated into a musical 
language. Descriptive music and the films that mimicked it emphasized the sounds and 
rhythms of the audiences’ everyday domestic chores, re-presenting sounds and sights that 
were both familiar and mundane as narrative events. Listeners or spectators—especially 
female ones—would likely have been experts on how accurate the sounds of a descriptive 
piece or film were, and it was their enjoyment of a descriptive piece or film that would 
have determined its success: not only did these songs and films foreground the “brutish” 
work of wives and domestics, they also targeted these women as knowledgeable, 
discerning spectators.  
 Descriptive music and films of everyday chores challenge the notion of a 
“brutish” audience in need of instruction or edification from the popular entertainments 
they patronized. In these songs and films, sound is the sign of the brute’s expertise and 
agency. Similarly, in the scene that takes place in Madame LeBrun’s sewing room, sound 
signifies a brutish freedom and power that explicitly eludes the narrator. Throughout the 
dialogue between Robert and his mother, the narrator “quotes” the sewing machine’s 
“clatter clatter bang,” as though it is not enough to state, as the narrator does at the 
beginning of the scene, that “the sewing machine made a resounding clatter in the room.” 
These onomatopoeic quotations alternate with the narrator’s running explanations of the 
people and events referred to in the conversation between mother and son—a “back 
                                                 
142 Altman 49. Altman notes the sewing machine as one of the modern “devices and events” that descriptive 
music “rushed to imitate,” citing the example of  “Blind Tom’s “Sewing Song: Imitation of a Sewing 
Machine (1888).” 47. 
 
 157 
story” that signals the narrator’s knowledge of the interior of her characters. Such 
knowledge is the purview of most realist and naturalist narrators: it signals their uniquely 
privileged position within the novel. Yet in this scene, this special knowledge is formally 
linked to a repetitive noise that the narrator seems to “speak” as she listens to and 
explains the conversation between Robert and his mother. The narrator’s imitation of the 
sewing machine suggests that she can “hear” the sewing machine as well as they do; that 
she, too, experiences the annoyance of its interruptions to the conversation that she 
transcribes. The narrator becomes like a phonograph herself—like a machine that can’t 
help but hear and re-present what she hears. The narrator seems helpless before the noise 
of the machine—a condition that contrasts sharply with the scene’s other “annoyance,” 
Robert’s brother, Victor. When Robert and his mother see Victor from the window, he 
pointedly refuses to hear either Robert’s summoning whistle or his mother’s call:  
“Call him.” Clatter, clatter! 
Robert uttered a shrill, piercing whistle which might have been heard back at the 
wharf.  
“He won’t look up.”  
Madame Lebrun flew to the window. She called “Victor!” She waved a 
handkerchief and called again. The young fellow below got into the vehicle and 
started the horse off at a gallop. [40]  
 
Victor—unlike the narrator, who seems unable to ignore the irritating clatter of the 
sewing machine that interrupts her account of the scene—pointedly ignores the irritating 
attempts of Robert and his mother to summon him. His refusal to respond to Robert’s 
whistle is an explicit rejection of ay attempt by the narrator or anyone else in the novel to 
characterize him as a brute. Dogs can hardly choose whether or not to respond to a 
whistle, but Victor can and does choose to ignore it. Victor employs a selective hearing 
that seems to elude the narrator, who is unable to keep from hearing—or, like Madame 
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Lebrun’s parrot, from imitating—the noise that continually interrupts her story.  The 
disconnects between seeing and hearing; between speech and understanding in this scene 
contribute to its general atmosphere of frustrated communications. Robert flees to his 
mother’s room after a conversation with Adele Ratignolle, in which she cautions him 
against paying too much attention to Edna, lest Edna should make “the unfortunate 
blunder of taking you [Robert] seriously.” [38] Annoyed at the realization that his 
attentions to Edna can only continue if they are regarded as something of a joke, Robert 
heads toward his mother’s house. In the narrator’s account of what he sees on the way, 
Robert’s despair is evident in the description of the pension’s eternal lovers and lady in 
black:  
The lovers were just entering the grounds of the pension. They were leaning 
toward each other as the water-oaks bent from the sea. There was not a particle of 
earth beneath their feet. Their heads might have been turned upside-down, so 
absolutely did they tread upon blue ether. The lady in black, creeping behind 
them, looked a trifle paler and more jaded than usual. [39-40] 
 
The narrator’s exaggeratedly deadpan description of the lovers’ infatuated attitudes seems 
inflected by Robert’s romantic frustration, and the lady in black’s “more jaded” 
expression seems like a knowing reflection of Adele’s reminder to Robert about how his 
attentions to married women are perceived. When Robert enters his mother’s sewing 
room, however, the narrator shifts her focus from the kind of interpretive, visual 
illustration of a character’s (i.e., Robert’s) emotional state to a mode of description that 
hears and transcribes more than it interprets and describes. The narrator surrenders the 
task of seeing this scene to Robert and his mother, while her own senses are made 
“audible” to the reader through her repetitive representations of the sewing machine’s 
clatter. Robert and his mother have a view that, like that of naturalism’s most familiar 
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narrators, is virtually boundless: they perch in a room “at the top of the house,” furnished 
with “two broad dormer windows” that, like eyes, “look out toward the Gulf, and as far 
across it as a man’s eye might reach.” [40] By the end of the scene, in fact, the narrator 
has ceased to describe anything visual at all: the reader deduces that Robert sees Edna 
returning from the beach from the narrator’s transcription of the conversation between 
Robert and his mother, in which what must be some change in attitude on Robert’s part 
prompts her to ask him if he sees Mrs. Pontellier and where he is going. Robert then asks 
his mother where the book that she has meant to lend Edna is, a question that seems to 
confirm that he has in fact seen Edna.  
 By the end of this scene, the narrator has surrendered her own expansive view to 
Robert, choosing instead to act more like a transcribing machine than a knowing narrator. 
This scene is a particularly extreme experiment with the potential of a reflective mode of 
narrative, one that the narrator ultimately rejects in favor of a mode of description more 
literary than mechanical. At the end of this scene, Edna’s appearance is signaled by 
Robert’s mention of “the Goncourt,” a book that his mother mentions to Robert earlier in 
the scene as one she has promised to lend to Edna. That a novel by the Goncourt brothers 
is as racy as another that has “gone the rounds of the pension” is highly likely143, and the 
symbolism of Robert presenting Edna with such a novel just after he has been cautioned 
against expressing his feelings directly suggests that, perhaps, the novel speaks for him.  
 
 
                                                 
143 The novels of Edmond and Jules de Goncourt, the first of which was published in 1851, were among the 
first examples of the sort of French naturalism (epitomized and made famous by Emile Zola) that was 
notable not only for its commitment to a “scientific method” of literary representation, but also for its frank 
depictions of sexuality and vice.  
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Metaphor And Descriptive Surrender 
 Robert’s use of the Goncourt novel as a material symbol of his feelings is a 
doubly literary gesture. The book itself is, of course, a work of literature, but even more 
significantly, Robert’s recourse to a symbolic mode of expression echoes the metaphoric 
symbols and substitutions that are the novel’s most explicitly “literary” narrative 
technique. And although the narrator’s metaphoric descriptions seem more sophisticated 
than the transcriptions and echoes of a parrot or a sewing machine, they attempt to 
capture the same accuracy that characterizes her thoughtless mimicry of either bird or 
machine. By imitating the novel’s brutes and machines, the narrator surrenders her own 
(purportedly) more sophisticated interpretations to their instinctual or mechanical 
representations. The narrator’s metaphoric descriptions in The Awakening enact a similar 
surrender of authority, both to the bodies of her characters and ultimately, to an audience 
of readers.  
 In The Awakening, the deferral of “the thing itself” associated with any 
metaphoric description—its substitution of the thing being described with something just 
like it in some important way—is a literary mode that carries the potential for a kind of 
subjective truth that is nevertheless confirmed by the concrete reality of particular sound 
and sight combinations. The narrator’s metaphoric substitutions strive for a similarly 
embodied guarantee of truth, one that is enacted by the bodies of characters, most notably 
Edna. Yet such a guarantee only holds for the body that produces it—a realization that 
shifts authority from the narrator who tells the story to the characters who experience it. 
By the end of The Awakening, the narrator’s metaphors are gestures that surrender the 
authority of being the one who knows and tells: like the novel’s constantly murmuring 
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sea, they invite the reader to discern not only what Edna’s story means, but what it looks 
and sounds like as well. 
 As an exceptionally sensitive artist whose craft seems to elude her conscious 
control, Edna is both a model for and a reflection of the narrator’s metaphoric practice. 
One of the narrator’s more detailed descriptions of Edna is a particularly pointed 
expression of the dynamic between character and narrator that persists throughout the 
novel, one in which Edna inspires the narrator’s unique mode of observation and 
narration:  
The charm of Edna Pontellier’s physique stole insensibly upon you. The lines of 
her body were long, clean and symmetrical; it was a body which occasionally fell 
into splendid poses; there was no suggestion of the trim, stereotyped fashion plate 
about it. A casual and indiscriminating observer, in passing, might not cast a 
second glance upon the figure. But with more feeling and discernment he would 
have recognized the noble beauty of its modeling, and the graceful severity of 
poise and movement, which made Edna Pontellier different from the crowd. [33] 
 
This passage is ostensibly a description of Edna, but it provides at least as much 
information about the narrator’s perceptual abilities as it does about Edna’s appearance. 
“Casual and indiscriminating observers” might not even notice Edna; however, this is not 
the case for a narrator who has obviously cast more than a “second glance” upon the 
figure of her protagonist.  The narrator’s opening statement about the “insensibility” of 
Edna’s beauty suggests that the “feeling and discernment” required to perceive the 
“truth” of Edna are as random and arbitrary as the novel’s ideal of artistic talent as an 
“absolute gift”: some have it, and some do not. We can only assume that the narrator “has 
it,” and the lack of specific physical details about Edna in this description suggests that 
her own impression of Edna is difficult to express in terms of an objective, physical 
description. That Edna’s beauty is “noble,” or that her movements have a “graceful 
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severity” are descriptions that leave considerable room for interpretation from the reader 
or observer—a person referenced by the “you” that appears in the first sentence.  
 In this early description of Edna, the narrator strives to keep the concrete reality 
of Edna’s appearance open to interpretation—an impulse that seems to resist the specific 
imagery of metaphoric description. The narrator’s frustration with the limitations of this 
kind of metaphoric specificity are apparent in her description of Adele Ratignolle—a 
description that is rife with metaphors that, by the end of the description, suggest nothing 
so much as their own limitations as an “accurate” mode of description: 
There are no words to describe her save the old ones that have served so often to 
picture the bygone heroine of romance and the fair lady of our dreams. There was 
nothing subtle or hidden about her charms; her beauty was all there, flaming and 
apparent: the spun-gold hair that comb nor confining pin could restrain; the blue 
eyes that were like nothing but sapphires; two lips that pouted, that were so red 
one could only think of cherries or some other delicious crimson fruit in looking 
at them. She was growing a little stout, but it did not seem to detract an iota from 
the grace of every step, pose, gesture. One would not have wanted her white neck 
a mite less full or her beautiful arms more slender. Never were hands more 
exquisite than hers…[26-27] 
 
Unlike Edna, whose beauty is distinctly not “stereotyped,” Adele’s appearance embodies 
the most typical standards of feminine beauty—standards that inspire a string of clichéd 
metaphors about her hair, lips and eyes. Throughout this description, the narrator 
repeatedly emphasizes that there is only one “correct” or accurate way to describe Adele: 
no words but the old ones can serve to picture her; her eyes are no other blue than that of 
sapphires, her lips no other red than that of crimson fruit. It seems as though the narrator 
is quoting the “old words” that have always been used to describe Adele’s particular kind 
of beauty, and despite the narrator’s insistence that these words are the only ones suitable 
for describing Adele, they ultimately invite speculation about ways of seeing Adele that 
are quite different than the image of her as “the fair lady of our dreams.” The narrator’s 
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repeated use of a negative construction to introduce both the metaphors and the other 
descriptions of Adele beg the reader to imagine what else is possible—surely the color 
red suggests more than crimson fruit; surely some might want Adele’s neck to be just a 
“mite less” full. When the narrator takes care to assure us that even Adele’s “stoutness” 
contributes to her beauty or muses that “one would not have wanted” Adele to be any 
more slender calls attention to the individual spectator’s desire: saying what “one” wants 
calls attention to the fact that different “ones” want, or could want, to see different things.  
 Yet metaphor is at least as appealing as it is frustrating for The Awakening’s 
narrator. Just as the representation of subjective sensation was a response to the growing 
skepticism towards the idea of a realist aesthetic as a viable means of knowledge 
production, the metaphoric mode of description that is eventually deployed by The 
Awakening’s narrator strives to strike a balance between the accuracy of observable detail 
and the kind of subjective truth that can only ever be known by a single individual. And 
again, it is Edna who inspires this kind of description—but as a conscious observer and 
narrator rather than the object of the narrator’s observation. Edna’s explanation of her 
thoughts to Adele as she gazes out to sea weaves her immediate sensory experiences, 
thoughts and childhood memories into an elaborate metaphor that strikes a balance 
between the truth of Edna’s subjective experience and the kind of specific detail and 
narrative gestures that make her story intelligible to Adele, her listener. Edna’s response 
to Adele’s inquiry about what she is thinking follows a path marked out by a kind of 
bodily metaphorics, in which Edna’s sensations and bodily gestures, both present and 
past, provide her with the means of knowing and telling the reality of her inner life. 
Admitting that she “was not really conscious of thinking of anything,” Edna relies on a 
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sensory consciousness rather than a purely cognitive one in order to recall her line of 
thinking. She begins by noting the visual yearning stimulated by “the sight of the water 
stretching so far away, those motionless sails against the blue sky,” describing the scene 
before her as a “delicious picture that I just wanted to sit and look at.” Edna continues to 
trace her sensations, remarking that  
The hot wind beating in my face made me think—without any connection that I 
can trace—of a summer day in Kentucky, of a meadow that seemed as big as the 
ocean to the very little girl walking through the grass, which was higher than her 
waist. She threw her arms as if swimming when she walked, beating the tall grass 
as one strikes out in the water. Oh, I see the connection now! [34-35] 
 
For Edna, the sensation of “hot wind” produces a kind of Proustian recollection of a 
childhood experience, one that she eventually perceives as intimately “connected” to her 
present emotions. This connection is not immediately available to Edna—it only becomes 
so as she strives to make the scene of her memory visible to Adele through a series of 
metaphors that connect her memory to the ocean scene before her: a meadow “as big as 
the ocean;” a little girl who “threw her arms as if swimming when she walked, beating 
the tall grass as one strikes out in the water.” Her concluding statement that she “feel[s] 
this summer as if I were walking through that green meadow again; idly, aimlessly, 
unthinking and unguided” [35] insists on the specificity of her childhood memory as a 
metaphoric expression of Edna’s feeling of malaise. The tools that Edna uses to make her 
story intelligible to Adele are the tools of her own subjective experience, both in terms of 
the immediate sensations of the scene and her childhood memories. Yet despite the 
introspective character of Edna’s musings, she strikes the pose of a narrator when she 
assumes the third person in describing her childhood memory—a pose that seems to 
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produce the immediate realization of the links between her memory, the scene before her, 
and her emotional state.  
 
Synesthesia: Metaphor And Bodies 
 When Edna traces her thoughts for Adele, she begins by describing the scene of 
the boats and sea before her as a “delicious picture.” Her metaphor suggests that the 
visual impression of the scene is intense enough to exceed the boundaries of one sense 
and stimulate another: what she sees is beautiful enough to appeal not only to her vision, 
but also to her sense of taste. Edna’s mention of her “delicious picture” references her 
capacity for synesthetic perception—a “talent” that represents the most extreme version 
of the novel’s narrative fantasy about the particular kind of realism that interplays 
between sight and sound could produce. The scene of Edna’s response to the masterful 
piano performance of Mme. Reisz is a particularly clear illustration of how the narrator 
models her metaphoric practice on Edna’s particular sensory tendencies. Edna and Mme. 
Reisz are both clearly depicted as unique in their abilities to appreciate and perform 
music, respectively—a pairing of exceptional listener and performer that echoes the 
narrator’s insistence on both Edna’s unique beauty and the narrator’s unique ability to 
perceive it. Mme. Reisz’s talent is well known at the pension: “Of course Edna would 
like to hear Mme Reisz play,” the narrator states, and the pianist’s appearance before the 
audience provokes “a general air of surprise and genuine satisfaction.” Edna, for her part, 
is described as a unique sort of listener, one whose profound appreciation for music takes 
the form of synesthetic hearing:  
Edna was what she herself called very fond of music. Musical strains, well 
rendered, had a way of evoking pictures in her mind. She sometimes liked to sit in 
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the room of mornings when Mme. Ratignolle played or practiced. One piece 
which that lady played Edna had entitled “Solitude.” It was a sort, plaintive, 
minor strain. The name of the piece was something else, but she called it 
“Solitude.” When she heard it there came before her imagination the figure of a 
man standing beside a desolate rock on the seashore. He was naked. His attitude 
was one of hopeless resignation as he looked toward a distant bird winging its 
flight away from him. Another piece called to her mind a dainty young woman 
clad in an Empire gown, taking mincing dancing steps as she came down along an 
avenue between tall hedges. Again, another reminded her of children at play, and 
still another of nothing on earth but a demure lady stroking a cat. [44] 
 
Edna’s synesthesia marks her as an exceptional listener, but this perceptive faculty also 
seems to signal her capacity to hear a musical “truth” that, though uniquely hers in its 
force and clarity, is nevertheless heard dimly by the other audience members. Rather than 
seeing the familiar pictures that accompany music, Edna experiences “the very passions 
[of hope, of longing, or of despair] themselves” rather than their representative pictures. 
Yet despite what seems like an endorsement of the greater truth or accuracy of Edna’s 
experience of the “passions themselves” over and above the production of synesthetic 
images, the narrator employs a synesthetic metaphor to explain the effect that the music 
has on Edna, musing that this evening was “perhaps the first time her being was tempered 
to take an impress of the abiding truth.” Both the terms “temper” and “impression” as 
metaphoric descriptions of the effect the music has on Edna’s “being” evoke both visual 
and aural media. Photographic plates take impressions; but so do the wax cylinders of a 
phonograph; in a similar way, either a metal substance or a musical instrument can be 
“tempered.” Edna’s experience of “the passions themselves” may be superior to her 
visual experience of seeing musically inspired images, but the narrator’s synesthetic 
metaphor insists on a concretization of her experience, one in which each of her doubly 
tempered senses guarantee the reality of the other’s impressions. And indeed, Edna’s 
body does become a site that represents the “true” meaning of Mme. Reisz’s playing. 
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Rather than a viewer of representative images, Edna herself becomes a visible register of 
the music’s intensity:   
She saw no pictures of solitude, of hope, of longing, or of despair. But the very 
passions themselves were aroused within her soul, swaying it, lashing it, as the 
waves daily beat upon her splendid body. She trembled, she was choking, and the 
tears blinded her. [45] 
 
Mme. Reisz “perceived her agitation and even her tears,” and takes this bodily response 
as proof that Edna is “the only one worth playing for.” Yet the narrator insists that this is 
not so, and proceeds to quote several appreciative exclamations from the audience, one of 
which is a metaphor that precisely describes Edna’s bodily response, the claim that “it 
shakes a man!”  This correspondence between the actual appearance of Edna’s body and 
the audience member’s metaphoric exclamation attaches another sort of accuracy to 
Edna’s sensing body, one that exists not only for Edna and Mme. Reisz, but also for the 
larger shared space of the audience.  
 Edna’s bodily response in this scene is a register of a unique sort of truth, and the 
narrator makes it clear that such a register can only be that of a brute. The narrator’s other 
metaphoric concretization of “the passions themselves” as the waves of the sea evokes 
not just the churning waters of the Gulf, but also the captive brute, one who is regularly 
“lashed” and “beat upon.” In addition, the most cerebral—i.e., the least brutish—of 
Edna’s sensory and expressive faculties144—her sight and her voice—are suppressed 
throughout the scene. Edna is blind in that she fails to see the pictures that she is 
accustomed to seeing; she is also blinded by tears by the end of Mme. Reisz’s 
                                                 
144 Historical perceptions of the hierarchy of sensation and perception have long insisted on the elevation of 
sight above the supposedly “lower” faculties of touch, taste and smell. Hearing’s rank in this hierarchy, 
however, has been much debated. The exalted role of music in The Awakening illustrates a concept of 
hearing as a faculty that brought one closer to the truth of experience than any other, one that elevated the 
abstract nature of music over and above the concrete reality of visual data.  
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performance. The narrator also suppresses Edna’s speech by never quoting her directly, 
even when doing so seems expected:  
“Would you like to hear Mademoiselle Reisz play?” asked Robert, coming out on 
the porch where she was. Of course Edna would like to hear Mademoiselle Reisz 
play; but she feared it would be useless to entreat her.  
“I’ll ask her, he said. “I’ll tell her that you want to hear her. She likes you. She 
will come.” [43]  
 
The narrator’s quotation of the question that Robert poses to Edna suggests that her 
response, too, will be quoted—but instead, the narrator paraphrases Edna’s response. 
Edna’s silence is here enforced by the narrator, but after listening to Mme. Reisz’s 
performance, it is the music itself that renders her “unable to answer” Mme. Reisz’s 
query about her enjoyment of the music. Edna’s speechlessness is the sign of a 
brutishness that initially functions primarily as a means of distinguishing her from the 
speaking, articulate narrator; however, by the end of the scene, Edna’s mute yet distinctly 
embodied responses to Mme. Reisz’s music mark Edna as the most “accurate” narrator of 
this particular scene. Edna’s visible appreciation of Mme. Reisz’s music speaks for the 
entire audience, showing the novel’s fantasy of creative greatness on her body more 
effectively than any narrator could tell it.  
 
Conclusion 
 Whether Edna Pontellier’s suicide makes her a feminist hero, a hapless victim of 
social forces, or simply a fool is a question that continues to occupy readers of The 
Awakening. Edna may be one—or all, or some—of these things. The narrator refuses to 
decide, insisting instead on a representation that mirrors Edna’s subjective, embodied 
experience rather than one that interprets or judges her motives. Edna’s final musings 
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suggest that her suicide is at least partly a surrender to the belief that no one will ever 
understand her—a belief that both the power and the limitations of Edna’s body ensures 
will come true. Robert, she reflects, “did not know; he did not understand. Perhaps 
Doctor Mandelet would have understood if she had seen him—but it was too late; the 
shore was far behind her, and her strength was gone.” The question of whether or not 
Doctor Mandelet could have understood the fullness of Edna’s “awakening” becomes 
pointless in the face of a suicide whose certainty is guaranteed by both the strength and 
the weakness of her body: Edna marshals the strength to swim far enough away from 
shore to ensure that she will be too weak to swim back, even if she wanted to.  
 The narrator’s final descriptive gestures in this scene suggest that she, too, is 
enacting a particular kind of surrender, one that, like Edna’s, is motivated by doubts 
about how deeply her story can really be understood. And, like Edna’s surrender of what 
might be an as-yet-to-emerge wish to survive to the certainty of her body’s limitations, 
the narrator’s representation of Edna’s final moments subsumes any kind of rational 
desire to interpret or understand the meaning of Edna’s death to the stubborn 
unknowability of her bodily sensations and perceptions. Edna’s suicide is an enactment 
of the synesthetic vision of “solitude” evoked by Adele’s rendition of an otherwise 
nameless piece of music on the piano: like the naked man in her vision, Edna “was there 
beside the sea, absolutely alone…she stood naked in the open air.” She then walks into 
the sea and swims too far to return, and in doing so, claims an experience that truly is 
unknowable by anyone else. The dead, of course, can never describe what it’s like to die: 
more so than any other, the sensation of death resists the kind of “accurate” description 
privileged by a realist aesthetic. The narrator’s final statements represent Edna’s death in 
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a way that accepts its resistance to meaning, focusing on the sensory details of memory 
that occupy Edna as she drowns:  
Edna heard her father’s voice and her sister Margaret’s. She heard the barking of 
an old dog that was chained to the sycamore tree. The spurs of the cavalry officer 
clanged as he walked across the porch. There was the hum of bees, and the musky 
odor of pinks filled the air. [137]  
 
The narrator begins by describing what Edna hears with an objectivity that maintains 
some distance between the narrator and Edna—a space that might allow for some 
interpretation of what Edna’s death means. However, in the final two sentences, the 
narrator’s free indirect discourse suggests that the only reality is the reality of what Edna 
hears, smells and sees. The hum of bees is not just the product of Edna’s subjective aural 
perception, they are simply what “was” making noise; in a similar way, the musky floral 
odor is not what Edna smells, it is what “filled the air.” The narrator claims an intimacy 
with Edna, surrendering her narrative distance to a belief that what it means to die cannot 
be penetrated by an observer’s insight or a narrator’s skill: it can only ever mean what it 
looks, sounds, smells or tastes like to a particular individual.  
 The narrator’s experience of sounds at this moment is far closer to Edna’s 
synesthetic visions of dancing ladies and playing children than it is to her overwhelming 
experience of “the passions themselves” in response to Mme. Reisz’s playing: assuming 
Edna’s sensory “point of view” suggests that the meaning of Edna’s death is as difficult 
to penetrate as the puzzle of the synesthete’s arbitrary associations of one sense 
impression with another. For all the narrator’s fascination with the potential of sound to 
bring forth a representation that exceeds even the ideal of synesthetic response—one that 
is hardly representation at all, but the pure expression of “the passions themselves”—in 
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the final moment, the narrator’s sensory intimacy with Edna brings forth a representation 
that reflects the concrete sounds, sights and smells that are unique to Edna’s memory. 
The narrator’s reflection of Edna’s final memories contains one last reference to 
synesthesia, but it is one that evokes the possibility of synesthesia without claiming it 
directly. The phrase “musky odor of pinks” refers to a flower called a “pink;” read 
differently, however, the phrase looks and sounds like a description of a synesthete’s 
impression of what various shades of pink might smell like. The narrator’s final 
evocation of synesthesia is a reminder of the ultimate unknowability of experience: the 
smell that fills the air could be a familiar one of flowers that many readers would 
recognize, but it could also be the scent of a color—a scent that only exists for a single 
individual.  
 The narrator’s references to sound and synesthesia in the final scene refuse to 
make the kind of sense out of Edna’s death that would elide the subjective and ultimately 
unknowable reality of Edna’s bodily sensations. Evoking another of the novel’s 
previously deployed metaphors—that of the bird with the broken wing—ensures that an 
explicitly literary sense cannot easily be made out of Edna’s final moments, either. As 
Edna stands on the beach, the narrator describes “a bird with a broken wing…beating the 
air above, reeling, fluttering, circling disabled down, down to the water,” an image that is 
a precise illustration of Mme. Reisz’s gesture of feeling Edna’s shoulder blades  
…to see if my wings were strong, she said. ‘The bird that would soar above the 
level plain of tradition and prejudice must have strong wings. It is a sad spectacle 
to see the weaklings bruised, exhausted, fluttering back to earth. [103] 
 
The appearance of a bird just before Edna’s death that is so much like the imagined 
weaklings that Mme. Reisz evokes seems blatantly symbolic, an obvious indication of 
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exactly what Edna’s suicide means: she is weak, unable to “soar above the level plain of 
tradition and prejudice” that defines her place in the world. Yet the narrator also makes it 
difficult to determine whether or not the circling bird on the Grand Isle beach really 
exists. In the sentence just before the description of the bird, the narrator states that “all 
along the white beach, up and down, there was no living thing in sight.” These 
contradictory descriptions emphasize the instability of any literary representation: the 
bird might exist only in Edna’s imagination, or the narrator’s, or maybe it is perceptible 
by other characters in the novel. Insisting on these multiple possibilities frustrates any 
interpretation of Edna’s suicide that would find support in a physical environment that 
seems to both signal the inevitability of her death and to offer the reader an easy answer 
to the question of what Edna’s suicide means.
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Epilogue 
 In The Awakening’s final descriptive moments, the narrator’s dubious perceptions 
of the physical world that surrounds Edna Pontellier at the moment of her death produce 
a narrative instability that stubbornly resists any reader’s attempt to fully know what 
“really” happens to Edna. I would like to use these final moments in the life of a 
character who I have identified as a unique sort of naturalist brute to reflect on how and 
why literary naturalism functions as an interpretive framework for this project. Certainly, 
the fact that The Awakening’s final moments of narrative instability derive from 
descriptions of both an untamed natural environment and the death of a protagonist who 
has been persistently troubled by “fate” seems like a deliberate affront to the genre’s 
well-known commitments and assumptions. In so many naturalist novels, it is, after all, 
the powerful, arbitrary forces of the natural world that symbolize the grim certainty and 
inescapable fated-ness to which so many of the genre’s best-known character succumb. 
Yet in The Awakening, the environmental details are among the narrator’s most profound 
expressions of uncertainty; furthermore, the narrator’s sensory intimacy with Edna just 
before her death suggests that even the most “naturalistic” of endings—i.e., the death of a 
protagonist at the hands of a merciless environment—cannot be truly known through any 
means other than a passive registry of the dying individual’s unique sensory experience. 
Even the nature of Edna’s suicide is a pointed challenge to naturalism’s insistence on the 
helplessness of human beings in the face of all-powerful environments: Edna may die 
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because she succumbs to the force of the sea, but it is the strength of her own body and 
will that take her far enough to ensure her own death.  
 The ending of The Awakening is only one of many features that mark the novel as 
a challenge to naturalism’s defining ideas and assumptions. The same could also be said 
about What Maisie Knew: the novel’s intense and subjective narrative focus on the 
evolving, private psychology of a subject who shrewdly learns to understand and shape 
her own social environment hardly evokes the kind of helpless confrontation between 
human being and environment associated with the naturalist novel. My intent, however, 
has not been to argue for the inclusion of either Chopin’s or James’s novel in 
naturalism’s canon: I am far more interested in investigating whether and how certain 
ideas associated with naturalism speak to and against the social and perceptual changes 
wrought by the late nineteenth century’s evolving visual technologies. Foremost among 
these ideas has been the trope of the brute.  
 The significance of Edna’s body in The Awakening’s final scene indicates much 
about what naturalism’s trope of the doomed, inarticulate—and above all, the 
embodied—brute expresses about the relationships between visual technologies, 
perception and knowledge at the end of the nineteenth century. Edna’s bodily strengths 
and limitations ultimately guarantee the “truth” of her suicide, in more ways than one: her 
bodily exhaustion ensures that she really will die, and the narrator’s assumption of Edna’s 
sensory point of view suggests that her bodily experience represents a sort of truth that 
resides most powerfully in the material world of bodies and things. This preoccupation 
with a new sort of truth associated with the material is one that marks both the texts and 
the novel practices of visual representation and entertainment that I have considered in 
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this project. At the turn of the nineteenth century, the photograph’s identity as a material 
object that was ever more obtainable, usable and transportable exerted a compelling 
influence on how many Americans came to understand both themselves and others; and 
the emergence of early film as an entertainment that frankly sought to engage the body at 
least as much as the mind emphasized the material and the embodied as standards of 
accuracy, truth and pleasure.  
 Naturalism’s topos of the brute is nothing if not a testament to the power of 
material, physical forces, whether they be biological or environmental, and the brute’s 
peculiar inarticulateness represents both the threat and the promise represented by 
emerging visual technologies. I say “peculiar” because, as I have tried to show, the 
brute’s inarticulateness is hardly as uncomplicated or naïve—whether expressed as 
Maisie’s wordless, involuntary spasm as she realizes the impossibility of a life with Sir 
Claude; or Edna Pontellier’s deathbed fantasies of smell and sound—as we might expect. 
The final moments of both Maisie and Edna are troubled by a certain failure to speak. But 
even so, the narrators who tell their stories attempt to appropriate these embodied modes 
of expression—gestures that endorse a truth that is both observable and subjective; 
perceptible and unknowable; one that exists quite apart from the kind of objective 
cataloguing of detail, or cause and effect, that occupies most narrators of realistic fiction. 
Foregrounding the idea of the brute as a kind of perceptual apparatus, one whose 
privileged point of view both challenges and competes with that of a supposedly more 
articulate narrator, enacts the same dilemmas of show and tell that were introduced by the 
late nineteenth century’s newly affordable, vivid and ubiquitous visual technologies and 
entertainments. Documentary photography, the emergence of the Kodak, and sensational 
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cinema made it impossible to ignore one’s own body, whether as a cumbersome 
limitation on the kind of experiences that could be meaningfully seen or understood, or as 
a uniquely accurate register of experience that seemed able to sense and tell a certain sort 
of undeniable truth. Fictional characters who are at once highly sensitive and seemingly 
inarticulate are illuminating reflections of the tensions and contradictions suggested by 
these varied perspectives on embodiment, observation and experience. The novels that 
are most often identified as part of the naturalist canon are full of such characters. 
However, as my final two chapters in particular suggest, naturalism’s brutes see and tell 
well beyond the boundaries of their habitual genre: far more than just the victims of fate, 
“naturalism’s” brutes are indices of the broader and more pervasive tension between 
sensing and making sense of the modern world. 
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